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Distributed Transient Networks (DTNs) are the type of network that is in-
herently decentralised by nature, and mainly consists of equally-privileged
client users who are able to join in and leave the network at any time. Users
are evenly assigned with the same computation tasks, such as routing mes-
sages and manage topological information, without bias. Typical examples
of DTN include Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Networks, Delay Tolerant Networks, Ve-
hicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) and many others. Depending on how
they use network infrastructure, we divide DTN applications into three cat-
egories, which are Infrastructure-based DTN, Infrastructure-less DTN, and
Hybrid DTN. However, there are some peer communication latency issues
in any type of DTN. In this thesis, our overall aim is to improve the relia-
bility of DTNs, which is degraded by long communication latency, from the
perspectives of augmenting the performance of fundamental routing and
the security of DTN devices.
This thesis rstly enhances the routing performance of high latency DTNs
by proposing a novel probabilistic routing protocol for DTNs, namely,
FGAR. It characterises the contact patterns among peers in a ne-grained
memory-ecient manner, and thus gains the ability to produce a exible
future contact prediction, based on the history within specied timeframes.
In addition, a dynamic message replication scheme is also built on the above
probabilistic estimation as part of the FGAR protocol, which intelligently
eliminates much of the unnecessary message copy generation, without in-
troducing too much computational complexity. Through the trace-driven
simulations, FGAR reduces network overhead up to 15 times, and improves
the message delivery ratio more than 20% compared to several popular ex-
isting routing protocols of DTNs.
iii
Blockchain technology, the distributed ledger and the fundamental security
scheme of bitcoin, provides a secure decentralised environment among un-
trusted users by maintaining an immutable global consensus contributed to
by any user that chooses to participate. In this thesis, we investigate the
impact of network latency on the safety of bitcoin blockchain, which is pri-
marily evaluated in terms of the time spent on block convergence, and the
possibility of violating the six conrmations convention. The conducted
simulation shows that with a longer communication latency, blockchain
suers an exponential delay on the convergence speed and more revoked
blocks. In addition, peers with lower latency gain unfair advantages in
competing for the PoW reward, as they have a higher chance of obtaining
the reward by contributing to the blockchain compared to the group of
users with high-latency connections to the network.
Avalanche is a lightweight decentralised consensus protocol that focuses on
guiding the entire network towards a global agreement for each conicting
event. We explore the impact of network latency on the safety of Avalanche
within three dierent network environments. Firstly, nodes have various de-
grees of communication latency. Secondly, the network is divided into two
communities, with a precisely controlled inter-communication frequency be-
tween them. Lastly, the communication among nodes is achieved via a pure
hop-by-hop manner. The simulated results illustrate that Avalanche has an
outstanding capability for operating correctly even with high communica-
tion latency. However, Avalanche becomes more fragile when opinions are
passed from one network partition to another, so network topology may
be an important consideration. Additionally, we also propose a general
mathematical relation between the security strength of Avalanche with the
number of transmission hops taken to deliver a message. Our mathemati-
cal analysis reveals that the security strength of Avalanche is exponentially
weakened with more intermediate nodes involved in relaying the consensus
queries. Accordingly, our mathematical analysis is well supported by the
reported statistics from the simulations. Our key ndings indicate that
communication latency, nodes' reachability and multi-hop communication
are the major factors that signicantly impact the security strength of de-
centralised consensus. The ndings provide us with an important direction
to design a new decentralised consensus for DTNs in future work.
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In this thesis, our contributions mainly concentrate on the eld of Distributed Tran-
sient Networks (DTN) (P2P Foundation Wiki (2007)), which is the kind of network
that usually consists of client users, who are self-managed in a fully decentralised man-
ner without any central management from trusted third authorities. Users in DTNs are
equally privileged and participate in the same computation tasks. The communication
between users is usually carried out via a peer-to-peer (P2P) approach, that is, peers
directly communicate with each other, and cooperatively provide crucial knowledge
among themselves when requested for the purpose of achieving particular functionali-
ties. The knowledge can be highly customised, depending on the requirements of DTN
applications. DTNs exist with a wide range of communication latencies. The commu-
nication delay is commonly caused by users utilising heterogeneous physical network
infrastructures as well as communication protocols. The latency issue can be more se-
vere when the peers' communication loses the backing from the network infrastructure.
The interruption of communication between users could lead to a serious degradation
to the fundamental routing performance, and thus to the functioning of applications,
if a global and consistent network connectivity is an essential requirement for such
applications.
In this thesis, our contributions focus on enhancing the reliability of DTN, from
the perspective of eliminating the impact of the high communication latency. Speci-
cally, this thesis explores the impact of P2P communication latency on the routing and
security protocols. Meanwhile, the corresponding solutions or analyses are presented
accordingly. Based on the availability of physical network infrastructure, this chapter
starts with introducing three major categories of DTNs, which are infrastructure-based,
infrastructure-less, and hybrid DTN. Additionally, the existing applications to each cat-
1
egory are introduced. Furthermore, routing in infrastructure-based and infrastructure-
less DTNs is introduced in detail. Then, the latency and security issues for all kinds of
DTNs are discussed, as the core motivation behind our research contributions. Lastly,
the structure of this thesis is described.
1.1 Communication in DTNs
With the heterogeneous availability of the physical network infrastructure in dierent
DTN environments, the ways that peers communicate with each other within these
networks are various. Some DTN applications rely on the existing network infrastruc-
ture to gain persistent connectivities among peers. However, there are still some DTN
applications which do not have such access to the network infrastructure. The commu-
nication in this kind of network is usually achieved by devices directly sending data to
each other using their own built-in radios. In order to have a reliable communication,
a stable continuous hop-by-hop connectivity over a certain area is needed. Thus, some
infrastructure-less DTN applications adopt immobilised devices with their locations
pre-planned, to provide a better intermediate connectivity for others within the area.
With the absence of a planned deployment of devices and scheduled connectivity, those
DTN applications often have a longer communication delay. Based on the availability
of the network infrastructure and the way of nodes' communication, we categorise the
existing DTN applications into three signicant categories: infrastructure-based DTN,
infrastructure-less DTN, and hybrid DTN. Due to dierent extents of the stability of
connectivity, these networks come with their respective strengths and weaknesses. The
following sections introduce the network architecture, the communication approach,
and the existing applications for each type of DTN.
1.1.1 Infrastructure-based DTNs
Figure 1.1 shows an example of infrastructure-based DTN. The infrastructure-based
DTN can be composed of the Internet, cellular network, and many other already es-
tablished networks. All the hierarchical routing components are physically connected,
as well as to the end devices. A full-time end-to-end communication can be acquired
by the establishment of network infrastructures, and devices can route their packets
through the Internet topology. To achieve a decentralised management among users,






Figure 1.1: An example of infrastructure-based DTN.
application layer. The overlay layer can be used for nodes indexing and peer discovery.
Contents are directly exchanged via the underlying Internet Protocol (IP) networks.
Infrastructure-based DTNs have outstanding communication eciency, fault toler-
ance, system stability, and high computation capability. With always-available connec-
tivity between users, the routing topology can be pre-managed before sending message
packets out, and thus a stable and secured routing path is guaranteed. Infrastructure-
based DTNs also gain the exibility of having various kinds of computing devices. The
devices can be either high complexity immobilised computing devices, such as desktop
PCs, smart TVs, servers and workstations, or lightweight mobile devices, such as lap-
tops, tablets, and cell phones, or the combination of any of the above devices. Because
of the high capability of computational complexity and stable connectivity, mature
security schemes can be directly launched onto the devices, such as asymmetric en-
cryption schemes. The guaranteed performance of both routing and security together
ensure a long term stability and safety for the infrastructure-based DTN applications.
Nevertheless, the establishment of the network infrastructure is usually extremely
expensive. For example, the 5G network is in the process of being rolled out on a large
scale. Updating to the 5G network is a heavy workload and requires a lot of funding
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to replace the outdated facilities and equip the new base stations. Some places such as
rural villages and remote areas or even natural reserves, are not viable or are unable
to establish such expensive infrastructure due to a poor natural environment. Besides,
most of the DTN applications are designed based on well connectivity network-wide.
With a xed range of network infrastructure coverage, the mobility range of devices
is highly constrained. The connectivity is signicantly worsened or even disrupted,
when devices are beyond the infrastructure coverage. Thus, these devices are unable
to access any service from the infrastructure-based DTN applications.
Numerous existing infrastructure-based DTN applications are running well nowa-
days. One of the most popular applications is le sharing (such as Gnutella, Nap-
ster, and BitTorrent). Video and voice streaming are also sophisticated applications
that are widely used, such as P2PTV and Skype. In addition, by taking advantage
of clearly targeted information retrieval from the distributed le sharing technology,
such decentralised P2P technology can also be adopted for search engines (Bender,
Michel, Triantallou, Weikum, and Zimmer (2005), Kubek and Unger (2018)). The
P2P paradigm of search engine gains the advantage of dealing with a massive amount
of data in a distributed and self-organising fashion. An equilibrium of distributing
the computation tasks in a large number of peers can be attained by assigning the
users equal privilege and functionality. These advantages give the P2P search engine
powerful capabilities in scalability, eciency, and resilience to failures and dynamics.
With the establishment of network infrastructure along with the use of high complexity
computing devices, some computational expensive decentralised P2P tasks can be done
in infrastructure-based DTNs. For example, blockchain is the underlying protection
scheme and distributed ledger of bitcoin and many other cryptocurrencies. The origi-
nal bitcoin blockchain provides transparency as well as immutability of the transaction
histories to the public. These two critical features of blockchain are guaranteed by
blockchain miners having not only a fast and stable Internet connectivity to align their
blockchain to the most up-to-date one as soon as possible, but also a high computa-
tional capability hardware for the purpose of contributing to the blockchain via solving
a very computational task, namely, Proof-of-Work (PoW) mining.
1.1.2 Infrastructure-less DTNs
Figure 1.2 indicates the communication between devices within an infrastructure-less
DTN. As shown in the gure, the infrastructure-less DTN is composed of only the end





Figure 1.2: An example of infrastructure-less DTN.
chical routing component. The communication in such a network is usually achieved via
devices' built-in signal, such as Bluetooth and Wi-Fi. The signal transmission range is
limited between two devices in use when such direct peer communication occurs. Since
the contemporaneous end-to-end path may be unavailable at all times, routing in such
networks has to be done in a hop-by-hop manner. Nodes need to cooperatively forward
message packets to one after another, until the packet reaches its specied destination.
For a broad area coverage of persistent connectivity, some applications intentionally
leverage immobilised devices deployed at pre-planned geographical locations, with a
xed distance gap between two neighbour devices to guarantee a stable continuous hop-
by-hop connectivity within the application coverage. For example, Chebrolu, Raman,
Mishra, Valiveti, and Kumar (2008) demonstrated that leveraging battery-operated
wireless sensors for a long-term railway bridge health monitoring, and report where
the maintenance operation is needed on the bridge. The status of a bridge is gathered
and transmitted to the central stations via a collaboration between the sensors that are
equipped on both the bridges and moving trains. In contrast, pre-managing devices'
location for many infrastructure-less DTN can be impossible because the devices could
be carried by uncontrolled moving objects, and it is unfeasible to deploy immobilised
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devices in advance. This enforces devices to store-carry-forward message packets for
delivering to others, as they may need to wait for the next proper message forwarder.
For this reason, it is essential to employ a long-term storage at the intermediate nodes.
Hence, communication disruption and unpredictable mobilities and behaviours of nodes
are the common appearances within infrastructure-less DTNs.
Although device-to-device communication makes data exchange possible when net-
work infrastructure is inaccessible, such a short-range communication approach re-
sults in two major limitations of the infrastructure-less DTNs. Firstly, some of the
infrastructure-less DTN applications are designed to meet the only criteria of complet-
ing simple computation tasks, and thus cheap hardware devices are the only facilities
required. The cheap devices often have limited resources for computation skills, mem-
ory storage, and power endurance. Thus, some advanced high complexity routing and
security schemes might not be able to be executed by these resource-constrained de-
vices. Some researchers (Menesidou, Katos, and Kambourakis (2017)) stated that the
deployment of strong complexity public-key cryptography schemes on the cheap de-
vices is infeasible. Because of this, insucient defence to the attackers can be a severe
concern of securely running DTN applications. Secondly, a high communication la-
tency caused by bad connectivity quality and low data throughput between users can
be another considerable drawback of infrastructure-less DTNs. Even though persistent
connectivity can be guaranteed when devices are deliberately deployed with planned
locations, the data throughput of wireless signals is much lower than optical bre.
Thus, large volume data transmission is not suitable for such a network environment.
More importantly, the DTN devices with a high mobility could bring more interruption
to peers' communication, as they may be able to move outside the contact range of
each other. This requires the design of software and procedures for infrastructure-less
DTNs to be lightweight and with a good tolerance for high communication latency.
Some infrastructure-less DTN applications are successfully running today. The
communication between the devices can only be carried out via their built-in signals.
Those applications usually aim to achieve collaborative works among network partici-
pants themselves over a certain area. For example, Apple AirDrop is a technology for
le sharing among Apple products, such as Macbook and iPad, through the devices'
built-in signal, rather than using the Internet. The household intelligent appliances of
Smarthome (Ashrafuzzaman and Fapojuwo (2015)) utilise the IEEE 802.15.4 standard
low rate wireless signal to exchange information among themselves within a house. The









Figure 1.3: An example of hybrid infrastructure DTN.
and Yu (2018)) can only communicate with each other through self-originated signals.
The scheduled trajectories of satellites are usually leveraged as the vital support to the
routing protocols to manage an extreme long-distance data transmission to the deep
space.
1.1.3 Hybrid DTNs
Of course, there is a hybrid type of network that combines the infrastructure-based
DTN and infrastructure-less DTN, as indicated in Figure 1.3. The communication
between devices is achievable through both the existing Internet infrastructure and
the direct wireless signal transmission. The hybrid infrastructure DTN does not have
a unied set of routing or security protocols that can be utilised in both areas. The
protocols for these two kinds of networks are isolated and independent from each other.
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Thus, each user needs to have a smooth shifting process to switch protocols when it
moves from one network to another.
The hybrid infrastructure DTN has the advantages of both the infrastructure-based
and infrastructure-less DTN. With the mixed-use of the devices in these two net-
works, hybrid infrastructure DTNs are capable of both computationally expensive and
lightweight collaborative tasks, and covering a large geographical area is not problem-
atic. More than this, the cooperation between the devices from these two networks
brings new potential to develop new concepts of large scale intelligent applications.
Typical examples for the applications of hybrid infrastructure DTN include, but are
not limited to, Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANETs), Internet-of-Things (IoT), and
cellular data ooading. VANET (Karagiannis, Altintas, Ekici, Heijenk, Jarupan, Lin,
and Weil (2011)) is a perfect example of demonstrating the cooperation between a
variety of devices within hybrid DTNs. Smart vehicles are equipped with multiple
on-board sensors to collect internal and external data of themselves. The sole use of
the data from an individual vehicle can carry out many useful functionalities, such as
real-time car status monitoring, autopilot, autonomous parking etc. In addition, the
collaboration between the on-board sensors of vehicles and base stations could perform
a wide area of intelligent applications, known as an Intelligent Transportation System
(ITS). The short-range communication between vehicles only can eectively avoid road
accidents, via labelling all the cars nearby to potentially prevent some of the vehicles
from the blind spot of a driver's visual eld. By cooperating with the central server
together, a safe and large area of smart trac management can be accomplished, such
as smart navigation, smart parking, and intelligent trac light control with the aware-
ness of trac ow. Many other hybrid DTN applications are also designed based on a
large area of collaborative work among the central management entities and client-end
computing devices, in order to achieve dierent intelligent functionalities.
1.2 Routing in DTNs
For the purpose of correctly delivering messages to specied destinations in a fully de-
centralised manner, most DTNs have their users uniquely and precisely indexed, and
the topological information is locally maintained by nodes themselves. With the estab-
lishment of fundamental topological information and routing mechanisms, the upper
level P2P-based functionalities and applications can be built on top of this, such as
eective computation task dissemination, resource storing and retrieving mechanisms.
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Based on the approaches of peer indexing and managing topological information, rout-
ing topology for P2P communication can be majorly classied into the two categories
below:
1. Structured network topology: the overlay network topology is tightly as-
signed and controlled for all users. The content is placed at specied locations to
eciently process subsequent queries. Such structured P2P systems use the Dis-
tributed Hash Table (DHT) as the topological information storage. Each node
ID is deterministically assigned since the node joins the network by following
the principle, which is to some extent related to the physical location or neigh-
bourhood. There are several well known structured P2P overlay networks, such
as Content Addressable Network (CAN) (Ratnasamy, Francis, Handley, Karp,
and Shenker (2001)), Tapestry (Hildrum, Kubiatowicz, Rao, and Zhao (2002)),
Chord (Stoica, Morris, Karger, Kaashoek, and Balakrishnan (2001)) and Pastry
(Rowstron and Druschel (2001)).
2. Unstructured network topology: in contrast to structured topology, nodes'
topological information is loosely controlled in this approach. Unstructured net-
work topology gains more exibility in designing the data structure for topological
information storage, so that it can be highly customised for the purpose of sat-
isfying dierent requirements for particular network conditions. However, the
self-customisation feature makes the unstructured topology-based P2P systems
impossible to be designed and developed under a unied platform.
1.2.1 Routing in Infrastructure-based DTNs
Due to stability and communication eciency, most of the infrastructure-based DTN
applications leverage structured network topology to manage the message routing. Nodes
using DHT need to maintain a routing table which contains only a xed number of
other node IDs as the access entries to them. Each node is only required to be re-
sponsible for message forwarding to the nodes within its routing table, rather than
maintaining a full copy of global addresses. The next forwarder selection is almost the
same for various DHT solutions. This is often done by picking up the node with the
closest numerical distance to the destination, based on the simple comparisons between
their IP addresses within the self-maintained DHT.
Aside from maintaining topological information, message routing can also be pre-
managed via discovering real-time topology by sending an immediate query message
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to the destination beforehand. Such an approach does not require nodes to maintain
any routing information, but a full time stable connectivity and more peers' commu-
nication is desired due to the need for instant report of topology availability. The
message routing for infrastructure-based DTNs is usually done in either a proactive
or reactive approach. In proactive routing, routes are pre-computed in accordance
with the maintained sub-graphs for the currently connected nodes from the overall
DTN topology graph. OLSR (Optimised Link-State Routing) (Jacquet, Muhlethaler,
Clausen, Laouiti, Qayyum, and Viennot (2001)) is one of the famous protocols of this
style. OLSR exploits network topologies via nodes selecting a set of Multipoint Relays
(MPR) from its 1-hop symmetric link neighbours. The nodes in MPR are respon-
sible for managing forwarding trac and propagating control messages to nd the
shortest routing path to all destinations. In reactive routing, routes are discovered
on-demand when an unknown destination is detected. Ad hoc On-Demand Vector
(AODV) (Perkins, Belding-Royer, and Das (2003)) is a typical reactive routing. To
learn about the connectivities of surrounding users, a node using AODV periodically
propagates advertisement packets namely Route Requests (RREQs) through the entire
ad hoc network. The nodes who receive RREQ, will reply with another Route Reply
(RREP) packet to indicate the activeness of themselves. AODV is only utilised to
establish and update new topologies, but it does not play any role in using the already
constructed reliable end-to-end paths when sending packets.
1.2.2 Routing in Infrastructure-less DTNs
The routing protocols for infrastructure-less DTN often manage the topological infor-
mation in an unstructured manner for the purpose of overcoming the issues caused
by long communication latency by nature. Cheap hardware with low computation
capability and long delay in peers' communication are the two major limitations in
typical infrastructure-less DTNs, and many other subsequent incapabilities are derived
from this, which makes structured network topology unsuitable for such DTNs. The
structured topology usually requires an immediate global update to the address entry
changing on the routing table, which could be a signicant barrier for infrastructure-
less DTN due to the absence of stable connectivity between users. Using DHT as an
example, since most of the DTN applications allow nodes to be permission-less, i.e., a
node could join in and leave the network at any time, its reserved address needs to be
either assigned or released as soon as its joining or leaving occurs. Peers' communica-
tion latency could more or less postpone the detection of nodes accessing behaviours
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as well as the management of nodes' addresses. Thus, numerous eorts need to be
made on the design of a high communication latency tolerance feature for the purpose
of tting DHT solutions to the infrastructure-less DTNs, especially from the perspec-
tives of keys' and addresses' assignment, management and revocation. Furthermore,
structured topology is also not a proper option for routing in infrastructure-less DTNs.
The routing path that is managed in a structured network topology approach is highly
deterministic, i.e., there is only one certain routing path. Exploiting only a single
path for message delivery is not recommended in infrastructure-less DTNs because the
seem-to-be proper message relays along the routing path might not be reachable. Such
deterministic routing might lead to a long waiting time to encounter the pre-selected
message forwarders. In the worst scenario, this could last forever due to the disconnec-
tion of nodes. The unstructured network topology addresses the above issues well, by
utilising a more exible data structure and customised topological information. The
ability to exploit multiple opportunistic routing paths increases the chance of delivering
packets in the dynamic infrastructure-less DTN environment.
As indicated above, infrastructure-less DTNs usually suer two major limitations,
which are a long communication delay and low computation capability, whereas the
routing algorithms for such networks need to be reliable and time ecient. In such
DTNs, the surrounding environment of a node could be volatile when the neighbour
nodes are highly mobile, and thus result in the impossibility of arranging a complete
routing topology in advance. To overcome the problems caused by these limitations,
real-time and per-hop routing is a common way of managing message routing. That
is, each node has to quickly determine by itself whether the current encountering node
is a proper next forwarder for each of its holding messages. In order to augment the
reliability of such per-hop routing, selecting the next forwarder is usually done in accor-
dance with various knowledge, such as the contact regularity between pairwise nodes.
The knowledge is either provided by neighbours or summarised from history. More
correct and detailed information can vastly boost the reliability of routing decisions,
but this could also place a heavier burden on memory consumption of devices. Hence,
many researchers try to balance the trade-o between the accuracy of presenting the
contact pattern and the storage complexity of history information when designing the
infrastructure-less DTN routing protocols. In addition, routing in infrastructure-less
DTNs also needs to be aware of time eciency. Because of the high mobility of nodes,
the routing decision needs to be placed in a very short time, as the proper next for-
warder could be easily moving outside the contact range. Also, for most of the time, it
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might be dicult for nodes to nd the proper forwarders, so that a long waiting time
to encounter the forwarders is the normal case for infrastructure-less DTNs. Hence,
routing algorithms have to be capable of surviving long communication delays as well.
Besides the above limitations on making a routing decision, routing algorithms also
need to be tolerated with message failures. Messages are very likely to be lost because
of fragile connectivity, memory buer overow, and devices' disappearance caused by
joining and leaving the network, or even hardware failure. The dropped messages are
very unlikely to be recovered. For this reason, most DTN routing protocols replicate
messages and forward message copies to other nodes, rather than pass the original mes-
sage itself without backup. In summary, the routing algorithms for DTNs are required
to have low computation complexity, be time ecient, and have a good tolerance to a
long communication delay.
1.3 Network Latency in DTNs
The network latency issue exists in both the infrastructure-based and the infrastructure-
less DTNs. For the infrastructure supported DTNs, some of the applications have the
network structure consisting of a large number of dierent computing devices, which
simultaneously use dierent network infrastructure and communication protocols. Be-
cause of this, the computing devices of infrastructure-based DTNs may come with
heterogeneous latencies among them, thus having a more or less unpredictable impact
on the high level applications. The infrastructure-less DTNs usually have a much more
severe latency issue than the infrastructure-based DTNs. The high latency is generally
caused by short-range signal communication. Without the support from network infras-
tructures, the communication between devices can only be achieved via their built-in
signal. Losing the reachability to the distant nodes requires them to send messages
in a hop-by-hop manner. A relatively long waiting time for the proper next message
forwarder, along with low radio frequencies usage are the major factors that cause a
high communication latency.
The network latency issue for infrastructure-based DTNs is usually caused by the
heterogeneity of network infrastructure and communication protocols. The latency gap
between nodes could result in various levels of impact on nodes' performance or the
eciency of gaining benets under some network speed sensitive DTN applications.
For example, indoor use of the Internet could be accessed by devices which include
desktops, laptops, cellphones, tablets, and smart TVs. Desktops are connected to the
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Internet via network cables, whilst most other devices use wireless signals originating
from routers. Because of this, there are various upload and download speeds of the
facilities that compose a Smarthome network. Nodes' performance can be critically
impacted by the network latency gap within the communication delay sensitive DTN
applications. For instance, Ning, Yang, Xie, and Wu (2011) proposed an incentive-
aware data dissemination scheme, in which the more frequently nodes participate in
helping propagate data, the more incentive rewards can be obtained. The nodes who
have a faster network speed also gain a high possibility of detecting and getting involved
in such activities, and thus gain benets from contributing to the DTN applications.
Therefore, although the network speed gap issue in infrastructure-based DTNs is not
as serious as that of the infrastructure-less DTNs, it still has an unpredictable impact
on the latency sensitive DTN applications.
Infrastructure-less DTNs have a more severe latency issue than infrastructure-based
DTNs due to lower data throughput and a much more limited communication range
of devices. Devices in infrastructure-less DTNs have to leverage their built-in signal
to achieve a direct wireless communication, which has a much lower bit rate than the
optical bre. Nodes which use a lower bit rate, have to split large data into more chunks
of packets, so that gains a slightly longer latency to deliver the entire data than the
high throughput devices. Despite low data throughput, the infrastructure-less DTN
devices usually suer serious disconnection and unreachability problems between each
other due to limited signal transmission range. For instance, the high mobility devices
in Mobile Opportunistic Networks (MONs) purely use the built-in signals for message
transmission, thus their communication is often achieved via nodes opportunistically
encountering each other. In order to send a message to distant destinations, multiple
intermediate nodes need be involved to help message relaying one after another. Since
the reachability of nodes cannot be ensured all the time, nodes might have to wait
for the proper next message forwarder. The delivery of messages can be signicantly
postponed by such a long waiting. Therefore, the packet delivery latency is caused by
not only low data throughput from the use of wireless signals, but also by a long wait
for the proper oncoming message forwarder. Such communication latency issues could
become more severe with a sparse distribution of the population over a large area.
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1.4 Security Issues in DTNs
The rapid development of P2P communication technologies derives the ourishing of
DTN applications, e.g., IoT, VANET, cellular ooading etc., which produce more and
more important and invaluable data. In fact, these emerging DTN applications may
require a secured communication environment, even though DTN may suer various
resource constraints that weaken the security of the networks. For example, a post-
disaster network can only be composed by energy-cheap mobile devices to establish
the connectivity for other devices, because the existing network infrastructure might
be malfunctioned. The security of devices' communication in such an environment is
important in order to ensure the correctness of data during propagation, and thus the
latter decisions for rescue management can be precise and ecient. Another example is
VANET, which might be the future daily-use network. Automobiles are equipped with
multiple types of sensors to collect internal data of themselves. They can also obtain
external data from the surrounding contactable vehicles and facilities such as Road Side
Unit (RSU). To achieve the smart goals of VANET such as collusion avoidance and
ecient trac management, the disseminated data need to be temper-proof as well as
transparent to the vehicles, thus proper real-time decisions can be made based on those
data. Malicious attackers could mutate the information for their benet, and such a
behavior could result in the malfunction of the system and further dire consequences
to the real world, such as serious interruption to the rescue, accident of the vehicles
and so on.
From the above DTN application examples, we believe that the security of DTNs'
data needs to be sustained in two major perspectives, which are the transparency
of the data for collaborative use of devices, and the immutability of the data during
transmission. We also believe that blockchain technology, and relevant asynchronous
consensus mechanisms, can be a promising solution to satisfy the requirements of main-
taining both the transparency and the immutability of data in DTN-like environment.
Blockchain gains the advantages of the uniformity and immutability of global consen-
sus via all nodes maintaining an identical longest blockchain. The existing consensus
protocols achieve a global decentralised agreement mainly in two approaches. One is
the traditional decentralised consensus, in which nodes with all-to-all connectivities,
keep aligning their opinions to be identical within the entire network. The other is
Nakamoto's consensus (Nakamoto (2009)), which ensures not only the global unifor-
mity of bitcoin transactions, but also the immutability of all past committed transac-
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tions by using a complicated blockchain storage. Even though PKC is highly relevant
to many key roles within Nakamoto's consensus, such as authenticating the transacting
parties, and verifying the ownership of the blockchain, which might cause a risk within
high latency DTNs, Nakamoto's consensus is still worth investigating for such kind of
networks for many reasons. The most important one is Nakamoto's consensus leverage
in the form of block and chain structure that guarantees a uniform global consensus,
along with the extreme immutability of the consensus within the untrusting popula-
tion. It is still unknown to what degree the convergence of consensus, as well as the
immutability of consensus, is weakened by various extents of network latency. There-
fore, in this thesis, we focus on exploring the impact of various network environments
and the dierent extents of peers' latency on the converging behaviours of two decen-
tralised consensus protocols, which are Nakamoto's consensus (Nakamoto (2009)), and
a non-PKC consensus, namely, Avalanche (Team Rocket (2018)).
1.5 Objectives and Scope
The overall aim of this thesis is to improve the reliability of DTNs that may have
comparatively long and heterogeneous latencies among devices. This thesis presents
the study of how the various degrees of network latencies aect the fundamental level
of message routing and security perspectives of DTNs.
Our rst contribution improves the routing eciency for infrastructure-less DTNs,
which is the network that only has intermittent and short-range connectivity between
nodes. Most of the existing history-based probabilistic routing protocols leverage a
highly summarised probability value as the evidence to predict the possibility of having
future contact between peers. However, generating the probability values based on the
entire history could introduce unwanted bias from the outdated history, and such a
highly summarised value is unable to quickly adapt to the contact pattern changes.
In addition, most of the existing protocols replicate messages rather than forward
the original message to secure a high delivery rate; yet, many of them are short of
ecient and reasonable message replication control mechanisms to reduce unnecessary
consumption to network resources. To address the above concerns, we present a routing
algorithm, namely FGAR, to increase the routing eciency from these two perspectives.
The other contributions focus on analysing the feasibility of deploying blockchain-
like decentralised consensus protocols to DTNs. Blockchain initiated an insightful so-
lution for maintaining an immutable global consensus within a decentralised network
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environment. Since most of the decentralised consensus schemes are designed based
on a strong assumption of having full connectivity among users, recent publications
lack an investigation of how the convergence behaviours of decentralised consensus are
aected by various DTN environments, such as long communication latency, network
partitioning, and multi-hop message transmission. We adopt two popular decentralised
consensus schemes, bitcoin blockchain and Avalanche, into the simulated DTN envi-
ronments with the above features. The safety of these two consensus protocols is
comprehensively evaluated in this thesis.
1.6 Thesis Structure
This thesis rst presents a comprehensive overview of the routing and security mecha-
nisms of DTN. The contributions in this thesis include a novel routing protocol, namely
FGAR, which enhances the routing performance from the perspectives of eectively
characterising the contact pattern among peers, and reasonably eliminating the unnec-
essary replication of messages. Then, the feasibility of deploying two blockchain-like
decentralised consensus, which are bitcoin blockchain and Avalanche consensus, to the
high latency DTNs is investigated.
Chapter 2 provides some general background knowledge about message routing
in infrastructure-less DTNs, and then some common attacks against DTNs and the
corresponding solutions are introduced in general. Firstly, we classify DTN routing
protocols into several categories, based on the knowledge leveraged for the routing
decision. Secondly, we summarise the criterion of evaluating routing protocols and
simulation tools that have frequently been used in past contributions. This chapter
also lists some existing attacks of DTNs. Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI), the most
well-known security mechanism that is widely used in many mature networks, is pre-
sented in detail. Blockchain has attracted much attention from academic researchers,
mainly because of its more powerful security strength in comparison to PKI. Even
though blockchain is built on PKI, and both of them are not suitable to be deployed
in resource-constrained DTNs, blockchain initiates an insightful solution to provid-
ing security for decentralised networks. Therefore, it is worth investigating how the
blockchain consensus converging is aected by high communication latency. Since we
mainly investigate the feasibility of deploying two blockchain-like consensus protocols:
the original blockchain, and Avalanche consensus, to DTN environments in this thesis,
a comprehensive introduction to these two protocols is provided in this chapter as the
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preliminary to our research.
Chapter 3 introduces our rst contribution, which is a DTN routing protocol,
namely FGAR, that has two aims. Firstly, we propose an ecient contact pattern
characterisation for nodes to accurately express communication regularity as well as to
quickly adapt to the changes in the contact pattern. Secondly, an adaptive message
replication control mechanism is proposed, which greatly eliminates the unnecessary
generation of message copies. The conducted simulations show that FGAR gains an ex-
tremely low message replication overhead, while guaranteeing a relatively high message
delivery ratio compared to several other DTN routing protocols.
The rest of the thesis investigates the feasibility of applying two blockchain-related
decentralised consensus schemes to high latency DTNs. Chapter 4 evaluates the impact
of the peers' communication latency on the safety of bitcoin blockchain. To ensure
the extreme safety for bitcoin transactions, blockchain only clears a transaction when
its block is followed by at least six more conrmed blocks. We name the term six
conrmations convention to denote this feature of blockchain. The merging of multiple
blockchains leads to the revocation of the conicting blocks. The previously conrmed
transactions within these revoked blocks become unprotected back again due to the
exclusion from the longest blockchain. We dene the situation that meeting more
than six blocks revoked as the failure to reach consensus for the blockchain. The
safety of the blockchain is measured under the network environment of having various
extents of communication latency among blockchain users, in terms of the time spent
on reaching a global converged state of blockchain by the entire population, and the
number of times the system meets the violation of the six conrmation convention. The
reported simulation results illustrate that the safety of blockchain is highly sensitive to
communication latency. Also, the low latency group of nodes has unfair advantages of
gaining rewards from competing PoW mining, as more than half of the blocks on the
longest chain are contributed by them, even though the entire population has an equal
computation power.
Chapter 5 provides a similar safety evaluation for the Avalanche consensus protocol
in the delayed communication environment. Avalanche is a gossip-like consensus that
aims to reach an agreed-by-majority consensus for every single conicting transaction
event, instead of force nodes to reach a globally uniformed consensus on the transaction
data. Because Avalanche does not strictly require all users to reach a unied agreement
for conicting events, we measure the consensus's safety in terms of the number of users
standing for each side. The simulation shows that Avalanche is negligibly aected by
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peer latencies due to its eective communication mechanism. However, Avalanche is
more vulnerable when the nodes' answers converge from two network partitions. This is
because Byzantine attackers can easily mislead the decision of legitimate intermediate
nodes. More seriously, a stronger harmful impact can be caused by attackers directly
playing the role of intermediate relays, so that their false decisions could pollute the
benign partition in a more straightforward manner.
Chapter 6 quanties the impact on the safety of Avalanche under a multi-hop com-
munication network environment. To precisely manage the number of transmission
hops, the topological information is maintained using Pastry as the solution to the
Distributed Hash Table (DHT). In this contribution, we gure out a general math-
ematical dependency between the security strength of Avalanche with the maximum
number of transmission hops. Our analysis shows that the safety of Avalanche is ex-
ponentially weakened when more nodes are involved in relaying query messages. The
reported statistics from the conducted simulations well match our equations generated
from the mathematical analysis. Our key ndings demonstrate that the security of a
decentralised consensus is highly sensitive to the probability distribution of transmis-
sion hops. This contribution also provides a guideline of analysing the security strength
of other consensus protocols under the multi-hop communication environment with a
similar adversary model.
Chapter 7 summarises all the contributions in this thesis. The limitations of each
corresponding solution are also indicated. In addition, the potential improvements to
each contribution are pointed out as well in this chapter, in order to provide future




In this thesis, our contributions mainly concentrate on improving the reliability for
DTNs from the fundamental routing and security perspectives. Routing in infrastructu-
re-based DTNs is highly deterministic due to the fast and stable connectivities among
peers provided by the full-time availability of physical network infrastructure. In con-
trast, most Infrastructure-less DTNs suer more severe limitations and uncertainties
on both the hardware and software than infrastructure-based DTNs. These drawbacks
bring plenty of diculties to achieving a reliable and secured routing in infrastructure-
less DTNs. For the purpose of enhancing the reliability of infrastructure-less DTNs,
our rst contribution is all about improving the routing performance for such DTNs.
Therefore, this chapter rst presents an overview of the existing approaches of man-
aging message routing in infrastructure-less DTNs, with several typical protocols for
each approach. Since routing protocols are often highly customised for solving various
particular problems, it is impossible to evaluate their performance via a uniformed
platform, as well as deduce a certain conclusion that there is a protocol which can
always outperform others in any condition. However, there are some criteria that can
be universally used to measure the performance of routing protocols. We list the most
frequently utilised criteria and simulation tools for the evaluation of routing protocols
in infrastructure-less DTNs from others' past literature. Despite message routing, we
also study how the comparatively high latency feature challenges the security of DTNs
in this thesis. Some often-seen attacks against DTNs are mentioned in this chapter.
Blockchain technology motivates us to enhance the security for DTNs via a dierent
approach, as it ensures an extreme immutability to the protected data in a fully decen-
tralised manner. We also comprehensively investigate the feasibilities of deploying two
blockchain-like decentralised consensus mechanisms onto DTNs, which are the bitcoin
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blockchain itself, and Avalanche consensus. Therefore, these two consensus protocols
are introduced in detail in this chapter.
2.1 Routing Algorithms for Infrastructure-less DTNs
Because of the short range communication, permission-less joining, leaving the net-
work, and the high mobility of nodes in infrastructure-less DTNs, it is infeasible to
manage a stable and global topology in advance. Routing decisions in such networks
are usually placed in a per-hop manner, so that the next message forwarder is dy-
namically selected by each individual node in accordance with the real-time knowledge
learnt from the surrounding environment. Based on the existing research into DTN
routing, we classify the routing algorithms into the following categories, dependent on
the types of knowledge they leverage for making routing decisions.
2.1.1 Zero-Knowledge Routing vs. Knowledge-based Routing
Zero-knowledge routing does not require any information on deciding the next for-
warder. A message is sent or replicated to all encountered nodes or a set of nodes
randomly selected from the encountered nodes. Epidemic (Vahdat and Becker (2000))
is a blind ooding scheme. A node generates replications for all the messages it carries,
and forwards them to all other nodes it meets. Spray & Wait (Spyropoulos, Psounis,
and Raghavendra (2005)) is a controlled-replication routing algorithm that only oods
a limited number of copies to the rst few encountered nodes for each message. The
number of message replications is congured as part of its system setting.
The reliability of routing decisions can be signicantly increased by accumulating
and using additional knowledge. The knowledge could be either gathered from neigh-
bours' advice, or summarised from historical information. Most recent DTN routing
protocols model the connectivity quality among nodes using mathematical approaches
and make subsequent routing decisions based on the generated values. Probability and
utility are the two most common factors used for such connectivity quality evaluation.
Probability value estimates the chance for two nodes to have contact in the near fu-
ture. The basic idea is that the more often nodes A and B meet each other, the higher
the probability is assigned to them. Thus, when B is the destination of a message, A
is very likely to receive this message from others to send it to B. PRoPHET (Lind-
gren, Doria, and Schelén (2003)), one of the well-known probabilistic routing protocols
recorded in the IEFT draft, measures the future contact probability for each pair of
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nodes according to the past encounter frequency between them. Many other proba-
bilistic routing algorithms leverage a similar idea about their routing decisions, but
the probability values can be generated from various information, such as recent en-
counters, past contact history, mobility likelihoods etc. Moreover, the future contact
probability can also be estimated based on the existing probability distribution model.
Gao, Cao, La Porta, and Han (2013) proved that the transient contact distribution,
connectivity, and community structure can be represented as a Gaussian function.
Another mathematical approach to making routing decisions is the assessment of
utility. Dierent from evaluating connectivity among users as to what the probability
achieves, utility usually measures the degree of activeness for each individual node.
Utility driven routing has much more exibility in the use of information. According
to the existing research, the following kinds of information can be used to dene the
utility value:
1. Recent encounters : The most recent encountered node has the highest priority
of being selected as a message relay. Dubois-Ferriere, Grossglauser, and Vetterli
(2003) chose the next forwarder according to the most recent encounters with the
message destination.
2. Sociality/Social tie: The utility value can also be dened, based on the sociality
of nodes. The more frequently a node communicates with others, the higher its
sociality. Wu, Wang, Liu, Tanha, and Pan (2016) proposed Reachable Probability
Centrality (RPC), which improves the accuracy of evaluating the centrality of a
node by using a weighted social network model.
3. Community/Cluster : Some routing protocols determine the utility value of each
node, based on the current community/cluster it belongs to. Papapetrou and
Likas (2018) proposed a dynamic replication scheme which groups nodes into
clusters that portray dierent delivery capability.
4. Latency : The utility value can be generated by taking into account the delivery
latency. Balasubramanian, Levine, and Venkataramani (2007) proposed a routing
protocol, namely, RAPID that replicates message copies, based on a utility metric
of minimising average delivery latency or minimising maximum latency.
5. Shortest path: The utility value can also be dened using the distance or number
of transmission hops along the path. The protocol proposed by Dhurandher,
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Sharma, Woungang, and Bhati (2013) calculates the utility value by taking into
account the perpendicular distance with the destination.
6. Geographical location: With the involvement of GPS and actual physical location,
the utility can also be determined based on the places that nodes frequently visit.
Chen and Shen (2013) split the entire DTN space into multiple sub-areas, and
automatically detect the geographical landmark for the often-visited sub-areas
with the awareness of data transfer capacity for each landmark.
Since most of the existing DTN applications are designed for a particular group
of clients, their activities and behaviours are to some extent regular and predictable.
Thus, some researchers enhance the routing reliability of DTNs from the perspective of
analysing users' contact and mobility regularity. Ciobanu, Dobre, and Cristea (2013)
showed that human mobility can be approximated as a Poisson distribution, while
Leguay, Friedman, and Conan (2006) proved that two nodes have similar mobility
patterns are more likely to encounter each other. The mobility pattern is modelled
using high-dimensional Euclidean space.
2.1.2 Aggregated Knowledge vs. Time-varying Knowledge
Most of the published contributions use aggregated knowledge as the evidence for mak-
ing routing decisions. History information or similar knowledge is aggregated into a
single mathematical value for an averaged estimation. The previous indicated probabil-
ity and utility value are the typical examples of this. Most of the probabilistic routing
protocols, e.g., PRoPHET (Lindgren et al. (2003)) and MaxProp (Burgess, Gallagher,
Jensen, and Levine (2006)), predict future contact between users via probability val-
ues. There are various approaches to generate such aggregated knowledge. Normally,
the aggregated knowledge requires very limited memory space from individual nodes.
The prediction based on it is precise when nodes have regular and frequent contact.
However, the highly summarised knowledge is not suitable for dynamic environments
in which the contact patterns among peers are changing over time, as it might un-
able to eectively detect and adapt to the contact pattern changes. As a consequence,
the involvement of outdated knowledge could introduce unwanted impact to the nal
summarised knowledge, which can be treated as its major drawback.
Some researchers facilitate more complex time-varying information to characterise
the regularity of nodes' behaviours or connectivity. Nodes could store the contact in-
formation in a timely manner, by accurately recording the time-stamped information of
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when the contact occurred. Such time-varying data is usually served in a rst-in-rst-
out approach, with the periodical removal of outdated information from the storage.
Because of such timely storage, future routing predictions can be made according to
the selective information from only the specied time frames instead of summarising
the whole history. Thus, the future estimation inferred from the time-varying infor-
mation gains accuracy in both exploiting the regular contact pattern and adapting to
the regularity changes. 3R (Vu, Do, and Nahrstedt (2011)) is one of not too many
routing protocols that utilises a ne-grained table to record the contact time and du-
ration between users, and the probability is generated, based on the history within the
same period of several days. The short-term information could clearly describe the
most up-to-date contact pattern between nodes, and thus can have a more accurate
prediction. However, maintaining such detailed information is costly for memory con-
sumption. Therefore, an ecient characterisation on such time-varying information
is necessary, in order to reduce the memory burden for hardware constrained devices
while guaranteeing high reliability on routing prediction.
2.2 Criterion of Measuring the Performance of Rout-
ing Protocols for Infrastructure-less DTNs
Many researchers contribute to improving the decentralised routing for DTNs from dif-
ferent perspectives under various network environments. Hence, it is uncertain to say
a routing protocol can always perform the best and overtake others in any condition.
However, there are some common factors which can be used to quantify the perfor-
mance of DTN routing protocols. The most frequently used criterion for evaluating
the performance of routing protocols are listed below:
1. Delivery rate: messages in infrastructure-less DTNs could be easily lost because
of fragile connection, memory buer overow, and the disconnection of devices
due to hardware failure or leaving the network. Therefore, the message delivery
rate becomes the most critical criteria in evaluating the goodness of a routing
protocol. It measures the number of delivered messages over the total number
of messages generated during a particular time duration. Some of the existing
research also measures bits transferred per time unit for a similar purpose.
2. Message replication overhead: To augment the delivery chance, most of the
routing protocols decide on replicating messages rather than forwarding original
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messages themselves. However, uncontrolled replication of messages could result
in a severe waste of the memory buer of devices. Most of the existing contribu-
tions focus on balancing the trade-o between the delivery rate and the message
replication overhead.
3. Memory consumption: Memory space can be drained by two issues due to the
inappropriate design of routing protocols. One is storing the excessive number
of unnecessary message copies, and the other is ineectively characterising con-
tact pattern. Many probabilistic routing protocols leverage contact history for
the prediction of future contact probability. Adding a little more knowledge for
nodes could enhance the reliability of routing decisions, but storing too detailed
information can be very costly for memory space of devices. Thus, the eciency
of characterising nodes' contact or mobility pattern, along with sucient accu-
racy, is also a challenge in designing a history-based routing protocol.
4. Delay/Latency: The intermittent connectivities between users result in a high
latency on delivering a packet. Finding the proper next relay within a shorter
time can also boost the performance of a routing protocol. Many researchers
also try to minimise message delivery latency as the overall aim of the proposed
protocols.
Of course, there are further criterion that can be used for the evaluation of routing
protocols. For example, Borah (2018), and Zhang, Wang, Jiang, and Zhang (2016)
proposed routing algorithms that are aware of energy consumption. The eciency
of energy usage can be a part of the performance measurement of routing protocols.
There are still many other criterion that are highly application-based, which are not
commonly used for evaluating the routing protocols, and thus are not listed here.
2.3 Simulation Environment
Although there is no universal platform for simulating and evaluating DTN routing
protocols, there are still some existing simulators which have modelled such oppor-
tunistic encountering communication networks to provide a relatively fair environment
to researchers in order to compare the performance of their proposed routing protocols.
Many simulators have been used in recent contributions, as listed in the following:
1. ONE:Opportunistic Networking Environment (ONE) (Keränen, Ott, and Kärkkäi-
nen (2009)), which is a Java-based simulator, which has become the most com-
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monly used tool for simulating P2P communications of users within the real-world
map. It provides the modelling of node movement, inter-node contacts, routing
and message handling. The interactive Graphical User Interface (GUI) displays
the simulation in real-time, such as node locations, current paths, connection,
messages carried by nodes etc., as well as logs and plots for collected statistics
after simulation is completed. Most of the well-known DTN routing protocols are
embedded, and self-customised routing protocol can also be implemented within
the simulator.
2. OMNeT++: Varga (2001) introduced OMNeT++ which is written in C++.
OMNeT++ is built from reusable components for large-scale hierarchical mod-
elling. Compared to other highly visualised simulators that only allow the cre-
ation of xed topologies, such as ONE, OMNeT++ numerically denes topology.
It enables parameterising topologies which can pass numeric parameters along
the path. Also, the real-time topology and plots for recorded statistics can be
displayed via the GUI windows of the software.
3. ns-3: ns-3 is also a C++-based simulator introduced by Riley and Henderson
(2010). ns-3 aims to make the network models closer in implementation to the
actual software implementations. It aggregates several simulators such as its
previous generation ns-2, the Georgia Tech Network Simulator (GTNetS), and
the YANS simulator.
4. MobEmu: Ciobanu, Marin, and Dobre (2018) presented a Java-based P2P net-
work simulator namely MobEmu. Dierent from the above simulators, MobEmu
models nodes' communication in a pure contact record approach, and it only cares
about when and which pair of nodes had communications, rather than keeping
track of nodes' mobility and position in a map view. Several popular routing
protocols have been included in the simulator, and self-customised protocols can
also be imported.
5. Adyton: Papanikos, Akestoridis, and Papapetrou (2015) proposed an event-
driven network simulator written in C++. It is capable of running simulations
using the data traces collected from the real world, as well as synthetic traces
generated manually. Several popular routing protocols and data traces for op-
portunistic networks are included in the software.
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6. Customised simulator: Due to special requirements in the network environ-
ment, many researchers conducted their protocol evaluations under customised
simulation environments. The customised simulator can be written in any pro-
gramming language and depends on researchers' preference.
2.4 Security in DTNs
With the development of DTN applications, the collected data from associated ap-
plications become more crucial and valuable. Maintaining the security is challenging,
especially for hardware-constrained devices, along with long communication latency in
some extreme DTN scenarios. This is because the cheap hardware might not be able to
run high-complexity security schemes. The cheap hardware devices are highly vulner-
able when they are under the attacks launched by more powerful computing devices.
Moreover, the intermittent connectivity between nodes highly interrupts the dissem-
ination of the essential security information through the entire network, so that the
security mechanisms might not be fully functioning for all nodes. For the above con-
siderations, advanced security schemes with low computation complexity and latency
tolerance are desired for such a dynamic DTN environment.
2.4.1 Attack Types
There exists several types of attacks in DTNs with the aims of retrieving particular
resources, or even dominating the entire P2P network system from a malicious group of
nodes. These attacks can be launched by an individual malicious node, or a fraction of
nodes which collude with each other. Some common attacks in DTNs are listed below:
1. Flooding: Malicious nodes randomly ood message copies to all other nodes to
augment their own message delivery chance and minimize latency. More seriously,
malicious nodes could assign a message with a random or non-existing destination
to let honest nodes preserve the fake ones for a long time. A ooding attack
usually consumes an extremely large memory buer and bandwidth of other
nodes.
2. Message modication: Malicious nodes could modify message content to de-
liver wrong information to the destinations.
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3. Black hole/Grey hole attack: This kind of assault is usually launched in the
middle of the routing path, which results in the disappearance of packets as a
consequence. Every time a black hole node receives a package, it simply drops it,
and sends an expected proper reply for concealing its misbehaviour, if necessary.
The grey hole attack is the extension of the black hole attack. A malicious node
uses selective data packet dropping methods to perform random DoS attack to
some of the received packets. The on-and-o misbehaviour makes such attackers
harder to detect.
4. Byzantine attack: Attackers provide false recommendations to legitimate users,
to misguide their future decisions. For example, it could give an incorrect con-
tact/mobility pattern to its neighbours, and thus mislead the routing decisions of
them. An attacker can also lower the utility/reputation value for honest nodes,
or raise such value for its companions.
5. Sybil attack: An attacker reserves multiple identities to augment the chance
of receiving messages from the network, thus bringing conveniences to perform
other subsequent attacks.
2.4.2 Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Cryptography
Cryptography is a security technology involving the encryption of messages in a par-
ticular format so that only intended users can read and process them. With much
past research and development, cryptography algorithms provide an outstanding safety
strength on data, privacy and so forth, and thus are widely used in the Internet and
many other kinds of networks. The encryption of the data prevents attackers from
reading and manipulating the message content. Cryptography can be classied into
two major categories: symmetric key-based cryptography and asymmetric key-based
cryptography.
Symmetric key-based cryptography, or secret key encryption, uses one key to encrypt
and decrypt data. The key should be distributed to whoever needs it within the
network before message transmission. A message is encrypted by the sender, and
the receiver decrypts the message using the same key. The strength of Symmetric
Key-based Cryptography very much depends on the size of the key used. For the
same algorithm, longer keys are harder to break using brute-force attacks than shorter
keys. Typical examples of symmetric key-based cryptographysome only of historical
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interestinclude AES (Rijmen and Daemen (2001)), DES (Die and Hellman (1977)),
and 3DES (Karn, Metzger, and Simpson (1995)).
Asymmetric cryptography, or Public Key Cryptography (PKC), involves key pairs
a public and a private keyfor each device to encrypt and decrypt data. The public
key can be disseminated widely without compromising security, and the private key
needs to be secretly maintained by local nodes themselves. Once a node needs to send
a message to a particular destination, it encrypts the message using the destination's
public key. The destination node then decrypts the message using its own private key
when it receives the message. Also, public and private keys can be used to create
a digital signature. The message sender signs a message using its private key, and
the receiver can verify the signature by successfully decrypting it using the sender's
public key. Some typical algorithms of asymmetric cryptography include RSA (Rivest,
Shamir, and Adleman (1978)), Die-Hellman (Merkle (1978)), ECC (Koblitz (1987)),
and Digital Signature (Die and Hellman (1976)).
2.4.3 Public-Key Infrastructure
Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) (Housley, Polk, Ford, and Solo (2002)) is a powerful
security system that has been widely used by many successfully running networks and
applications. PKI comprises a series of hardware, software, policies, and algorithms
to achieve secured and immutable peers' authentication. It consists of a few essential
entities to perform its critical roles, including key creation, management, distribution,
and revocation. Certicate Authorities (CAs) generate keys and bind them with re-
spective identities to the corresponding network participants, such as individual devices
or organisations. A Registration Authority (RA) validates the key and assures a peer
is registered correctly. The RA is also responsible for accepting requests for applying
digital certicates from the participants and authenticating those making the request.
A third-party Validation Authority (VA) can provide the information of participants
on behalf of CA. Asymmetric key-based cryptography schemes together with PKI pro-
vide a security system for data encryption and authentication, thus providing security
and privacy for data transmission.
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2.4.4 Limitations and Improvements for Cryptographic Schemes
and PKI to High Latency DTNs
With fast and stable connectivity among all the devices, most of the above attacks
mentioned in Section 2.4.1 can be well addressed by asymmetric cryptography along
with PKI in practice. However, the unreliable connectivity to centralised support and
intermittent connectivities between nodes may signicantly disrupt functionality such
as revocation of credentials that depend on keys that have been compromised.
One approach to handling centralised CA-like functionality within DTNs is dis-
tributing the functionalities of CAs to multiple end computing devices. Threshold
Cryptography (TC), proposed by Luo, Kong, Zerfos, Lu, and Zhang (2002), bypasses
the constraint of must having CAs in the network, via distributing CAs' functionalities
to multiple nodes. Each of the selected node maintains a secret share of the CAs,
which is determined based on a threshold secret sharing mechanism. Multiple nodes
in a local neighbourhood jointly provide complete cryptography services.
While there are open challenges in maintaining the security of DTNs, in this thesis,
we are more interested in how to reach a decentralised consensus among network nodes,
instead of using cryptographic approach to maintain the security of DTNs. The rest of
this chapter presents the background knowledge of decentralised consensus mechanisms,
especially blockchain-related protocols.
2.5 Decentralised Consensus in DTNs
Decentralised consensus preserves the security for distributed networks from the per-
spective of maintaining a global agreement among all users. The unied agreement
is achieved via consensus participants continuing to propagate their opinions to oth-
ers. As P2P users are usually permission-less to the network, who may continuously
join in and leave the network, the safety of consensus systems can be highly impacted
by the dynamics of nodes' behaviours. Successful permission-less systems require a
fault-tolerant design, such as standard consensus or Byzantine agreement methods.
Blockchain, the distributed ledger and fundamental security mechanism for bitcoin,
not only guides the entire network towards a global agreement, but also ensures the
consensus cannot be easily manipulated by anyone during the diusion phase and after.
The immutability of consensus is guaranteed by applying various additional technolo-
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Figure 2.1: The structure of blockchain (Nakamoto (2009)).
In this thesis, we explore the feasibility of deploying two decentralised consensus
protocols to the high communication latency DTN environment, which are bitcoin
blockchain (Nakamoto (2009)), and Avalanche consensus (Team Rocket (2018)). These
two consensus protocols are introduced in the following sections.
2.5.1 Bitcoin Blockchain
With the astonishing success of Bitcoin in both its peaks in market price and the num-
ber of cryptocurrency users, blockchain technology and its underneath asynchronous
decentralised consensus also attract much attention from both the academic and indus-
trial elds. Bitcoin is a P2P system and cryptocurrency which is exchangeable with real
world currency. The underlying security technology of bitcoinnamely blockchainis
a distributed ledger that provides a highly tamper-proof data storage for bitcoin trans-
action history. It preserves a complete transparency on viewing and retrieving data
from public blockchain to all users. Despite being the secured storage for cryptocur-
rencies, it is widely believed that blockchain technology can also play an important
role as part of the future P2P network protocol.
The blockchain structure is shown in Figure 2.1, which contains only the critical
components for the key roles, without including many other attributes for commercial
use in practice, such as the version number, the timestamp of block generation etc. As
its name describes, a blockchain consists of several blocks connected consecutively in
a linear shape. As indicated in Figure 2.1, a block mainly contains two parts: a block
header and a list of transactions. A block header is composed of an overall hash value











Figure 2.2: Transactions hashed in a Merkle Tree within a block.
this block. The previous hash stores a reference that points to its previous block. The
involvement of a previous hash within the blocks one after another forms a digital
chain. The nonce value is simply a random number with 32-bit eld. It is adjusted
by blockchain miners to become a valid number to be used for hashing the value of
block, which is known as solving the Proof-of-Work (PoW) hash puzzle. Merkle Tree
hash root is another hash value for the safety of all the transactions within the current
block. As indicated in Figure 2.2, every two transactions are hashed together to form
an upper-level hash value. Such a hash process is repeated until there only one single
root hash value. All the contents inside a block are hashed to get a nal single overall
hash value for the current block, which will be included in the next block. SHA-256 is
the metric presently used for the aforementioned hashing.
Proof-of-Work (PoW) performs the most crucial role in the security of the blockchain.
PoW is a computational puzzle that needs each blockchain miner to solve it. A
blockchain miner simply keeps trying the nonce value with random integers for the
unsolved block, until it opportunistically gures out an overall hash value for this
block, with at least a certain number of leading zeros. The number of leading zeros
is determined by the current mining diculty level, which is periodically adjusted to
31
sustain a constant block generation speed according to the current total computation
power from the entire blockchain community. Blockchain has a solid constraint on the
generation speed as 10 minutes per block, which indicates there could be one or a few,
but not too many blockchain miners can opportunistically solve the PoW puzzle in ap-
proximately that time. The miner who solves the puzzle could have its unsolved block
conrmed and get appended onto the blockchain. Then, the newly generated block is
broadcast to the network in order to get committed by others. A sucient number of
commits on the new block indicates the acceptance of the updated blockchain, so that
everyone can update their local blockchain to the newest version. The mining winner
gains a certain amount of bitcoin as the reward for contributing to the blockchain.
Since only 20 million bitcoins can be mined from the blockchain, the amount of mining
reward is tapering o, and will eventually vanish, with the blockchain system running
longer. Each block contains up to 4200 transactions at most. Bitcoin blockchain can
only process seven transactions per second. For the security consideration, a transac-
tion can only be cleared after six more block conrmations, which indicates an hour
delay on conrming a transaction. Therefore, low transaction throughput is the major
drawback of blockchain. This makes the bitcoin blockchain inapplicable to modern
nancial systems that have millions of transactions pending every second.
The global consensus of blockchain is achieved via all users maintaining an identical
blockchain. Blockchain users always follow the global longest chain with the greatest
mining diculty. To achieve this, blockchain users keep updating their self-maintained
blockchain to the longest one. With the convergence of blockchain data, a global
consensus is reached network-wide. As the replacement of local blockchain occurs,
some transactions might be excluded from the blockchain because of the revocation of
diverged blocks. These transactions then have to wait to be re-encapsulated into the
next new block, and get appended to the updated blockchain. Since blockchain PoW
mining is done by individual users parallelly, it is possible to have multiple users solving
the hash puzzle simultaneously and generating conicting blocks. The transactions
within the conicting blocks lack protection because they are not committed by all
users within the network. This problem can be addressed by miners continuing to
contribute to the blockchain. Other blockchain users who receive multiple conicting
blocks only need to choose one of them arbitrarily. With the growth of blockchain forks,
one of them could be extended faster than the others by chance. With the replacement
of other forks, the blockchain is converged, and the entire network reaches a global
consensus for the protected data again.
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Soft fork and hard fork techniques are triggered when a merge must be completed
between dierent versions of blockchain forks. When the system conguration of
blockchain is required to be updated, such as the changes on the consensus proto-
col itself and block contents, a system alignment is desired to merge multiple versions
of blockchain. Sometimes it requires all users to have an immediate and compulsory
update of the blockchain software due to a severe security leakage caused by old rules,
whilst most of the time the shifting process to the new version blockchain takes place
smoothly. Based on the impact to the non-upgraded users, the forking techniques are
categorised into two types, as listed below:
1. Soft fork: the new rules are accepted by both the upgraded and non-upgraded
users. Non-upgraded nodes can still generate blocks based on old version rules;
however, the blocks generated by non-upgraded nodes keep being rejected by
the upgraded users. With more users aligning their blockchain up-to-date, the
non-upgraded users will nd themselves in a partitioned network, so they have
to catch up with the blockchain version to ensure they are doing valid work.
2. Hard fork: due to a more severe security concern, the old rules become invalid
as soon as the new rules are launched. New rules are not considered as valid for
non-upgraded users, and old rules are also invalid to upgraded users as well. If
the non-upgraded users still run the old version blockchain, it will end up with
two dierent systems running parallelly.
Blockchain gains an outstanding security strength in protecting bitcoin transaction
in practice, due to the advantages of its chain structure and the computational eciency
of the hashing algorithm. It is widely believed that malicious users or organisations
need to have at least 51% of computation power to take over the entire blockchain
system, which seems impossible for such a large population blockchain community. The
full Internet connectivity enables any update onto the blockchain to be immediately
propagated to all users. The SHA-256 hashing function plays the most important role
in the tamper-proof feature of block contents. Any change to the content will result in
a totally dierent hash value of the current block. Because the mining diculty ensures
the entire population can only generate a block approximately every 10 minutes, it will
be very computationally expensive for individual attackers to redo the PoW mining
work. Nonetheless, there is still a certain nite computation workload on attacking
a single block. The chain structure further enhances the immutability of the data
inside blocks. Due to the involvement of previous block's overall hashing inside the
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block headers, the content modication to the target block will denitely result in a
change to the overall hash values of the target block, and the changes to all the blocks
afterwards. Thus, the attacker needs to redo the PoW mining for all the aected blocks.
It has been proved that the computation workload is linearly increased with the target
block buried more in-depth on the blockchain. This brings a higher invulnerability
to the deeper blocks. However, the newly generated ones are more easily attacked in
comparison with the ancient blocks. To ensure the safety of a new transaction, it can
only be settled after six more blocks are conrmed since the transaction is recorded onto
the blockchain. With all the above techniques, the immutability of bitcoin transaction
history is strongly guaranteed.
Due to the high computation workload of PoW mining and the large memory con-
sumption in storing the full copy of blockchain data, the original version of blockchain
is obviously unsuitable for the resource constraints and the high communication latency
within DTNs. PoW mining brings a massive workload to cheap devices, which could
be much heavier than the actual functionality the devices need to achieve. In addition,
signicant memory storage demand for maintaining blockchain data is another consid-
erable barrier for the devices. Since all blockchain miners are required to maintain a
full copy of the global longest chain, the data inside will denitely be massive with
the blockchain system running longer. Enormous memory space is wasted on storing
redundant and non-relevant data for individual users. Besides this, communication in
DTNs usually suers more or less from the latency issue. The long latency could result
in the disruption of blockchain convergence, and thus multiple blockchain branches in
the network can exist as a consequence. A long-time divergence of blockchain branches
leads to the data inside the conicting blocks lacking sucient protection from Byzan-
tine attacks. Also, much energy waste can be caused by merging divergent blockchains.
The alignment of blockchain branches requires a re-computation of PoW to encapsu-
late the revoked transactions into a new block, in order to upload them back onto
the updated blockchain. With a longer time on running multiple blockchain branches,
more conicting blocks can be generated. Thus, the longer the divergence of blockchain
lasts, the heavier the PoW computation workload is required to reconrm the revoked
transactions from the extinct branches.
2.5.2 Avalanche
Avalanche is a leaderless Byzantine fault tolerance consensus protocol built on meta-
stable mechanism. It mainly focuses on solving the double spending issue of cryp-
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tocurrencies. Avalanche consensus ensures a strong probabilistic safety in the presence
of Byzantine behaviours. The concurrent processing of queries from nodes enables
them to achieve a high transaction throughput (1300 transactions per second), low
conrmation latency (4s), as well as a high scalability on population size.
Avalanche is composed of a series of consensus protocols, which are Slush, Snowakes,
Snowball, and Avalanche itself. Inspired by gossip protocol (Demers, Greene, Hauser,
Irish, Larson, Shenker, Sturgis, Swinehart, and Terry (1987)), Avalanche users keep
collecting others' decisions for unsolved conicting transaction events until the consen-
sus is reached within the majority of the population. To simulate the double spending
issue, the original work of Avalanche leverage blue and red colours to indicate the two
conicting transactions that can never be accepted by an honest node at the same
time. Once a conicting transaction is detected, a node triggers query processes, with
each process sample only k nodes, where k is a very small number, but very important
to the system conguration, as it critically impacts the performance and the safety of
the system. The query source node then collects the replies from these k randomly
selected nodes. A query is treated as valid only when a sucient number of nodes vote
on the same colour among these k nodes. A conicting transaction event is spread to
the network during each time of querying the k nodes. The nodes which receive the
conicting transaction for the rst time, will also trigger the same query process as the
source node. Nodes are allowed to have dierent opinions for a conicting transaction
event, but honest nodes always follow the decision agreed by the majority of the pop-
ulation. Each node needs to maintain two integer counters, namely, condence level,
which is accumulated respectively in accordance with the answer of each query. For
a conicting transaction event to be determined, nodes need to go through a number
of rounds of queries, until one colour reaches a sucient condence level. Since the
queried nodes are selected in a fully random approach from the population, a sucient
condence level of a colour indicates the consent from most of the nodes. Because
Avalanche is one of the consensus protocols we mainly investigate in this thesis, a more
detailed introduction to it is presented in Section 5.3.
Avalanche has signicant advantages of computation complexity, communication
eciency, and memory consumption, but has a weaker security than blockchain. It has
already been proved that Avalanche consensus can reach a correct global consensus in
the presence of 20% Byzantine nodes inside the population, with a negligible probability
(< 10−9) of reverting to the wrong side of the consensus. Like the bitcoin blockchain


















Figure 2.3: Example of Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) for Avalanche transactions.
agreement among nodes, but this is achieved with lower communication demands.
Bitcoin blockchain and most of the other decentralised consensus protocols have the
communication complexity of O(N2), while Avalanche only needs from O(kN logN) up
to O(kN) communication demand, where N is the population size, k is a critical system
conguration of Avalanche and k ≪ N . Aside from a low communication requirement,
there is also no such computationally expensive task like PoW for Avalanche users to
solve. In addition, Avalanche is memory-ecient in storing cryptocurrency transaction
history compared to blockchain. Nodes using Avalanche are not required to maintain
a complicated data storage for the transaction history. Avalanche transactions are
linked to each other via an append-only Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) structure, as
shown in Figure 2.3. Both the benign and malicious transactions are attached to the
DAG, but they are on dierent branches. Each transaction T is labelled with a chit
value cT and a condence value d(T ). It always has cT = 1 for a benign transaction,
and cT = 0 for a malicious transaction. If a transaction T has benign descendants,
T 's condence value d(T ) is accumulated. The branch with a higher condence value
has more chance of receiving further benign descendants. Such a DAG structure also
guarantees a tamper-proof feature on protecting transactions, as the decisions on past
conicting transactions are dicult to be modied without the approval of correct
nodes. Above all, Avalanche is more quiescent and green than blockchain, and thus
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can be treated as a better option to deploy to the high latency DTNs.
2.6 Summary
There are tremendous eorts to improve the reliability of end-to-end routing for infra-
structure-less DTNs. Most of the routing protocols mathematically quantify the quality
of peer communications using probability and utility values. These values are generated
based on prior knowledge, and are leveraged as evidence for making future routing de-
cisions. Many existing solutions show that the reliability of future prediction can be
eectively increased when using exible time-varying history information, as it precisely
characterises the recent contact pattern and avoids introducing unwanted impact from
outdated history. The complexity of routing protocols is heterogeneous, in terms of
both the computation workload and history storage complexity. However, a protocol
with a higher complexity cannot certainly conclude that it can always outplay oth-
ers in any scenario, as many existing protocols are designed for particular problems
under specied network conditions. Because of the highly customised design of the
infrastructure-less DTN routing protocols, having a uniform platform to simulate and
evaluate the performance of the protocols seems to be impossible. Many researchers
implement and evaluate their proposed routing protocols using their own customised
simulators instead of the existing ones, even though the existing simulators embed-
ded with a good visualisation of both real-world map topology and plotting collected
statistics.
The improvements on the traditional cryptographic schemes and PKI have over-
come some critical limitations caused by the nature of DTNs, from the perspective
of distributing shared secrets and eliminating dependence on centralised management,
but there are still some open challenges that have not been resolved. Bitcoin blockchain
initiates an insightful solution to maintain the security and immutability for protected
data in a fully decentralised environment. However, the enormous storage consumption
and high computation complexity of blockchain makes it unsuitable for hardware con-
strained devices. Avalanche has a more straightforward data structure for its ledger,
and much less communication and computation demand than bitcoin blockchain, which




FGAR: Adaptive Message Routing in
DTNs with Ecient Contact Pattern
Characterisation and Replication
Control
As indicated in the previous chapters, infrastructure-less DTNs usually suer a severe
connectivity interruption issue. This is mainly because of the short-range wireless com-
munication and hop-by-hop message transmission through multiple nodes. Sometimes
the network latency issue is more serious because of the unreachability of the distant
nodes. The recent published contributions of the probabilistic routing protocols for
infrastructure-less DTNs exhibit a good accuracy for predicting future encountering
among nodes by leveraging the contact regularity summarised from the past. However,
most of the probabilistic routing protocols utilise a single probability value that is gen-
erated according to the entire history, which cannot eectively adapt to the contact
pattern changes. Also, many protocols do not take message replication control into
consideration during the design phase. Generating an extremely large number of mes-
sage copies causes numerous waste in the memory space of resource-constrained DTN
hardware. To address the above issues, in this chapter, we present FGAR, a probabilis-
tic routing scheme for high latency infrastructure-less DTN that exploits the following
two mechanisms: (1) Fine-Grained contact characterisation; and (2)Adaptive message
Replication. The contributions of this chapter are listed as follows:
1. A novel sliding window mechanism is leveraged to extract ne-grained informa-
tion from the contact history, and the characterised contact information is stored
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using a bit matrix data structure in a memory-ecient way. Based on the bit
matrix structure, the probability that two nodes will have an encounter within a
given time period (e.g. the lifetime of a message) can be eectively estimated, and
this probability is more accurate than the long-term average contact probability
for contact prediction.
2. We propose a novel decentralised mechanism to adaptively control message repli-
cation based on the expected message delivery rate, the replication history, and
the quality of the encountered node. A replica can be generated only when it
is necessary to fulll the expected message delivery rate, thereby avoiding over-
and under-spreading message replicas.
3. We evaluate the performance of FGAR through trace-driven simulations. Simu-
lation results show that FGAR can achieve a much higher message delivery rate
than existing schemes with a very low message overhead. The reported statistics
demonstrate that FGAR has an outstanding performance when devices are con-
strained on resources. The message deliver rate is improved by more than 20%
whereas the message overhead is reduced by a factor of up to 15 in comparison
with several popular routing protocols of DTNs.
3.1 Existing Routing Protocols for DTNs
Research on message forwarding in opportunistic networks originates from Epidemic
routing (Vahdat and Becker (2000)), in which each message is ooded to all reachable
nodes in the network. Epidemic can achieve the highest message delivery rate in
scenarios with massive message buers, but does not perform well when devices have
limited resources. Hence, Epidemic is commonly used as a benchmark to evaluate
the performance of new routing protocols. To avoid blind ooding, controlled-ooding
protocols have been proposed. PRoPHET, one of the few routing protocols that has
an IETF draft (Lindgren, Doria, Davies, and Grasic (2004)), avoids blind-ooding by
pruning the Epidemic distribution tree. This pruning is done by allowing a node to
send a message replica to an encountered node only when the encountered node has a
larger probability than itself to contact the destination. Delegation forwarding (Chen,
Shen, Groves, and Wu (2009)) is very similar to PRoPHET, except that each message
is replicated and forwarded based on the maximum quality observed so far, instead of
only the quality of the current encountered node. Spray & Wait (Spyropoulos et al.
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(2005)) controls message overhead by limiting the number of message replicas generated
in the spraying phase, and then relies on direct contact to deliver each replica to the
destination. The protocols proposed by Balasubramanian et al. (2007) and Krifa,
Barakat, and Spyropoulos (2008) leverage utility values to manage the forwarding of
each message and their replicas. Rather than directly optimizing the delivery rate,
they focus more on minimizing the average delivery delay using utility value. Also, the
utility value can be employed for nodes to drop the packets when the memory is full.
The OOF protocol proposed by Liu and Wu (2012) simply limits the forwarding hop
for message transmission, and a new metric taking into account both the remaining
hop-count and the residual time-to-live is proposed for message forwarding. With a
xed number of message copies, OOF can maximise the message delivery rate. Dierent
from OOF, our scheme can adaptively control the number of message replica to achieve
the best delivery rate, without having to specify the number of replicas that can be
generated for each message.
Recent studies show that contacts between devices in opportunistic networks, espe-
cially in mobile social networks, commonly exhibit some repeating patterns. Discover-
ing and exploiting these repeating patterns can greatly improve the message delivery
rate. Zhang, Kurose, Levine, Towsley, and Zhang (2007) studied bus-based DTNs
and observed that the inter-contact time aggregated at a route level exhibit periodic
behaviour. Moon and Helmy (2010) analysed the periodicity in encounter patterns
by using power spectral analysis. It was observed that nodes with low encounter fre-
quency show strong periodicity. Predict and Relay (PER) (Yuan, Cardei, and Wu
(2012)) takes into account the contact time and location information, and exploits a
time-homogeneous semi-Markov process model to represent node mobility as transi-
tions between landmarks. Gao et al. (2013) exploited transient social contact patterns
for message forwarding.
Some studies utilise dynamic connection status as the reliance on contact prediction.
The schemes proposed by Vu et al. (2011) and Jain et al. (2004) learn the information
from each encountering and transmitted message to compute the path cost between
pairwise nodes. Thus, messages can be routed through the shortest path. The work
done by Chen and Shen (2014) constructs a fully connected distributed social map for
message routing. Li, Wang, Yang, Jiang, and Stojmenovic (2014) proposed a scheme
which forms several communities to classify nodes into dierent groups based on their
geological information, and messages are propagated to the appropriate community
where destinations are located.
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Some routing protocols of social network employ detailed context information for
topology decisions. The schemes proposed by Nguyen and Giordano (2011), Musolesi
and Mascolo (2009), and Boldrini, Conti, Jacopini, and Passarella (2007) record the
context information to summarise the social relationship of a user. The context in-
formation includes name, address, organisation etc. Each attribute in the context has
a dierent degree of impact on the future contact prediction based on its associated
weight value. The message routing decision is based on the likelihood of the context
between pairwise nodes. The higher the likelihood, the closer the message to its desti-
nation. However, it is a concern that such complicated context structure and contents
can occupy too much memory for mobile devices, especially for a large population com-
munity with a signicant number of frequent contact nodes. In addition, inadequate
message replication control makes them still have a relative high network overhead.
To the best of our knowledge, 3R (Vu et al. (2011)) is the only close-related DTN
routing protocol using ne-grained history. In 3R, previous contacts are classied
and maintained according to the day (weekday/weekend) and the time slot in which
they occurred. Messages are forwarded based on the ne-grained contact information.
However, past contacts are stored directly at each node in a database, which is not
storage-ecient. Moreover, 3R only keeps a single copy for each message, which cannot
achieve the best message delivery rate.
3.2 Motivations




Figure 3.1: Contacts between two randomly chosen devices in the Cambridge, MIT
Reality, and UMassDieselNet traces.
Figure 3.1 shows the pairwise contacts between two active devices randomly chosen
from three data traces: Cambridge (Scott, Gass, Crowcroft, Hui, Diot, and Chaintreau
(2006)), MIT Reality (Eagle and Pentland (2005)), and UMassDieselNet (Burgess,
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Zahorjan, Mahajan, Levine, Balasubramanian, Venkataramani, Zhou, Croft, Banerjee,
Corner, and Towsley (2008)). It can be seen that most contacts occurred approximately
in the same period of a day. This repeating pattern is useful to predict future contacts.
However, most existing schemes do not fully take this advantage. In PRoPHET, when
two nodes a and b contact, they update their encounter predictability, denoted by
P (a, b), as follows:
P (a, b) = Pold(a, b) + (1− δ − Pold(a, b))× Pencounter, (3.1)
where Pold(a, b) is the encounter predictability before the current contact occurs, Pencounter
is a scaling factor at which the probability increases upon encounters, and δ is a small
positive value to set an upper bound on P (a, b) (Lindgren et al. (2004)). Forwarding
messages based on this metric is simple, but may not be ecient due to the inaccuracy
of contact probability estimation, as illustrated by the following example. As shown
in Figure 3.1, the two nodes a and b in the Cambridge trace frequently contacted each
other between 11am and 6pm on a daily basis, and P (a, b) will be relatively large (e.g.,
0.8) according to Equation 3.1. Suppose that node a generates a message at 8pm and
has to send it to node b in 12 hours. Node a only knows that it has a large probability
to contact node b, but is not aware that the two nodes never contacted between 8pm
and 8am in the past. Since P (a, b) is high, the probability for node a to spray a replica
to another encountered node is very small. However, if node a maintains the timing
information of each previous contact, it can estimate the probability that two nodes
will have an encounter in the lifetime of the message, thereby improving the accuracy
of contact prediction.
Also the pairwise node contact patterns may change over time, and these changes
must be reected in a timely way to improve the accuracy of future contact prediction.
In PRoPHET, if nodes a and b do not encounter each other during a time interval,
P (a, b) is reduced using the aging mechanism as follows:
P (a, b) = Pold(a, b) × λK , (3.2)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is the aging constant, and K is the number of time units elapsed since
the last time P (a, b) was aged (Lindgren et al. (2004)). However, the performance of
the aging mechanism heavily depends on the parameters λ and K, as an improper
setting will cause either slow or fast aging. Moreover, λ and K are global parameters




Figure 3.2: Performance with unlimited message buer size.
3.2.2 Adaptive Message Replication
A key challenge in designing routing protocols for mobile opportunistic networks is
to achieve the highest message delivery rate with the minimum message overhead, as
devices are usually resource-constrained. We carried out trace-driven simulations to
evaluate three representative schemes, Epidemic, PRoPHET, and 3R, in terms of the
average message delivery rate and message overhead. In our simulation, we used the
Cambridge data trace, which is a trace of Bluetooth sightings by graduate students
carrying small devices (iMotes) for six days, and we duplicated the original trace to
expand it to one month. Messages were generated with random sources and destina-
tions. Each message has a lifetime randomly chosen from 2 hours to one week, and the
message size varies from 2k bytes to 100k bytes. The three schemes were evaluated
using the same message trace. We compared the three schemes in terms of the number
of (a) created messages, (b) replicated messages, (c) transmitted messages, (d) dropped
messages, and (e) delivered messages. The number of transmitted messages equals the
number of hop-by-hop transmissions, which indicates the communication overhead.
Messages can be dropped due to either deadline expiration or buer overow. For the
latter case, messages are dropped using the First-In-First-Out policy.
Figure 3.2 shows the performance of the three schemes with no constraint on mes-
sage buer size. To clearly show the dierence among dierent protocols, the y-axis
44
maximum value is set to 20,000, and the values above the bars for Epidemic represent
the real number of messages for Epidemic. It can be seen that Epidemic achieves the
highest average delivery rate (0.725) with an extremely high message overhead. The
number of replicated messages is around 41 times the number of created messages,
and 98.2% of the created messages and replicas were dropped. PRoPHET achieves
an average delivery rate of 0.669 with a signicant drop in the number of replicated
messages, but the message overhead still remains high (∼ 8 replicas were generated per
created message). It is worth noting that 3R achieves an average delivery rate of 0.67
with a very low overhead. Even though 3R keeps only a single copy of each message in
the network to reduce message overhead, the average delivery rate is not dropped too
much as it uses ne-grained encounter information for contact prediction.
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Figure 3.3: Performance with limited message buer size: 1M bytes/node.
Figure 3.3 shows the performance of the three schemes where the message buer
is restricted to 1M bytes/node. The average delivery rates achieved by Epidemic and
PRoPHET drop to 0.43 and 0.45, respectively, and the performance of Epidemic is even
worse than PRoPHET. This is because many message replicas have to be dropped due
to message buer constraint. However, the performance of 3R is not aected since it
keeps a single copy for each message. Hence, message overhead has a big impact on
the performance of a routing scheme in resource-constrained DTNs. A single copy per
message is not sucient to achieve the best message delivery rate, but the pruning
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mechanism in PRoPHET is too simple and not ecient.
From Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 it can be seen that a large portion of the replicated
messages is not helpful to improve the message delivery rate. Our motivation is to
avoid the generation of the unnecessary message replicas to achieve the best message
delivery rate with a very low message overhead. Dierent from existing works, we aim
to develop an ecient message replication scheme in which each device can adaptively
control the replication of the messages it carries based on the expected message delivery
rate, the replication history, and the quality of the encountered node. A replica can
be generated only when it can contribute to the improvement of the message delivery
rate, thereby avoiding over- and under-spreading message replicas.
3.3 Protocol Overview
We consider unicast messages, where each message is characterised by a source address,
a destination address, a delivery deadline, and an expected delivery rate imposed by
either the user or the upper-layer application or set with a default value. For example,
a value equal to 1 indicates the message is expected to be reliably delivered to the
destination within its deadline. Each node uses a time-slotted sliding window to main-
tain the most recent contact history, as shown in Figure 3.4. The sliding window is
divided into slots of equal length (e.g., 1 hour), and the length of the slots controls the
granularity of the contact history. Each node keeps track of the nodes it contacted in
each time slot. In such a way the encounter probability between any two nodes in any
time period can be estimated based on this ne-grained contact history. As illustrated
in Figure 3.4, node a generates a message at 8am, and needs to deliver it to node b
within 3 hours. The probability for node a to directly contact node b in the following 3
hours can be estimated using only the past contacts which occurred between 8am and
11am, thereby improving the accuracy of contact prediction.
To reduce the message overhead, message replication and forwarding in our scheme
is driven by the message's expected delivery rate in a fully decentralised manner. Each
message can generate multiple replicas, and each replica can further generate more
replicas to full the message's expected delivery rate. The expected delivery rate
associated with each replica represents the accumulative delivery rate that is expected
to be achieved by this replica and all its descendants that are either directly or indirectly
generated based on this replica. When node a that carries a replica encounters node b,








































Figure 3.4: Message replication and forwarding.
has been fullled; otherwise, it decides whether a new replica needs to be forwarded to
node b and how much delivery rate this new replica is expected to achieve, based on
the probability for node b to contact the message's destination.
An Illustrated Example: as shown in Figure 3.4, node a has a message to be
delivered to node d in 3 hours with an expected delivery rate of 0.9. According to
the contact history in a′s sliding window, node a has a probability of 0.8 to directly
encounter node d within 3 hours. Therefore, it keeps a replica for this direct delivery.
After one hour, node a encounters node b and learns that node b has a probability of
0.4 to contact node d. As the expected delivery rate of the original message has not
been fullled, node a sends a replica to node b. The expected delivery rate for this
replica is set to 0.4, and the deadline is set to 2 hours from now. After two hours,
node a encounters node c and sends another replica to node c. Since the expected
delivery rate (0.9) has been fullled, node a stops spreading more replicas to other
encountered nodes. As the contact probabilities may change over time, each node needs
to dynamically control message replication. For example, node b did not encounter node
d in the rst hour, and the contact probability between b and d drops to 0.2. To fulll
the expected delivery rate of 0.5, node b spreads a new replica to node e.
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3.4 Contact Characterisation and Prediction
3.4.1 Contact Detection and Representation
Each node needs to maintain the ne-grained information of the past contacts such as
the address of the encountered node and the contact time. However, directly recording
this information is not ecient in terms of both storage and retrieval speed, as most
devices are resource-constrained, and a device may encounter hundreds of devices or
even more. In our scheme, we use the bit matrix data structure to characterise the
contacts which occurred in the sliding window. Let Lw denote the length of the time-
slotted sliding window, and Ls represent the length of each time slot in the window.
Each node a maintains a bit matrix, denoted by Ma, to represent the recent contacts
which occurred between node a and its encountered nodes during the time period
covered by the sliding window. Ma is dened as
Ma[b][k] =
{
1, if maxnki=1 l
k







where nk is the number of contacts which occurred between a and b in time slot k, and
lkab(i) is the contact duration for the i
th contact. Ma[b][k] is marked to 1 only when there
is at least one contact in slot k with contact duration no smaller than a threshold α,
and the accumulative contact time in time slot k is no smaller than a threshold β. The
reason for using two thresholds α and β is to take into account the following scenario:
any single contact in slot k is not long enough for the two nodes to transfer all messages
that need to be exchanged. However, the two nodes contacts several times in slot k,
and the aggregated contact time is long enough to exchange messages. This eliminates
instantaneous contacts that are not helpful to message forwarding, as counting these
instantaneous contacts will lead to incorrect message forwarding decisions.
In mobile opportunistic networks, the contacts between nodes are commonly de-
tected through periodical scanning. We assume each node scans to discover neighbors
every θ seconds (e.g., 60s), and each scanning lasts for ϕ seconds (e.g., 10s). Then, the
duration of each contact (i.e., lkab(i) in Equation 3.3) can be estimated based on this
periodical scanning. As shown in Figure 3.5, a contact may span multiple scanning
periods. Since a contact may start and end at any time in the (θ − ϕ) seconds before
the rst time and after the last time it was detected, we estimate the duration of the
ith contact in the kth slot as follows:
lkab(i) = rand(0, θ − ϕ) + ni × θ + rand(0, θ − ϕ), (3.4)
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where ni is the number of consecutive scans in which b is discovered by a, and the two
rand(0, θ−ϕ)s represent the amount of time the contact lasts before the rst time and




Contact 1 Contact 2
Figure 3.5: Illustration of the estimation of lkab(i).
Figure 3.6 (a) gives an example of the bit matrix used to represent a sliding window
with 672 slots (i.e., Lw=4 weeks and Ls=1 hour). As shown in Figure 3.6 (b), each
row represents the ne-grained contact information for one encountered node within
the siding window. Each row is implemented using a circular buer data structure
with size of Lw/Ls bits, since it is well-suited for FIFO buering without the need
for element shuing for insertion operations. Moreover, all circular buers at one
node can share the same write pointer as each column in the bit matrix is updated
together slot by slot. Therefore, each node periodically scans, calculates the maximum
and accumulated contact time in the current slot, moves the writer pointer to the
current slot, and then updates the corresponding column in the bit matrix according
to Equation 3.3. Also, data in the circular buers can be fast retrieved based on the
matrix indexes. The requirement for storing the bit matrix in comparison with other





















































Figure 3.6: (a) bit matrix with 672 slots; (b) circular buer for one row.
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3.4.2 Contact Prediction
Contacts between dierent nodes may exhibit dierent patterns. For example, post-
graduates may have weekly meetings with supervisors, friends may have weekly social
gatherings, and employees in the same department may frequently contact each other
during workdays. The sliding window mechanism and the bit matrix representation
allow us to capture these patterns.
In the slotted sliding window, the history for one week is represented by 24×7
Ls
slots,









We assume nw is an integer, i.e., Lw is divisible by
24×7
Ls
. Given any slot k in the future,
the sliding window must contain nw slots that correspond to the same period of a day
as slot k, but in dierent weeks. The index for such a slot m in its circular buer




, where m ∈ [0, nw − 1], and mod is a Modulo
operation that returns a positive remainder. Let pab(k) denote the probability that
nodes a and b will contact in slot k. Then, pab(k) can be estimated using the history






where wm is the weight assigned to slot index(m). Dierent slots can have dierent
weights, e.g., more recent slots get larger weights to timely reect changes in contact
patterns.
Suppose node a carries a message/replica that needs to be delivered to node b during
the time period [ts, te]. Since ts and te may appear at any time in a slot, the slot in
which ts or te resides may not be fully covered by [ts, te]. Let k be the slot in which ts




1, te − ts + ηk ≤ Ls;




where ηk is the amount of time from the start of slot k until ts, which can be easily
obtained since each node needs to maintain the start time of the current slot to update
the bit matrix. If te − ts + ηk ≤ Ls, ts and te are in the same slot.
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Let pab(ts, te) be the probability that node a can send the message/replica directly
to node b during [ts, te]. According to Equation 3.6, the probability of two nodes
contacting in a slot is estimated, based on only the past contacts with contact time
long enough for message transfer. Hence, the message delivery fails only when there
is no such contact during the period of [ts, te]. We assume that ts and te of a contact
occur in a slot with uniform distribution, and let k be the slot that ts resides in. Thus,
pab(ts, te) can be estimated as follows:
pab(ts, te) =
{
pab(k)× te−tsLs , te − ts + ηk ≤ Ls;
1−
∏k+ns−1
i=k (1− p̄ab(i)), otherwise.
(3.8)




pab(k)× Ls−ηkLs , i = k;
pab(i), i ∈ (k, k + ns − 1);
pab(k + ns − 1)×
η(k+ns−1)
Ls
i = k + ns − 1.
(3.9)
It can be seen that the distribution of ts and te is used only for estimating the contact
probability in the incomplete slots. Therefore, the distribution will not signicantly
inuence the accuracy of the estimation for pab(ts, te), even if it is not uniform.
3.5 Message Replication and Routing
3.5.1 Message Replication and Forwarding
Each message or replica m has a lifetime Tm and an expected delivery rate Em, where
Em is the accumulative delivery rate to be achieved by this message/replica and all
other replicas that are either directly or indirectly generated based on m. Based on
Em, the node that carries m will decide how many replicas should be generated to
fulll Em. Suppose that k replicas have been generated and forwarded to nodes in
Fm = {f 1m, f 2m, ..., fkm}, and the expected delivery rates to be fullled by these k replicas
and their descendants are given in Pm = {E1m, E2m, ..., Ekm}. The delivery rate that is







where E0m = p
0
m is the probability of delivering m from the node that carries m directly
to the destination. Note that the computation of Pm(k) does not require the mainte-
nance of either Fm or Pm since the product part of Equation 3.10 is the probability
that all replicas failed to reach the destination, which can be computed incrementally
upon the generation of each replica. If Pm(k) ≥ Em, the node that carries m will stop
generating more replicas.
Algorithm 1: Replication and Forwarding at Sender
/* Upon encountering node b: */
1 for each message m in a′s buer do
2 if Destm == b then
3 Forward message m to node b;
4 Delete message m;
5 else
6 Add < IDm, Destm, Tm, γm > to SVa;
7 Send SVa to node b;
/* Upon receiving ACK for SVa: */
8 for each < IDm, p̄m > in ACK do
9 case Pm(k) < Em&p̄m ≥ Em do
10 Forward message m to b;
11 case Pm(k) < Em&p̄m < Em do
12 Generate a replica of m and forward it to b;
13 Update Pm(k);
14 case Pm(k) ≥ Em&p̄m > p0m do
15 Forward message m to b;
Algorithms 1 and 2 give the pseudo-code for message replication and forwarding at
sender (node a) and receiver (node b), respectively. When node a encounters node b,
node a rst delivers all its messages that are destined to node b. After that node a checks
how node b can help deliver the other messages it carries. To do this, node a generates
a summary vector SVa that contains information about the undelivered messages in
the format of < IDm, Destm, Tm, γm >, where IDm and Destm are the message ID and
destination, Tm is the message lifetime, and γm is the minimum expected delivery rate
for a replica of m that is used to eliminate bad forwarders. After generating SVa, node
a sends it to node b. Upon receiving SVa, for each < IDm, Destm, Tm, γm >, node b
will check if it has already carried a replica with IDm. If not, node b calculates the
probability for itself to deliver a replica of m to the destination before the deadline,
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Algorithm 2: Replication and Forwarding at Receiver
/* Upon receiving SVa from node a: */
1 for each < IDm, Destm, Tm, γm > in SVa do
2 if node b carries a replica with IDm then
3 Continue;
4 else
5 Calculate p̄bDestm according to Equation 3.8.
6 if p̄bDestm ≥ γm then
7 Add < IDm, p̄bDestm > to the ACK message;
8 Send ACK to node a;
denoted by p̄bDestm , according to Equation 3.8. If p̄bDestm ≥ γm, it indicates that node b
is a good forwarder for m, and < IDm, p̄bDestm > is added to the ACK message. In the
end, node b sends the ACK message to node a and informs which messages it chooses
to help delivery. After receiving the ACK message, for each < IDm, p̄m >, node a
decides whether to forward message m or send a replica of m to node b based on the
following rules:
Rule1: If Pm(k) < Em & p̄m ≥ Em, node a directly forwards the message/replica m
to node b. This is because the expected delivery rate allocated for m has not
been fullled, but node b can achieve an expected delivery rate no smaller than
Em if it carries m. Hence, there is no need to generate a new replica.
Rule2: If Pm(k) < Em & p̄m < Em, node a generates a new replica and sends it to
node b. The expected delivery rate for the new replica is the probability for node
b to contact the destination, and node a updates Pm(k).
Rule3: If Pm(k) ≥ Em & p̄m > p0m, node a forwards m to node b. This is because,
even though the expected delivery rate Em has been fullled, node b can provide
higher delivery rate than node a.
Illustrating Example: As shown in Figure 3.7(a), node a has a message to be de-
livered to node d in 9 hours with an expected delivery rate of 0.9. The probability
for node a to send the message to node d through direct contact is 0.4. As shown in
Figure 3.7(b), node a encounters node c after one hour, and forwards a replica to node
c according to Rule2. The expected delivery rate for this new replica is set at 0.8.
After two hours, node a encounters node b and forwards it another replica. After that,
the expected delivery rate for the original message at node a has been fullled, and
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node a stops spreading replicas. As shown in Figure 3.7(c), node b carries a replica
and encounters node e that has a larger delivery rate (0.7) than b. According to Rule3,








































Figure 3.7: Illustration of replication and forwarding.
When two nodes encounters, they will rst update the expected delivery rate via
direct contact for each message they carry. It might happen that, for a replica carried
by node a, the probability for node a to deliver the replica directly to its destination
drops below the replica's expected delivery rate as time elapses. In this case, node a
will resume message replication and spread more replicas to fulll the expected delivery
rate. As illustrated in Figure 3.7(d), node e carries a replica with an expected delivery
rate of 0.5. but the probability for node e to directly send the replica to node d drops
to 0.3 after one hour. Therefore, node e spreads a new replica to node f to help
fullling the expected delivery rate of 0.5. It can be seen that, driven by the message's
expected delivery rate, message replication is performed online by taking into account
the real-time network conditions and the replication history.
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3.5.2 Automatic Adjustment of Relay Selection Threshold γm
In our scheme, each message replica m is associated with a parameter γm for forwarder
selection. A large γm prevents sending replicas to encountered nodes with a low message
delivery rate, which reduces message overhead, but may not spread enough replicas to
fulll the expected delivery rate. On the other hand, a small γm will lead to the
generation of many replicas to encountered nodes with a low message delivery rate,
which will increase the message overhead. Since each node in our scheme maintains
only local information, it cannot decide whether another node is a good forwarder for a
certain message until it encounters that node. Also a node cannot predict whether the
current encountered node is the best or it will encounter a better one later. Therefore,
we use the following scheme to dynamically adjust the message forwarding threshold.






where ∆tm is the remaining lifetime for replica m, ∆
e
m is the delivery rate that is
expected to be fullled by the already generated replicas, and γ0 is an upper bound
for γm. It can be seen that, the smaller the ∆
t
m, the smaller the γ
new
m so that more
replicas will be generated and spread to more forwarders to fulll the expected message
delivery rate. In the same way, the larger the ∆em, the larger the γ
new
m to ensure that
only good forwarders are selected to reduce the message overhead.
3.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our scheme through trace-driven sim-
ulations. A self-customised simulator is implemented using Python 3.7.0. The reason
for not choosing any of the existing simulators is because they usually manage nodes'
mobility in a random approach, which results in the work of optimising parameters be-
coming very time consuming. Our FGAR protocol contains a few parameters need to
be adjusted. Using constant real-world data traces bring us the convenience of needing
only a limited number of experiments to nd out the optimised set of parameters. Also,
the real-world data trace could also enable us to precisely monitor and learn dierent
contact patterns between nodes. Based on the observation of contact patterns, our
self-designed simulator also clearly present the generated probability between pairwise
nodes and message replication process, and thus to monitor whether the generated
probability could adapt to the contact pattern changes quickly and accurately enough.
In addition, our customised simulator also can accurately exhibit the performance of
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FGAR and other protocols in several data traces, which may appear quite dierent
contact patterns. For the above reasons, a self-customised simulator, together with the
existing data trace, perfectly satises our requirements.
Through the conducted simulations, we rst investigate the impact of parameter
settings on routing performance, and then compare the performance with Epidemic,
PRoPHET, 3R and Spray & Wait in terms of average delivery rate, message overhead,
and memory requirement. We used the following three representative DTN traces:
Cambridge Scott et al. (2006): This trace includes Bluetooth sightings by graduate
students carrying iMotes for six days, and contains more than 200 devices. In our
simulations, we extend it to 2 months by duplicating the original trace, and add some
noise by shifting each duplicated contact for δ seconds where δ is randomly chosen from
[-4500, 4500]. Therefore, the pairwise contacts in this data trace have a high degree of
repetitions.
MIT Reality Eagle and Pentland (2005): We used the devicespan subtrace that
records Bluetooth contacts among faculties and students at MIT for ∼ 9 months, and
this trace contains more than 20,000 devices. The pairwise contacts in this data trace
have a medium degree of repetitions, and it contains many random contacts.
UMass DieselNet Burgess et al. (2008): The trace contains bus-to-bus communi-
cation during the spring semester of 2006. The trace contains 36 buses in total. Some
of the pairwise contacts have a high degree of repetitions, but still contain random
contacts and noise.
We use the following metrics to compare the performance of dierent routing
schemes: (1) average message delivery rate: the ratio of the number of delivered mes-
sages to the number of created messages; (2)message overhead : the ratio of the number
of replicas to the number of created messages.
3.6.1 Simulation Set-up
Due to the large dierence on node popularity, the selection of sources and destinations
for the three traces are slightly dierent. In the Cambridge trace, the 30 most active
nodes are selected as sources and destinations, whereas in the MIT trace, the destina-
tion for each message is selected randomly from the 20 most active nodes during the
lifetime of that message. There is no limitation on selecting source and destination
nodes in Dieselnet trace since it contains only 36 nodes, and most of them have a
relative high contact frequency. This selection avoids negligible delivery ratio caused
by numerous inactive nodes. We use the same message trace to compare the perfor-
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mance of dierent protocols, and the message trace is generated as follows: each source
generates a message with a probability of 0.1 in every 600 seconds, and the message
destination is randomly chosen from the set of destinations. The lifetime of each mes-
sage varies from 4 hours to 1 week, and the size of a message varies from 2k bytes to
100k bytes.
To make fair comparisons, in each simulation run, the network is warmed up for one
month with no messages generated, and there is also no message generated in the last
week to avoid any wandering packet at the end of the simulation. All parameters in
PRoPHET are congured to the recommended values (Lindgren et al. (2004)). Unless
specially noted, the parameters in FGAR are congured as follows: the sliding window
is set to 4 weeks (672 slots, 1 hour per slot), the expected delivery rate for each message
is 0.9, and λ0 in Equation 3.11 is set to 1. For Spray & Wait, we use its binary
version in our experiments. Since the performance of Spray & Wait is very sensitive
to its parameter setting, to achieve its best performance, based on results collected
from our comprehensive simulations, the maximum number of message replicas is set
to 5 for Cambridge, 70 for MIT Reality, and 10 for UMass DieselNet trace as the
best conguration for each corresponding data trace. This is because the contact
pattern between pairwise nodes in Cambridge is very regular; thus it only needs 5
replicas/message to achieve its best performance, as well as avoiding memory overow
issue. However, massive noise and irregular contact patterns inside the MIT Reality
and the DieselNet traces result in more replicas to be generated in its semi-ooding
mechanism.
3.6.2 Impact of Protocol Parameter Conguration
Expected Message Delivery Rate
Message replication in FGAR is driven by the expected message delivery rate. The
higher the expected message delivery rate, the more replicas may be generated to fulll
the expected delivery rate. Figure 3.8 (a) and (b) show the achieved average message
delivery rate and the message overhead with the variation of the expected message
delivery rate. For the Cambridge trace, the achieved message delivery rate slightly
increases with the increase of the expected message delivery rate, and drops a little
at the end. The message overhead slightly increases, and the maximum is just 0.21.
This is due to the regularity of the Cambridge trace as it is produced by duplicating
the original trace. Even though noise has been added, the contacts between nodes still
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Figure 3.8: (a) and (b) show the impact of the expected message delivery rate; (c)
shows the impact of window size; (d) shows the impact of weighting.
exhibit strong weekly repeat patterns. Hence, most pims in Equation 3.10 are 1, and
very few replicas need to be generated. Since our approach can capture the contact
patterns, nodes can propagate replicas to the right relays so that the message delivery
rate and overhead remain approximately constant. This demonstrates that our scheme
can achieve superior performance when contacts between nodes exhibit a high degree
of repeated patterns.
For the MIT trace, with the increase of the expected message delivery rate, the
achieved delivery rate increases gradually, except for a sharp drop when the expected
delivery rate is set to 1. The message overhead is proportional to the expected delivery
rate when the expected delivery rate is no larger than 0.9. Beyond that, the message
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overhead increases signicantly, and reaches around 3.5 when the expected delivery rate
is 1. This phenomenon can be explained using Equation 3.10. Theoretically, Pm(k)
can never reach 1 if all pims are smaller than 1. Since the MIT trace contains many
random contacts, most pims are smaller than 1. Therefore, each source node continues
spraying replicas upon encountering good forwarders unless the expected delivery rate
has been fullled.
Size of the Sliding Window
Figure 3.8 (c) shows the impact of the sliding window size on the achieved average
message delivery rate. For the Cambridge trace, the size of the sliding window does
not have much impact on the average delivery rate. This is due to the regularity of
this trace since maintaining only one week contact history can still precisely represent
the nodes' contact patterns. For the MIT trace, the achieved average delivery rate
improves with the increase of the window size. Since contacts in this trace do not
have perfect repeat patterns, a larger sliding window can better represent the contact
patterns and improve the accuracy of contact prediction.
Weight on Contact History
In Equation 3.6, dierent slots in the sliding window can have dierent weights in
computing the contact probability. Figure 3.8 (d) shows the achieved average message
delivery rate using dierent weighting schemes. For the Cambridge trace, there is no
big dierence for the two weighting schemes due to the regularity of this data trace.
However, for the MIT Reality trace, a higher message delivery rate is achieved by giving
larger weight to more recent slots, since this can reect changes on contact patterns in
a timely manner.
3.6.3 Storage Requirement for Contact Prediction
Table 3.1 compares the storage requirement for contact prediction in dierent schemes
in terms of the maximum storage required for the busiest node, and the average storage
consumption for the entire population. Each device uses its MAC address (6 bytes)
as its identity. In PRoPHET, each device needs to record the encounter probability
(oat type, 4 bytes) for each encountered device. In FGAR, each device locally records
the bit matrix, whereas in 3R, each device needs to record the date and time for each
contact. It can be seen from Table 3.1 that 3R has the largest storage requirement
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Table 3.1: Storage Requirement for Contact Prediction
Protocol
Cambridge MIT
Max (bytes) Avg (bytes) Max (bytes) Avg (bytes)
PRoPHET 2,230 119 99,970 420
3R 339,300 1,677 665,730 1,844
FGAR (672, 1) 7,830 387 42,480 74
FGAR (336, 2) 4,176 206 22,656 40
FGAR (168, 3) 2,349 116 12,744 23
FGAR (84, 4) 1,436 71 7,788 18
as it needs to store the information for each contact, and FGAR does not consume
extremely large storage in comparison with PRoPHET, even though it maintains ne-
grained contact information. In addition, FGAR is able to consume less memory by
characterising the history into a sparser sliding window, but the performance is slightly
degraded as discussed in Section 3.6.2. For the Cambridge trace, when Lw = 672 and
Ls = 1, both the maximum and average storage requirements for FGAR is around
3 times of those for PRoPHET. For the case where Lw = 168 and Ls = 3, FGAR
consumes approximately the same memory as PRoPHET. For the MIT trace, both the
maximum and the average storage requirement of FGAR is much less than PRoPHET
at all stages. This is because MIT trace contains a large number of inactive nodes.
Although PRoPHET only needs to record the device address and its contact probability,
a node has to keep the entire list from the encountered nodes, even though the records
contain a lot of the information about the nodes it has never seen. However, a node
using FGAR only needs to maintain the history for its encountered nodes, and also the
history is dumped if the previous encountered nodes disappear for a long time. Due to a
signicant dierence in the population of the two traces, the number of history records
on average is 87 per node when using PRoPHET, and 4.3 for FGAR in Cambridge
trace, while it is 42.02 for PRoPHET, and 0.82 for FGAR using MIT trace.
3.6.4 Comparison with Existing Schemes
Advantage of Dynamic Message Replication Control
Figure 3.9 compares the performance improvement achieved by ne-grained contact
characterisation and adaptive message replication. FG is a simplied version of FGAR
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Figure 3.9: Performance of FG and FGAR: (a) and (b) for Cambridge trace, and (c)
and (d) for MIT trace.
which has removed its replication control process. In Cambridge trace, it can be seen
that FGAR outperforms FG on delivery rate when memory buer is small, and they
have the same performance when the buer is large enough. However, FG generates
24.6 times more message replicas than FGAR with a sucient memory buer. Due
to the removing of message replication control, the redundant message replicas con-
sume too much memory which might lead to other packets being rejected because
of memory overow. The lost packets will consequently result in the degradation of
the performance. In the MIT trace, the performance gap is much smaller than it in
the Cambridge trace. FGAR and FG have a very close achieved delivery rate for all
memory settings, but FGAR only needs 1.7 replicas/message on average, while FG
requires at least 11 replicas. This indicates that the contact prediction based on ne-
grained history is reliable, and an intelligent message replication control can remove
unnecessary message copies, thus further enhancing the performance.
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Figure 3.10: Performance of FGAR, Epidemic, PRoPHET and 3R: (a) and (b) for
Cambridge trace, (c) and (d) for MIT trace, and (e) and (f) for DieselNet trace.
Cambridge Trace
Figure 3.10 (a) and (b) shows the average delivery rate and the message overhead of
the ve schemes by varying the size of the per-node message buer. For Epidemic,
the achieved message delivery rate increases with the increase of message buer size as
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it performs blind ooding. For the other four schemes, the achieved message delivery
rate rst increases with the increase of buer size and then remains steady. This is
because these four schemes control message replication, and the message delivery rate
cannot be further improved when the message buer is large enough to carry messages.
It can be seen that both FGAR and 3R outperform PRoPET and Spray & Wait for all
buer settings, especially when the message buer is small. This is because FGAR and
3R use ne-grained contraction history to predict future contacts, through which the
accuracy of contact prediction has been greatly improved. When the message buer
is set to 1M bytes/node, the average delivery rate achieved by FGAR is improved by
47% in comparison with PRoPHET. It can be seen that FGAR outperforms 3R under
all buer settings due to the delivery rate driven message replication. However, it is
worth noting that the message overhead in FGAR is not signicantly increased and
remains very stable, as shown in Figure 3.10 (b). When the message buer is set to
6M bytes/node, the message overhead of FGAR is only 0.09, whereas Spray & Wait,
PRoPHET, and Epidemic, have a message overhead of 2.9, 5 and 39, respectively.
These demonstrate that FGAR can achieve remarkable performance when the nodes
are memory-constrained and have regular contact patterns.
MIT Trace
Figure 3.10 (c) and (d) show the performance of the ve schemes using the MIT
Reality trace. Generally speaking, the average message delivery rate and message
overhead have the same trends as those in the Cambridge trace. FGAR achieves higher
average delivery rate than the other schemes in most cases, but with an extremely low
overhead. When the message buer is set to 4M bytes/node, the average delivery
rate achieved by FGAR is improved by 15.3% in comparison with PRoPHET, but the
message overhead in PRoPHET is more than 38 times that in FGAR. 3R achieves
roughly the same message delivery rate as PRoPHET when the message buer is no
larger than 4M bytes/node, but performs much worse than PRoPHET when message
buer is large. This is because the MIT trace contains numerous random contacts that
show no discernible patterns, and 3R keeps only a single copy for each message which
is not enough to achieve a high message delivery rate. When the message buer is set
to 10M bytes/node, Epidemic and PRoPHET perform slightly better than FGAR, but
this slight improvement is achieved by a signicant increase in the message overhead.
FGAR outperforms Spray & Wait at all memory stages, while Spray & Wait generates
at least 20 times more message replicas than FGAR.
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UMass DieselNet Trace
Figure 3.10 (e) and (f) show the performance of ve schemes using DieselNet trace. It
can be seen that the overall trends of both the achieved delivery rate and the message
overhead have the same appearance as in the previous two traces. FGAR still gains a
higher delivery rate than the other four protocols when devices have a small message
buer. When the memory buer is set to 2M bytes/node, the delivery rate of FGAR
increases to 9.8% more than PRoPHET, and 10.1% better in comparison with Spray
& Wait. The message overhead for FGAR at this stage is only 1.72, while it is 5.12 for
PRoPHET, and 3.99 for Spray & Wait. This is because FGAR takes the advantage
of ne-grained historical information characterisation for its accurate prediction, and
the adaptive message replication can eectively eliminate unnecessary message replicas.
Due to the limitation on the number of message replicas in Spray & Wait, it always has
a lower message overhead than PRoPHET. As the memory buer increases, Epidemic
and PRoPHET have the advantage of ooding, thus they outperforms FGAR a little
bit. However, Epidemic generates 14.65 replicas per message on average, PRoPHET
has 11.8 for this, while it is only 3.37 for FGAR.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we propose an ecient routing scheme for infrastructure-less DTNs,
namely FGAR, which achieves a high message delivery rate with an extremely low
message replication overhead. A ne-grained bit matrix is leveraged for characterising
the contact history. The future encountering probability between pairwise nodes is
estimated according to the retrieval of the contact history from particular time slots
using a exible sliding window mechanism. Message replication is controlled in a decen-
tralised way by taking into account the expected message delivery rate, the replication
history, and the real-time network conditions. Trace-based simulations demonstrate
that FGAR can achieve remarkable performance when contacts between nodes have
a high degree of repetition, and performs better than other schemes, even when the
contacts between nodes are more random, especially when the message buer size is
small. The conducted simulations exhibit that the accuracy of contact prediction is
improved by characterising contact history in a ne-grained manner, from the advan-
tages of both an accurate expression in the regular contact pattern and an eective
real-time adaption to the dynamically changing pattern.
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Chapter 4
Evaluating the Safety of Bitcoin
Blockchain under a High Latency
DTN Environment
Blockchain technology exhibits an outstanding security strength in protecting cryp-
tocurrency, as it ensures a strong immutability of bitcoin transaction history in an
untrusted decentralised network environment. Such decentralised security inspired us
a clear direction to enhance the safety of DTNs, which have more limitations than
the Internet environment where the actual bitcoin blockchain is running on. How-
ever, the computationally expensive Proof-of-Work (PoW) and a solid requirement
for a fast and stable peers' connectivity result in the infeasibility of directly applying
the bitcoin blockchain onto the resource-constrained high latency DTNs. Despite the
hardware limitations on DTN devices, it is also uncertain to what extent the heteroge-
neous communication latency negatively impacts both the performance (i.e., transac-
tion throughput) and the security strength of the blockchain. To move a step forward
towards making the deployment of blockchain technology to DTNs into reality, in this
chapter, we comprehensively analyse the impact of peers' communication latency on
the safety of blockchain. More particularly, we focus on analysing the speed of block
convergence and the violation of the six conrmations convention (the denition of
this term is in Section 1.6) of blockchain when nodes may have the network latency
congured from 10 minuteswhich is the typical average target time for the generation
of bitcoin blocks, as adaptively adjusted by PoW mining dicultyup to two hours.
The contributions of this chapter are:
1. We analyse the trade-o between the block convergence speed of blockchain, given
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the changes to population size and PoW mining diculty under dierent extents
of network latency.
2. We measure the safety of applying the six conrmations convention at dierent
levels of the network latency.
3. We conduct several simulations that model heterogeneous network latency. We
quantify the extent to which nodes with lower latency gain an additional unfair
advantage for PoW mining.
4.1 Motivation
The most critical problem in investigating the feasibility of deploying blockchain to a
DTN environment is guring out how the various extents of communication latency
aect the safety of blockchain. The key feature of blockchain is its decentralised se-
curity over a P2P untrusted network. This is achieved by ensuring the majority of
cryptocurrency users converge on consistent blockchain data. Proof-of-Work (PoW)
schemes make changing the blockchain expensive, and block hash chaining ensures
that any change to blocks (and thus transactions) is detectable. Therefore, tampered
blocks can be easily detected with low computational complexity, by agreement of the
distributed inspection of the potentially divergent chains across many nodes. We dene
block convergence as all nodes agreeing on an identical blockchain.
The block convergence of blockchain can be easily disrupted by increased network
latency. Ideally, nodes should hear about freshly mined blocks as quickly as possible.
Faster spreading to the network of a new block enables it to be validated earlier by
other nodes, allowing them to update their blockchains with the new validated block.
Thus, the blockchain will stabilise back to a globally converged state within shorter
time frames. However, as network latency increases, the blockchain has a much higher
chance to form forks due to multiple new blocks being mined by dierent nodes. The
variety of new blocks will result in honest nodes being unsure as to which of the forks
will end up being established as the longest chain, thus destabilising global consensus.
The divergence of these new blocks expose the corresponding transactions involved to
the risk of ending up on a blockchain fork that is not adopted globally. In scenar-
ios with variable network latency for dierent nodes, nodes with lower latency will
gain disproportionate control though selsh mining. For some emerging technologies
that are designed for a high-latency network communication environment, the security
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of blockchain could become fragile with delayed communication between blockchain
maintainers (e.g., bitcoin miners).
Few studies have investigated the impact of network latency on the performance of
blockchain. Most existing blockchain-based systems are designed under the assump-
tion of stable peer-to-peer connectivity. The delay of synchronisation is not a focus
in their work. Existing research has instead well examined the inuence of the typi-
cal delays that exist in real-world blockchain systems, and has explored non-security
perspectives of blockchain performance, such as the rate of blocks being exchanged,
or the throughput of transactions into the blockchain. Gencer, Basu, Eyal, van Re-
nesse, and Sirer (2018), and Decker and Wattenhofer (2013) investigated the impact
of network latency on transaction throughput and the ratio of lost ledger replica in-
formation. However, their experiments were conducted in environments with network
latencies ranging from milliseconds to seconds. To the best of our knowledge, there is
no existing research that measures comprehensively how much latency would interfere
with the security of blockchain, or that studies the eect of latencies that range up
to the minute or hour level. We also provide guidance on the feasibility of deploying
blockchain to environments with a high or highly-variable network latency.
4.2 Related work
Blockchain was introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto (Nakamoto (2009)); blockchain pro-
vides an advanced decentralised peer-to-peer security for bitcoin transactions without
the need for authorised third parties. Beyond the protection of activities involving cy-
bercurrencies, the convergence of blockchain technology with various emerging network
applications brings numerous opportunities as well as challenges. The suitability of ap-
plying blockchain technology in dierent domains has been reviewed in publications
by Michael, Pattanayak, Verma, Kalyanaraman, et al. (2016) and Lo, Xu, Chiam, and
Lu (2017). Some researchers designed blockchain-based infrastructure for IoT (Kosba,
Miller, Shi, Wen, and Papamanthou (2016); Fabiano (2017)), and the privacy and legal
concerns behind blockchain technology are also discussed. Sharma, Moon, and Park
(2017) examine emerging VANETs in smart city applications, and a distributed archi-
tecture for VANET based on blockchain is further introduced. They also introduced
the combination of Software Dened Network (SDN) with blockchain technology for
cloud storage in a later contribution (Sharma, Chen, and Park (2018)), to achieve a
minimal end-to-end delay between IoT devices. Additionally, Dorri, Steger, Kanhere,
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and Jurdak (2017) designed a lightweight scalable blockchain for VANET.
Few publications explore the impact of network disconnection on the performance
of blockchain. Gencer et al. (2018) conducted a comprehensive measurement study of
decentralisation metrics for two leading cyptocurrencies, namely, bitcoin and Ethereum.
Their results indicate that bitcoin users are often geographically closer together than
Ethereum users, so bitcoin users typically have a network latency less than 100ms.
They also showed that many of the bitcoin nodes are run in datacentres. Decker and
Wattenhofer (2013) discovered that network latency critically aects the propagation
of blocks smaller than 20KB.
Many blockchain overview and survey publications (Bonneau, Miller, Clark, Narayanan,
Kroll, and Felten (2015); Conti, Sandeep Kumar, Lal, and Ruj (2018)) have mentioned
the six conrmations convention to reduce the risk of the revocation of transactions
that are stored on blockchain forks that end up being discarded. A new cryptocurrency
was claimed by Kogias, Jovanovic, Gailly, Kho, Gasser, and Ford (2016), namely
ByzCoin, which optimises transaction commitment and verication, while still guar-
anteeing safety and liveness under Byzantine faults. ByzCoin only needs one block
conrmation to approve a transaction, which hugely improves the transaction through-
put compared to the original blockchain. Rosenfeld (2014) calculated the possibility
of double-spending can be raised within the bitcoin blockchain, based on changing the
number of conrmations required, and the computation power of attackers. To the best
of our knowledge, our work is unique in conducting a comprehensive survey on the im-
pact brought about by large-scale network latency on the fundamental and important
properties of blockchain, especially targeting block convergence and the feasibility of
applying the six conrmations rule.
4.3 Block Convergence
Blockchain has such eectiveness in practice because of the global unication of the
blockchain data that are maintained and agreed on by the majority of the mining
population. We dene the block convergence of blockchain as the state in which every
single node in the network maintains exactly the same chain copy, with a consistent
sequence on both the blocks on the longest chain and the transactions inside each
block. The blockchain managed by dierent bitcoin users needs to periodically achieve
the state of block convergence by synchronising new validated blocks, or updating it-
self to a longer blockchain from other nodes network-wide. Bitcoin blockchain allows
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nodes to align themselves towards block convergence through its PoW mining scheme
and the blockchain consensus protocol, which is supported by stable and fast Internet
connectivity. PoW mining is computation that is hard to solve by blockchain miners
themselves, but easy to validate for other users. For each newly mined block, miners
have to solve a hash puzzle with an agreed diculty level. The simplicity of hash-
based PoW leads to an extremely low computational diculty in validating the entire
blockchain. Any modication to block content leads to a detectable change on the PoW
hash, and re-solving a PoW hash puzzle remains as highly computationally expensive
as the original published solution. The blockchain consensus protocol requires all the
nodes to broadcast both unapproved transactions and newly generated blocks. Com-
pared to the relatively long time for blockchain block generation (around 10 minutes,
on average), synchronising a new block is much faster for nodes with a stable Internet
connectivity. Hence, nodes in the network can quickly readapt to a block-converged
state, and those nodes' blockchains will be stable most of the time. Because of this,
an extremely strong decentralised integrity-check of blockchain is formed, and brings
success to real-world blockchain-based cryptocurrencies and applications.
It is widely believed that by controlling at least 51% of the net computational
power, malicious attackers can successfully take control over the blockchain. Actually,
some types of eective attacks can be easier, since it has been proved by Castro and
Liskov (1999), Christidis and Devetsikiotis (2016), and Zoican, Vochin, Zoican, and
Galatchi (2018) that attackers have the ability to perform Byzantine fault attacks via
controlling only one third of the total computation power. In any case, it is desirable
to have as many nodes as possible maintain an identical blockchain to guarantee the
decentralised immutability of the blockchain.
Bitcoin blockchain will not quiesce into a long-term, stable block convergence state
because so many incoming transactions are waiting to be added into the blockchain,
Nonetheless, it is still necessary to get some insights into block convergence. This is
because the integrity of blockchain mainly comes from the global block convergence
state. PoW and the consensus protocol underneath blockchain are all designed for
the purpose of reaching block convergence for all the blockchain nodes. However,
block convergence is highly sensitive to many environmental factors. Slower block
convergence causes the degradation of the decentralised security of blockchain, and
raises the risk of malicious attacks. In this chapter, we mainly focus on investigating the
degree of negative inuence on block convergence that comes from exploring increasing
peer-to-peer network latency.
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4.4 Six Conrmations Convention
To reduce the risk of double-spending, a bitcoin transaction is typically only treated
as being permanently conrmed when it is six blocks deep in the longest accepted
(known) blockchain (Bonneau et al. (2015); Conti et al. (2018)). Double spending
issue is a typical attack type of cryptocurrency, in which malicious attackers try to
spend the same crypto-coins multiple times. This is achieved via a malicious node
claim a conicting transaction which consume the same Unspent Transaction Output
(UTXO) but yield dierent outputs with the benign transaction. Although transactions
are cryptographically signed within new blocks when they are rstly entered into a
blockchain, the transaction is not allowed to be cleared for the transacting parties:
because the block is not buried deep enough inside a blockchain, it has a comparatively
high chance of ending up on a chain that is replaced by a longer chain when forks
are resolved. Thus, to treat the transaction as cleared, typically, both transacting
parties will wait for six subsequent blocks to be appended to the chain containing the
transaction. In the real-world bitcoin blockchain, the longest chain will usually only
be one block ahead of other blockchain forks due to the high availability of network
connectivity. Six conrmations approach makes committed transactions extremely
unlikely to be revoked from the blockchain.
There is no particular reason for choosing six as the default number of conr-
mations required, and it can be exibly changed by updating the consensus rule of
the blockchain software. Rosenfeld (2014) summarised the possibility of successfully
launching double spending attacks under various combinations of dierent numbers of
block conrmations and the computation power of attackers. His calculations conclude
that with six conrmations for transaction commitment, the risk of double-spending is
negligible (< 0.1%), even in the unlikely situation that attackers amass up to 10% of
the entire computation power of the blockchain network.
Of course, a transaction followed by six blocks is not automatically safe from being
revoked. As noted above, the transaction's block could still be discarded (rolled back)
due to soft/hard forks caused by consensus change or software updates. For example,
when an additional constraint on the blockchain consensus rule needs to be applied to
the new versions of software, a soft fork is triggered for nodes to upgrade to the newest
blockchain. The blocks generated by the old version miners will be treated as invalid by
the nodes with a new version blockchain consensus. Continued rejection of the mined
old-version blocks will force blockchain nodes to catch up to the latest released version
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of blockchain.
Case Study: More than 15 soft fork events are recorded within the Bitcoin Im-
provement Proposal (BIP) (Taaki (2012)). BIP16 (Andresen (2012b); McCorry, Heil-
man, and Miller (2017)) is one of the most famous soft forks of the bitcoin blockchain,
and happened in 2012. The purpose of the soft fork was to ocially standardise addi-
tional validation rules to the new transactions, namely, pay to script hash (P2SH).
The newest version of the consensus rule can only be activated if more than 55% of the
users update to the newest software within seven days. However, the evaluation point
was signicantly delayed, and the miners who used the new software version had their
blockchains stuck at a block height of 170,060 because the remaining 45% of miners
produced invalid blocks for several months after P2SH was released. Later, BIP34
(Andresen (2012a)) prevented this problem by raising the activation threshold to 95%.
The above case study demonstrates that a large number of blocks containing trans-
actions can be revoked because of manually updating the consensus or software. Besides
this, network latency, while not a common problem in today's blockchain community
with good network connectivity, still has the potential to violate six conrmations of
blockchain in a much easier way compared to the soft/hard fork scenarios. In this
chapter, we investigate the impact of various network latency levels on how conver-
gence occurs within blockchain, and the safety of applying the convention of waiting
for six subsequent blocks for these dierent network latency settings.
4.5 Experimental Set-up
The goal of our simulation is to investigate the impact of network latency on the safety
of blockchain. The blockchain we implemented uses a greatly simplied structure
compared to the original bitcoin blockchain. The PoW mining is modelled in a much
less computational approach, which eliminates what would have been an impractical
and unnecessary workload for our blockchain simulator. To the best of our knowledge,
there has not been a blockchain simulation that has focused on investigating the impact
to blockchain security caused by a large range of network latency.
4.5.1 How to Reach Block Convergence
To measure the speed of block convergence, we dene the concept of block convergence
in our simulation as how much time is needed for all the nodes to nally obtain ex-
actly the same blockchain, with all pre-generated transactions included. Therefore, the
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number of transactions has to be limited, as well as their generating period. After the
transaction generation, PoW winners still create empty blocks without transactions
included, and nodes still communicate and synchronise their blockchain with others as
they do throughout the rest of simulation time. The simulation is terminated when all
the nodes reach the block convergence state.
4.5.2 Nodes and Communication
Due to hardware and simulation time limitations, it is more eective to simulate the
activities within competing mining pools, rather than a large number of small partic-
ipants in a blockchain community. Therefore, the node population size is relatively
small in our simulation, with the conguration options of 20, 30, 40, 50 and 60, respec-
tively. Also, it is constant without the consideration of nodes dynamically entering and
exiting the network during a given simulation. Nodes are initialised with a network
disconnection interval that is randomly chosen from an appropriate time range. The
latency time setting for each node might be dierent, and this is further discussed in
Section 4.5.3.
It is hard to quantify the impact of random peer-to-peer network latency, which is
always the case for DTNs' realities, on the safety of blockchain. This is because un-
normalised latency will bring unpredictable bias to the nal statistics. To address this
problem, we model the peer-to-peer communication as nodes periodically connecting
to an additional global reachable node which denotes Internet connectivity. Except
randomly picking a latency time at the very start of simulations, nodes will have con-
stant Internet disconnection intervals during the rest of simulation time to avoid further
random contact within the population. The subset of nodes that connects to the In-
ternet node indicates the availability of stable peer-to-peer connectivity among all of
those nodes within the current time unit (i.e., 600 seconds). When a pair of nodes has
Internet connectivity, it performs the following three tasks:
1. Uncommitted transaction exchanging: Both nodes exchange their transac-
tions inside mempool. Of course, the transactions already received will not be
accepted by a node twice.
2. Blockchain validation: nodes validate each other's blockchains by inspecting
the hash correctness of each block.
3. Blockchain updating: nodes always replace their blockchain with a longer one,
if such a blockchain is exchanged with them.
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4.5.3 Network Latency Setting
Let l denote the current network latency, which is the disconnection time for a node
away from the Internet. Let p be the network population, and time_unit represent
the time unit for simulation, which we set at 600 secondsequal to the target average
block generation interval for the original bitcoin blockchain. For the simulations with
homogeneous latency conguration, the latency time of a node is randomly chosen from
the range of [l, l+time_unit ].
To explore the impact of dierent degrees of heterogeneity of network latency on
the performance of blockchain, it is helpful to avoid large variance within the statistics
introduced by random distribution of peer-to-peer latency. Therefore, we normalise
nodes' latency into dierent heterogeneous network latency groups (HNL). A simulation
is held under the any of the conguration options of HNL1, HNL2, HNL3 and HNL4,
respectively. In each case the n in HNLn indicates how many heterogeneous groups
the entire population will be evenly divided into. Each group of nodes has its latency
chosen from an appropriate range, which is given as follows:
1. HNL1one homogeneous group. Network latency of nodes is always within the
range of [l, l+time_unit ].
2. HNL2two heterogeneous groups. The network latency of the rst half of the
population is set within the range [l, l + time_unit ], while the second half of the
nodes has [2l, 2l + time_unit ].
3. HNL3three heterogeneous groups, with the network latency settings of [0.5l,
0.5l + time_unit ], [l, l + time_unit ], and [2l, 2l + time_unit ]. The entire
population is equally divided into these three groups.
4. HNL4four heterogeneous groups, with the network latency settings of [0.5l, 0.5l
+ time_unit ], [l, l + time_unit ], [2l, 2l + time_unit ], and [4l, 4l + time_unit ].
Each group has the same size of population.
4.5.4 Blockchain Structure and Transaction Storage
All nodes are initiated with an empty chain and an unapproved transaction list, namely
mempool. The uncommitted transactions will be temporarily stored in mempool before
they are added into blocks on the blockchain. Since the removal of transactions due
to an overlled mempool is unnecessary in our simulation, our mempool is unbounded.
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Similarly, there is no limitation on the capacity of a block for the approved transactions.
Every time a mining winner generates a new block, all the transactions in mempool are
included into the new block, and mempool is entirely emptied of transactions.
The blockchain structure is much simplied from the original one for bitcoin. Con-
sistent with the original bitcoin blockchain, nodes still maintain a linear time-stamped
structure blockchain, and the blocks are interconnected by hash consecutiveness. How-
ever, a block maintains fewer components, specically:
1. Index number: the index of the current block.
2. Approved transaction list: the bitcoin transactions.
3. Previous block hash: the overall hash value of the previous block.
4. Block generator: the ID of the node that has generated this block.
Since the consistency of transaction content is outside the scope of this contribution,
it is not necessary to store extra bits for the transaction hashes using Merkel Trees.
Instead, they are simply stored in the block without any encryption or compression.
We only need to keep track of the timestamp of when the longest blockchain contains
all the generated transactions, and the longest chain that is obtained by all the nodes.
Therefore, how the transactions are stored is not relevant in our simulation.
4.5.5 Selection of Parties within a Transaction
The payer and payee of a simulated bitcoin transaction are randomly chosen from
the node population. Due to the need to reach a nal block convergence state, it is
necessary to constrain the number of transactions and their generation period. Based
on the current simulator's speed, a total of 3,000 transactions was selected, and their
invocation times are evenly distributed within 90,000 seconds, i.e., 20 transactions per
time_unit. Due to the small population size within our selected congurations, 3,000
transactions are sucient to allow our simulation to generate useful results. Beyond the
period of transaction generation, nodes still keep generating blocks and synchronising
their blockchain with others. The simulation is terminated when nodes reach the state
of block convergence for their blockchain.
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4.5.6 Selection of PoW Winners
The diculty of PoW mining is also a critical factor for the performance of blockchain.
We model our PoW mining diculty by controlling the number of winners picked
during each time_unit. Unsurprisingly, to speed up simulation, nodes are not required
to solve actual PoW mining challenges. Instead, PoW winners are randomly selected
from the nodes' population in each time_unit. There are three, six, or nine winners as
conguration options, which indicates the number of winners that need to be selected
within each time_unit. The selected winners will generate a new block and append it
to their blockchain. All their pending transactions inside their mempool are approved
and added into the new block.
Despite avoiding actual PoW computation, the growth of the blockchain is still
correctly simulated. All the nodes have equal probability to be selected as a PoW
winner, which indicates an equal computation power for all the nodes in terms of their
PoW mining. The number of winners can be treated as the level of diculty of the
PoW mining process. The greater the number of winners, the simpler the mining
diculty. The number of winners is constant during an experiment. This approach to
modelling PoW mining enables us to accurately quantify the impact of mining diculty
on blockchain performance in a lightweight manner.
4.5.7 Synchronisation of Blockchain Forks
Since the real PoW mining is not implemented in our simulation, a single blockchain
cannot be measured in terms of PoW diculty. Therefore, the length of blockchain
is the only criteria for deciding which blockchain fork should persist. A node always
updates its blockchain to a longer chain during a peer-to-peer communication. How-
ever, we will possibly meet blockchain synchronisation conicts due to the existence of
multiple same-length blockchain forks, which are caused by the selection of multiple
winners within each time_unit. In this case, a node always chooses the rst, longest
chain that it meets, and ignores all the other same-length blockchains that it might
discover, later. In addition, blockchain forking might lead to some committed trans-
actions inside the removed blocks which have to be re-approved because they were
not committed into the longest chain. These transactions will be recycled back to the
mempool and wait to be signed into a future block by simulated PoW mining.
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（a) （b)
Figure 4.1: Convergence speed of dierent size of population with (a) homogeneous
network latency, and (b) dierent numbers of winners.
4.6 Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate the impact of dierent network latency settings on blockchain
security in terms of block convergence speed, safety of the six conrmations convention,
length of the longest chain, and the maximum and average number of blocks that get
rolled back, and thus revoke transactions. We also examine the impact of heteroge-
neous connectivity to the security of blockchain. In order to counteract the variance
in behaviour caused by the (entirely desirable) randomness within the simulator, each
reported statistic is determined based on 40 runs of the simulator.
4.6.1 Convergence Speed
The convergence speed versus homogeneous network latency under a dierent number
of population and winners is shown in Figure 4.1 (a) and (b), respectively. The y-axis
represents the convergence time, which is the total amount of time required to reach
the block convergence state under dierent settings on the network latency. Note that
the last transaction is generated at 90000s of simulation time, thus the period after it,
i.e., convergence time − 90000, is the time spent on reaching the block convergence.
As shown in the gures, the convergence time of blockchain is proportional to the
peer-to-peer network latency. With almost any amount of network connectivity (i.e.,
the network latency is in the range of 0s600s), the block convergence state can be
immediately reached by nodes before the next block generation time. However, ap-
proximately an hour is needed (≈ 94000s90000s) for nodes to reach the global block
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.2: The occurrence times of six rolled-back blocks for revoked transactions
versus (a) the number of nodes, and (b) the number of winners.
convergence state when the network latency is extended to 6001200 seconds, and al-
most one day when the network latency is set to 42004800 seconds. After this, the
convergence speed is further exponentially increased, and it takes almost four days
when the peer-to-peer latency is set to two hours (72007800 seconds).
It can also be observed from Figure 4.1 (a) and (b) that neither the node population
nor the number of winners has an obvious impact on the convergence time. This is
because there is plenty of randomness in the simulator, which is introduced by random
winner selection, selection of transaction parties, and dierent network latency between
nodes. These random factors add variance to the convergence time in each run of the
simulation.
4.6.2 Six Conrmations' Feasibility
Unsurprisingly, the six conrmations convention can easily be violated if the PoW
mining diculty is reduced, as nodes could mine a long, local blockchain entirely on
their own. Also, a long network latency is a critical factor to fail six conrmations.
However, it is not clear under which level of network latency the six conrmations
convention has a negligible risk of being violated. Figure 4.2 indicates the safety of
the six conrmations convention with all the number of nodes and winners settings.
Figure 4.2 (a) shows the distribution range for the number of occurrences of six blocks
revocation for all the simulations with various population size congurations together,
and Figure 4.2 (b) covers all the simulations for changing the number of winners selected
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Figure 4.3: The length of the blockchain versus the network latency (a) with dierent
numbers of nodes, and (b) with dierent numbers of winners.
in each mining round. The number of occurrences of six rolled-back blocks indicates
how many times six blocks revocation happened during a simulation, which is collected
from all the blockchain forking events. Having no occurrence of six rolled-back blocks
indicates we do not violate the six conrmations convention for the corresponding
network latency range. As shown in Figure 4.2 (a), the phenomenon of six rolled-
back blocks starts to appear in the range of 12001800 seconds for network latency.
However, the failure of six conrmations convention appears at all latency levels for
the simulations with the various numbers of winner settings as shown in Figure 4.2
(b). This demonstrates that the six conrmation convention could be easily violated
by having more simultaneous winners in each time unit, or in other words, a lower
diculty of PoW mining.
4.6.3 Length of Blockchain
Figure 4.3 displays the number of blocks needed on the longest blockchain to reach
global block convergence. It can be seen that the length of blockchain decays until the
latency setting of 24003000s, but it grows afterwards. This is because when nodes
have continuous connectivity, the new generated blocks can be spread immediately to
the network. However, when the disconnection time is slightly longer, the propagation
of new generated blocks is disrupted. Thus, these new blocks could be replaced by a
longer chain during the next nodes' communication, which results in the shortening
of the blockchain size. With the network latency further expanded, the time spent
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Figure 4.4: The maximum number of rolled-back blocks with (a) dierent sizes of
population, (b) dierent numbers of winners; also, the average number of rolled-back
blocks with (c) dierent sizes of population, and (d) dierent numbers of winners.
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Figure 4.5: The percentage of blocks belonging to each heterogeneous group member
on the longest blockchain, with the heterogeneous latency groups setting of (a) HNL2,
(b) HNL3, and (c) HNL4.
on reaching block convergence is signicantly augmented, so that more blocks will be
generated within the extended period, thus having a much longer blockchain.
Figure 4.3 (a) displays the dependency of length of the blockchain with dierent
population sizes. The gure shows that the length of blockchain is inversely propor-
tional to the population of nodes. This is because a larger network population results
in more communications in the network, which leads to more opportunity for nodes to
have blockchain synchronisation.
Figure 4.3 (b) exhibits the relation between the length of the blockchain and the
number of winners. It can be seen that the length of blockchain is perfectly proportional
to the number of winners at any network latency. This is because the more winners
selected each time, the higher the possibility of having more blockchain forks growing
at the same time, and the higher the risk of suering synchronisation conicts due to
multiple blockchain forks of the same length.
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4.6.4 Maximum and Average Number of Rolled-back Blocks
Figure 4.4 shows the maximum and average number of rolled-back blocks under various
experimental congurations. The maximum rolled-back blocks as shown on the y axes
of Figure 4.4 (a) and (b) indicate the largest number of blocks we met in the simulations
being revoked, and the average rolled-back blocks for Figure 4.4 (c) and (d) are the
average number of rolled-back blocks collected from all the blockchain merging. It
can be seen in the gures that the increasing trends of both the maximum and average
numbers of rolled-back blocks are exactly the same. As shown in Figure 4.4 (a) and (c),
the maximum and average numbers of rolled-back blocks are inversely proportional to
the population size. This is because with a larger population, nodes have more chance
to communicate and synchronise their blockchain with others. Thus, fewer new blocks,
which are generated within nodes' time of disconnection, will be replaced because of
more frequent merging of blockchain forks.
Figure 4.4 (b) and (d) demonstrateunsurprisinglythat having more winners per
time unit leads to more rolled-back blocks. With a lower PoW mining diculty, there
will be more nodes that can solve hash puzzles within a time unit, so that more blocks
can be generated within the same period. Multiple equal-length blockchain forks could
be simultaneously grown, and consequently, more blocks will be replaced when the
merging of blockchain forks occurs in the near future.
4.6.5 Impact of Heterogeneous Connectivity
This section investigates the impact on blockchain security brought about by dier-
ent degrees of heterogeneous network connectivity. This is evaluated in terms of the
proportion of winning for each heterogeneous latency group, the convergence speed,
and the length of the blockchain, as depicted in Figure 4.5, Figure 4.6, and Figure 4.7,
respectively. The proportion of winning of a heterogeneous latency group indicates
the percentage of blocks on the longest accepted blockchain that are generated by the
members of this latency group. The network population is set at 20 and there are only
three winners within each time unit for the simulations mentioned in this section.
Figure 4.5 shows the proportion of blocks generated by each heterogeneous latency
group of nodes on the longest blockchain. The blocks are mainly generated by the
nodes with the lowest latency, i.e., the nodes within HNL1 group, as they create more
than 50% of the blocks in all the experiments. The nodes with the largest network
latency generate only 30%, 10% and 5% of blocks, respectively. Note that all the nodes
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Figure 4.6: The convergence speed of various heterogeneous latency group congura-
tions.
have equal computational power in our PoW mining model. Therefore, our experiments
demonstrate that the nodes with low network latency have a much higher chance to
mine the longest chain, and thus are able to gain the majority of blockchain rewards
from winning PoW challenges.
Figure 4.6 displays the convergence speed of blockchain under various heterogeneous
network latency settings. It can be seen that the convergence speed of the heteroge-
neous groups HNL3 and HNL4 is up to three times faster than HNL1 and HNL2.
This is because the nodes with lower network latency, which have a disconnection time
within the range of [0.5l, 0.5l + time_unit ], are able to boost the speed of blockchain
convergence.
Figure 4.7 explores the dependency between the length of blockchain and the het-
erogeneous latency groups. It can be observed that the blockchain length for all het-
erogeneous groups is shrunk until the network latency reaches 2,400 seconds, and then
it further grows with a larger latency. The reason behind this is identical to the ho-
mogeneous latency simulation shown in Figure 4.3. In addition, most of the time,
heterogeneous groups HNL3 and HNL4 obtain a shorter blockchain than HNL1 and
HNL2. This is because there are more active nodes that increase the convergence speed,
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Figure 4.7: The length of blockchain versus various heterogeneous latency group con-
gurations.
as shown in Figure 4.6, so that fewer blocks are generated for the simulations of HNL3
and HNL4, which, in turn, leads to a shorter blockchain for these two heterogeneous
groups.
From the above experimental statistics, the following summarises the unfair advan-
tages that could be obtained by nodes with a low network latency:
1. Nodes with network latency can focus most of their PoW mining work on the
longest chain, and thus have a much higher chance to earn blockchain mining
rewards.
2. The blockchain is updated much faster for the low latency nodes. Hence, their
transactions have a higher chance to be well protected.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we investigate the impact of a wide range of network latency con-
gurations on blockchain security, in order to gure out the feasibility of deploying
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blockchain to high latency DTNs. We dene the term global block convergence to
quantify blockchain security within our simulation results. We mainly analyse the
speed of block convergence and determine how the safety of the six conrmations con-
vention of blockchain is aected by large peer-to-peer network latencies. From the
simulations, it is obvious that the time spent on block convergence is proportionally
increased with the extension of network latency; however, there is no clear dependency
for the block convergence speed with either the network population size or the mining
diculty. In addition, the safety of the six conrmations convention of blockchain for
the transaction commitment is highly sensitive to both the diculty of PoW mining
and peer-to-peer latency.
Finally, we show that variance in network latency is an important factor to mon-
itor: we quantify the extent to which nodes that consistently experience lower net-
work latency gain a signicant unfair advantage from PoW miningin some cases
low-latency simulation groups dominate more than half of the blocks on the globally
longest blockchain.
Despite the computationally expensive PoW mining, high communication latency
brings a signicant concern to the security of blockchain, which makes it infeasible to
be deployed for high latency DTNs. Many existing evolvements of blockchain try to
replace PoW with some other robust and communication-ecient Byzantine agreement
methods; however, the major cause of degrading the safety of blockchain, i.e., the di-
vergent chain branches, cannot be well addressed. The full dissemination of blockchain
data plays the most signicant role in maintaining the security of blockchain. The
disrupted connection makes the unication of blockchain data impossible, and several
parallel blockchain branches grow within multiple network partitions. The design of a
blockchain-like decentralised consensus for DTNs requires the prevention of such full
propagation, and a more ecient communication mechanism in order to address the
issues caused by long communication latency.
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Chapter 5
Evaluating the Safety of Avalanche
Consensus under a High Latency
DTN Environment
With a strict constraint on the global block generation speed, but a fast growth of the
community of blockchain miners, massive computational power is wasted by the fail-
ure of Proof-of-Work (PoW) mining by the majority of blockchain miners. The recent
eorts to optimise the blockchain-like consensus is to eliminate, or completely avoid
the redundant parallel computation from the network. Successful examples include
Proof-of-Stake (PoS) proposed by King and Nadal (2012), and Proof-of-Luck (PoL)
introduced by Milutinovic, He, Wu, and Kanwal (2016), etc. Besides the considera-
tion of the computation complexity of consensus models, high communication latency
is another signicant barrier to the deployment of decentralised consensus to DTNs.
Avalanche, which is a memory-less and leaderless decentralised consensus scheme, takes
advantage of both low computation complexity and extremely high communication ef-
ciency. It guides all users towards a unied global agreement to conicting events
using a gossip-like approach, in which each individual node only needs to collect the
opinions of of a partial set of nodes, instead of the entire population. To precisely
monitor the impact of the security of Avalanche on DTNs, we demonstrate a series of
measurements in three dierent DTN environments of within this and next chapter, as
listed below:
1. Network latency environment: nodes have various extents of a 1-hop communi-
cation delay during completing Avalanche queries.
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2. Network partition environment: the entire population is split into two partitions
with various intercommunication frequencies between the partitions.
3. Multi-hop environment: we also present a comprehensive analysis on the safety
of Avalanche under a multi-hop communication environment in Chapter 6.
The contributions of this chapter are listed as follows:
1. We conduct a comprehensive survey on investigating the impact of the dierent
extents of network latency on the safety of Avalanche consensus in the presence
of Byzantine faulty nodes in the network.
2. We also model a partitioned network environment, in which nodes are split into
two communities, and the frequency of intercommunication between them is
adaptively adjusted in the simulations. Also, the proportion of Byzantine faulty
nodes and intercommunication nodes within k sampled nodes for each query is
precisely congured.
3. The simulation statistics show that the honest nodes are very likely to lead the
consensus formulation of the entire network under a relatively high network la-
tency with Byzantine faulty nodes of up to 25% of the population. However,
Avalanche becomes more fragile under a partitioned network. The reported statis-
tics show that the Byzantine faulty nodes are able to take over the network when
only 15% of the population is malicious with frequent communications between
network communities.
5.1 Motivation
The straightforward communication mechanism, low computation complexity, and
lesser storage consumption make Avalanche consensus a better option than blockchain
for being employed on resource-constrained DTN devices. Avalanche is a decentralised
consensus protocol that mainly focuses on solving the double spending issue of cryp-
tocurrency. A global consensus for conicting transaction events is reached within the
entire network by nodes disseminating their decisions to others. They simultaneously
collect decisions from others and then make their own decision by following the side
which is agreed on by the majority of the population. Avalanche gains the eciency
on communication because a node is only required to sample a relatively small number
of other nodes (although the nodes can be chosen from the entire network), instead of
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collecting decisions from the entire population. Aside from the advantage of communi-
cation eciency, Avalanche does not need to solve any high computational complexity
tasks such as PoW. Avalanche also spends less memory space on storing the transaction
history of cryptocurrencies. As shown in Figure 2.3 of Chapter 2, Avalanche utilises a
Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) that links transactions in a parent-child relationship.
Any change to the decision of a previous conicting transaction event needs to be
agreed on by all legitimate nodes, and the following descendant transactions on the
DAG also have to be appropriately and globally adjusted, such as the chit and con-
dence value. The network-wide inspection of the DAG ensures the global consensus
and immutability of the transaction history.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing research that investigates the
impact of network latency on the safety of Avalanche consensus. Although Avalanche
gains the eciency on peers communication with the complexity from O(kN logN) up
to O(kN) as mentioned in Chapter 2, it is still unclear how various degrees of latency
between nodes impact the convergence behaviour of conicting decisions. In addition,
due to the disrupted connectivity among users, it is very likely to form multiple parti-
tions due to insucient communication. When spreading the decisions of a conicting
transaction event from one partition to another, the safety of consensus can be highly
sensitive to the characteristics of intercommunication nodes. For instance, Byzantine
attackers could propagate wrong decisions to other network partitions for the purpose
of misleading them, if they dominate the channel of intercommunication between the
partitions. Thus, in this chapter, our investigations for the safety of Avalanche consen-
sus focus on two DTN environments, namely, network latency environment and network
partition environment. Firstly, we observe how dierent degrees of peer latency post-
pone and direct the converging trend of the decisions for conicting transaction events
among Avalanche users. Secondly, we model the communication among two network
partitions with a precise and adaptive control on the frequency of intercommunication.
Also, the proportion of Byzantine attackers is arranged within not only the entire pop-
ulation, but also the sampling nodes during each exchange of decisions between the
partitions. The convergence of Avalanche users' decisions is accurately monitored in
these two network environments.
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5.2 Related Work
The security of Bitcoin (Nakamoto (2009)) is achieved by utilising blockchain technol-
ogy to ensure a global agreement on the ledger among all bitcoin users. However, due
to an enormous waste of energy, the emerging blockchain technologies try to get rid
of the computationally expensive PoW and replace it with other lightweight consensus
mechanisms. Proof-of-Stake (PoS) (King and Nadal (2012)) is an alternative to PoW
which does not require a mining process. Users need to prove the holding of a certain
amount of coins for the consensus. PPCoin and BlackCoin are the two PoS-based cyrp-
tocurrencies. Proof-of-Luck (PoL) (Milutinovic et al. (2016)) assigns random numbers
to all newly generated blocks within the current round to determine which block is
luckier. A node needs to dump its mined block if it receives a luckier block. Proof-
of-Capacity (PoC) (Dziembowski, Faust, Kolmogorov, and Pietrzak (2015)) requires
users to dedicate a signicant amount of disk space instead of computation power.
5.3 Avalanche Consensus Protocol
Avalanche (Team Rocket, 2018) is a leaderless and memory-less Byzantine fault tol-
erance consensus protocol built on a metastable mechanism. Avalanche is mainly de-
signed to address the double spending issue of cryptocurrencies, where two conicting
transactions consume the same Unspent Transaction Output (UTXO) but yield dier-
ent outputs. The global consensus among all users is accomplished via a gossip-like
approach. Nodes keep acquiring others' decisions for each conicting transaction event,
and they respond to the query with their decisions when they are inquired. Each node
in the network can vote either way in a pair of conicting transactions. An honest node
always follows the side which is agreed on by the majority of the population, while a
Byzantine faulty node could stand for the opposite side to mislead the network. The
Avalanche consensus approach is described by stacking up a series of consensus proto-
cols, as summarised below:
1. Slush: Slush introduces the simplest metastable protocol. Suppose the two
colours blue and red represent the two sides of a single conicting transaction
event, and two integer counters for the respective colours are maintained by each
individual node. A query is composed by the decisions of k nodes, where k is
a randomly-chosen constant small number. The query is valid only if there are
more than αk of the answers with the same colour decision, where α ∈ (0, 1) is a
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system parameter that denes the lower bound threshold of a round of sampling.
However, Slush is not Byzantine fault tolerant.
2. Snowake: Based on the Slush protocol, Snowake leverages an additional
counter, namely, consecutive counter c that captures the strength of a node's
conviction in its current colour. Each node maintains only one counter c for the
most recent colour decision, which is accumulated if a node keeps receiving the
same colour answer from queries. c is reset to zero once the colour decision is
changed.
3. Snowball: Snowball further strengthens the entire consensus protocol by intro-
ducing additional condence counters for the corresponding colours to guarantee
a more permanent notion of belief. The condence counters capture the num-
ber of the respective colour results yielded from previously completed queries.
Thus, the colour decision cannot be easily swapped by a temporary change. The
colour at the Snowball stage is determined according to the maximum of these
two colour condence values.
4. Avalanche: Avalanche uses a DAG to provide continuous links, in a parent-child
relationship form, between transactions, instead of the chain structure that con-
nects blocks of the bitcoin blockchain. Both the conicting transactions, which
are generated by the benign and malicious nodes, are stored on dierent branches
in a branched graph. Additional condence values (i.e., dierent to the above
condence counters used in Snowball) of the ancient transactions are accumu-
lated with more descendants attached at the bottom. The branch with a higher
condence value indicates the properness of attaching the benign transactions.
Avalanche shows a strong probabilistic guarantee on the safety, as the entire pop-
ulation could end up with a correct consensus, even when 20% of the population are
malicious nodes, with a negligible probability (< 10−9) of reverting to the wrong side.
Since the key feature of Avalanche is the convergence of colour decisions among nodes,
the Avalanche consensus we implemented in our research is only up to the Snowball
stage for the conducted simulations.
5.4 Globally Colour Determined State of Transactions
Avalanche consensus provides a positive environment that guides client nodes towards
one side of the conicting decisions. The overall aim of Avalanche is to have nodes
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accept a set of transactions that does not conict with each other in the presence
of Byzantine behaviours. Think about the double spending issue of cryptocurrencies,
where a malicious node is able to issue both the benign and malicious transactions that
have a duplicate UTXO. The successful issuing of both transactions indicates that the
same crypto-coins can be spent multiple times by malicious users. In this case, we
say the original transaction and the faulty one with the same UTXO are a pair of
conicting transactions. Avalanche nodes can freely vote for either transaction. An
honest node always follows the side that is agreed on by the majority of the nodes.
The voted transaction can be treated as the most seems-to-be-correct one among several
conicting transactions. To avoid innitely querying other nodes, an upper bound on
the number of query rounds is set in Avalanche. A node will never change its mind
when a specied number of consecutive queries yield the same answer.
Since Avalanche nodes are not required to make a globally identical decision on
any conicting transaction event, together with the interrupted connectivities, it is
uncertain how the safety of Avalanche is impacted by a high communication latency
between DTN nodes. Dierent from the bitcoin blockchain, nodes do not necessarily
have a unied answer for the consensus of Avalanche. However, it is unknown to
us to what extent the diusion of nodes' decisions are aected by network latency.
We are interested in whether insucient communication across the network causes the
consensus converging to the faulty side, and whether it will take longer for transactions
to reach a stabilised state.
To clearly monitor the impact of each corresponding group of nodes on the safety
of Avalanche, we borrow the idea of coloured transaction from the original Avalanche
work, in which blue and red are characterised as two conicting decisions of a transac-
tion that cannot both be accepted by a node at a time. In contrast, we assume that
honest nodes always vote blue for a transaction, while Byzantine faulty nodes always
respond red for the same transaction. We dene the state of colour determined as all
the transactions in the network having their colour decisions stabilised. Avalanche does
not strictly force users to converge to the blue side. In the real-world use of Avalanche
for protecting cryptocurrency, both conicting transactions, benign and malicious, are
recorded onto DAG, but only one of them can be accepted by the population. The
strongly preferred transaction is inspected, not only the pair of input spending and
unspent output spending of the transaction itself, but also that of its eligible parents
according to the DAG. The successful launching of an attack on Avalanche transac-
tions could be that the malicious transactions gain chit values from each time to collect
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more is-preferred opinions from other nodes, and thus avoid the benign transactions
to increase their condence value. If so, the malicious transactions can be accepted
the majority of the population instead of the benign one. Hence, regarding the simula-
tion, having either stabilised blue or red among populations indicates the convergence
of consensus among that population. However, a population with more red decisions
indicates failure of using Avalanche, e.g., to protect cryptocurrency, because the con-
sensus among the population is being led by the malicious nodes.
5.5 Simulation Set-up
The goal of our simulation is to investigate the impact of network latency on the safety
of Avalanche consensus. The simulation is done in two dierent network models, which
are the network latency environment, and the network partition environment.
5.5.1 Conguration of Nodes
Avalanche's description (Team Rocket (2018)) includes proof that the node population
size is not a signicant factor in the performance of the protocol. For this reason,
the node population size N of all our simulations is consistently set to 100. To avoid
introducing unpredictable dynamics to the simulations, the scenario of nodes joining
in and quitting the network is not considered. The transactions are simply stored in
a transaction list without any compression or encryption. The Byzantine faulty nodes
are randomly selected from the node population by simply assigning the Byzantine
characteristic (which is a 0 or 1 property) to the chosen nodes at the conguration
stage. The number of Byzantine nodes is determined, based on the current Byzantine
ratio β setting of an experiment. Since it is unlikely that 30% of the nodes would be
malicious users in real world DTN applications, we set the upper bound of β to 40%,
i.e., β ∈ [0, 0.4] for all the simulations, with each simulation with a consistent level
of β. We observe how far the asynchronous consensus could go with an increasing
proportion of malicious nodes inside the entire population.
5.5.2 Transactions
As mentioned above, blue and red for transactions are used to denote the decisions that
originated from honest and malicious groups of nodes, respectively. When an honest
node is queried, it will either follow the answer obtained from the majority of the
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population, or simply accept the colour carried by the transaction as its decision, if the
transaction is unknown to the node. Conversely, malicious nodes simply reply with a
red answer when they are queried by others. It is worth noting that the transaction can
only be generated by honest nodes in the simulation because the transactions generated
by Byzantine faulty nodes will always obtain a red answer from all other nodes, and
the associated collected statistics are not necessary for our experiments.
The generation of transaction copies is always accompanied by the propagation
of Avalanche queries to more nodes. Because of the gossip style of communication,
Avalanche queries are very likely to be fully propagated through the hop-by-hop spread-
ing to the network, and each of the nodes who receives the queries will also maintain
the transaction replicas associated with the queries. The colour for a newly generated
transaction is determined according to the originator's Byzantine characteristic, but
an uncoloured state is assigned to the transaction copies by the nodes who receive
them for the rst time. Upon receiving a copy of the transaction, the receiver node
rstly gives its answer based on the above rules, and then triggers additional queries
and replicates the transaction to the subsequent queried nodes in order to obtain their
opinions. The semi-broadcasting behaviour of a transaction results in numerous repli-
cations being produced. To shorten the experiments' running time, there are only a
limited number of transactions are originated for an experiment, but the number of
generated transaction copies is enormous.
5.5.3 Nodes' Communication and Queries in the Network La-
tency Environment
Since the communication latency among devices in real-world DTNs is highly dynamic
and unstable, this will denitely have an unpredictable impact on our experimental
statistics. For this reason, we normalise nodes' peer-to-peer latency as a xed dis-
connection time interval of individual peers. Nodes are periodically connected to an
additional global reachable node which denotes Internet connectivity. All nodes that
have Internet connectivity have unconstrained intercommunication. The network la-
tency model within the simulation is exactly the same as the HNL1 setup indicated
in Section 4.5.3. However, the time_unit is always set to 10 seconds instead of 600
seconds, as for the simulations of blockchain. The time_unit here is only a randomly-
chosen, small number that indicates a reasonably short time for a device to connect
back to the Internet. Also, the heterogeneous network latency groups setting is not
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necessary for the simulations of Avalanche due to the outstanding communication ef-
ciency of Avalanche. This is because only a very limited number of transactions are
generated due to the consideration of experiments' running time. A node can denitely
solve all the received transaction events within a 10-second slot after its re-emergence
online. However, the network latency conguration of each node will never be changed
during an experiment once it is congured at the beginning.
As mentioned in the original Avalanche paper (Team Rocket (2018)), the decisions
of a transaction and its replicas start to converge from 620ms up to 1.1 seconds to
have all the transaction copies settled down. This is achieved under the conguration
of a population size set to 2000, with the consecutive counter c = 150. We take 0.62
seconds as the time of a single transaction reaching its converged state. Therefore, the
time spent to perform a single query about sampling k nodes is 0.62/150 ≈ 0.00413
seconds, and we take 0.005 for the simplicity of calculation. Because we assume a node
is guaranteed a 10-second stable connectivity every time it goes online, it can perform
roughly 10/0.005 = 2000 queries during that time. If a node has multiple pending
transaction events to be handled, it processes them one by one in a rst-in-rst-serve
order.
5.5.4 Nodes' Communication and Query in the Network Parti-
tion Environment
We also simulate the consensus convergence behaviours of Avalanche nodes under a
partitioned network environment. Very often in the real world the network is split into
several partitions because of a sparse communication between nodes or using dierent
network infrastructures and routing protocols. A network partition could possibly
end up with dierent answers to a conicting event across dierent groups of nodes,
and it is dicult to predict the ongoing trend of the convergence behaviour of the
consensus when the decisions are diused from one partition to another. Therefore, it
is necessary to investigate how the asynchronous behaviours of nodes impact the safety
of Avalanche.
Modelling nodes' communication and queries in the network partition environment
is Very dierent to that of pure network latency environment. The entire population
is divided into two equal groups. Nodes belonging to the same group can freely com-
municate with each other, but the communication between groups can happen only
within the intercommunication nodes from two groups. The intercommunication rate
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is part of the system conguration of Avalanche, and the property of intercommuni-
cation is randomly assigned to a xed number of nodes in each simulation. It is also
worth noting that there is no P2P communication latency between nodes. Nodes keep
processing 2000 queries in 10-second slots.
Our proposed network partition model can precisely simulate nodes' communication
within several real-world scenarios. For example, imagine a two-network-community
scenario within an infrastructure-less DTN environment: two network communities
have to some extent rare communication, and there are a few nodes in between who
have a high mobility and can carry out message transmission among the communi-
ties. Suppose they can collude with each other and intentionally place their decision
to mislead others for their own benet. Since these nodes are the only communication
channels between the two communities, based on our adversary model, their charac-
teristics, benign or malicious, will signicantly aect the decision propagation within
the second community. Therefore, the more malicious attackers are within the inter-
communication nodes, the higher the possibility of spreading incorrect decisions to a
benign community. The most extreme case would be where all the intercommunica-
tion nodes are malicious, or there is a sucient number of attackers that they can
signicantly impact the decisions from other honest intercommunication nodes. In
such a case, the blue decision can be spread within the rst community because the
query originates from an honest node, while in the second one, the decisions could be
ipped to red because the malicious attackers dominate the communication channel be-
tween the communities. Our proposed network partition model can precisely simulate
nodes' communication behaviours within the above case, as we leverage the property
of intercommunication ability that is assigned to random nodes to constrain nodes'
communication among communities, instead of tracking the movement of nodes in the
simulation. Based on this, the decision spreading and convergence from one commu-
nity to another through a dierent number of malicious intercommunication nodes can
be well monitored. Similarly, our proposed model highly abstracts most of the nodes'
behaviours within network partition scenarios, so we will not focus on implementing
nodes' real-world communication and movement in detail.
Let γ be the communication rate between two partitions, which indicates there in a
total of γN intercommunication nodes in the network. We split the whole population
into only two partitions, with an equal number of Byzantine faulty nodes and intercom-
munication nodes in each partition. Thus, there are βN
2
Byzantine faulty nodes, and
γN
2
intercommunication nodes in each network group. Similarly with the selection of
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Byzantine faulty nodes, the intercommunication nodes are also arbitrarily selected from
the node pool at the beginning of each experiment. The reason for having the same
number of intercommunication nodes in each group is because the overall intercom-
munication frequency between two partitions within simulations needs to be precisely
aligned with the level of γ. Furthermore, the partitions can only communicate with
each other through a pair of nodes who have the intercommunication capability for
both of them. However, with a heterogeneous proportion of intercommunication nodes
within partitions, the intercommunication rate can be signicantly limited by the par-
titions with fewer intercommunication nodes, which lose accuracy in maintaining a
certain level of intercommunication frequency.
5.5.5 Query Node Selection
Query nodes are randomly chosen from the node pool for both the pure network latency
and the network partition environment. We assume that nodes always have a global
view of the addresses of other nodes. When a node has a conicting transaction event
which needs to be solved, it pre-selects k node IDs from the node pool, and tries to
contact these nodes. With the existence of P2P communication latency, nodes might
not be immediately reachable. The query can only be achieved among the currently
connected nodes. If a node cannot fulll k sampling nodes for a query, it only sends
the query message to the current reachable nodes rst, and repeats another round of
query process for the remaining nodes. The inability to collect a k sampling of nodes'
response also happens in the network partition case. It usually occurs when a node
who does not have intercommunication capability tries to query the nodes from the
other partition. Similarly, the query source node still needs to simply perform another
round of query to fulll these k nodes.
5.6 Experimental Results
In this section, we exhibit the performance of Avalanche consensus under two simu-
lated network conditions, namely, the network latency environment, and the network
partition environment. The safety of Avalanche is measured in terms of the speed of
reaching a colour determined state, the number of query rounds, the number of re-
spective colour transactions, and the corresponding colour condence at the colour
determined state for all transactions. The important parameters are congured as
N = 100, k = 10, c = 150, β ∈ [0, 0.4], and γ ∈ (0, 1). Only 10 transactions are
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Figure 5.1: The convergence speed of Avalanche consensus among nodes in network
latency environment.
generated within each simulation. For the consideration of the impact of experimental
dynamics, each reported statistic is collected and averaged, based on 40 runs of the
simulator.
5.6.1 Network Latency Environment
Speed of Colour Determination
The speed for all the colour decisions reaching a colour-determined state of transactions
using Avalanche is displayed in Figure 5.1. The gure well illustrates the correlations
between the consensus convergence speed with both the heterogeneous latency and
the Byzantine ratio β, respectively. The x-axis indicates the current network latency
level of nodes within an experiment, while the y-axis is the time spent on reaching
the converged consensus at a particular network latency level. As we can see in the
gure, the time spent on reaching the colour-determined state for the entire population
is linearly dependent on the P2P communication latency. However, the convergence
speed is exactly the same at all Byzantine ratio levels, which is mainly because of the





Figure 5.2: Condence level of (a) blue colour, and (b) red colour versus network
latency, and the variance of (c) blue condence, and (d) red condence versus Byzantine
ratio.
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solved when a sucient number of queries are processed. Because there are only 10
transactions generated in total and a 10-second guaranteed connectivity of nodes after
their disconnection, as reported in the statistics, a node can complete all the queries
for its pending transactions within two seconds on average after it has connected.
Therefore, network latency is not a signicant factor for the decision convergence of
Avalanche due to the eciency of communication and the underlying metastability
mechanism.
Colour Condence
Figure 5.2 shows the blue and red condence levels under various Byzantine ratios and
network latency levels, which are averaged from all the colour-determined transactions.
As mentioned before, the blue decisions for any transaction are voted on by honest
nodes, and red answers are always initiated by malicious nodes. The colour with a
higher condence level indicates the domination in the network is achieved by the
corresponding group of nodes. Figure 5.2 (a) and (b) show the dependency of the
respective colour condence with various levels of latency, and Figure 5.2 (c) and (d)
exhibit the variance of colour condence that covers all the network latency levels
under each Byzantine faulty ratio level accordingly. In Figure 5.2 (a) and (b), it can be
seen that the blue condence level is perfectly inversely proportional to β, and the red
condence has an opposite trend. In addition, both the blue and red condence levels
remain stable with an increasing network latency. Figure 5.2 (c) and (d) display that
the condence level varies greatly under all Byzantine ratio levels except zero. The
randomness of the statistics is introduced by the arbitrary selection of nodes during
each query, which contains an uncertain number of malicious nodes inside. The gures
show that the blue condence level is higher for most of the time, with the Byzantine
attackers showing less than 25%, which illustrates a high probabilistic guarantee of
having the honest nodes lead the network. Our ndings demonstrate that network
latency also has negligible impact on the safety of Avalanche because the original
Avalanche work proposed a similar security strength with no peers' communication
latency considered in their security analysis.
Number of Transactions
Figure 5.3 displays the relationship between the number of respective coloured transac-
tions and the dierent extents of network latency. Figure 5.3 (a) and (b) demonstrates
the number of blue and red transactions in a stabilised state within the entire network
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.3: Number of (a) blue transactions, and (b) red transactions.
at the end of the simulation. As shown in Figure 5.3 (a), the number of blue trans-
actions is inversely proportional to the Byzantine ratio, and the trend for the number
of red transactions is totally opposite to this. However, there is not a clear relation
between the number of transactions and the heterogeneous network latency. This is
because the P2P latency cannot critically aect the eective query mechanism, and
thus the trend of the number of respective colour transactions is not changed very
much. The statistics for each simulation do not vary very much. The randomness is
mainly caused by the arbitrary selection of query nodes.
Number of Queries
Figure 5.4 demonstrates the dependency of the number of queries on various network
latency levels and dierent Byzantine faulty node ratios. The number of queries on
the y-axis indicates the average number of query rounds that are needed to reach the
global colour determined state. Figure 5.4 (a) shows the number of queries at each
level of network latency, and Figure 5.4 (b) exhibits the variance of the number of
query rounds under various Byzantine faulty node ratios. In Figure 5.4 (a), there is no
obvious dependency between the number of queries and the network latency. However,
it can be seen that the overall trend for the number of queries is raised a little at rst
with the Byzantine ratio up to 0.3, and then it drops to β > 0.3, as shown in Figure 5.4
(b). The reason for having a rise-then-fall trend for the number of queries is because
Avalanche reaches its shifting point of consensus at the Byzantine level of β = 0.25.
The consensus could be converged to either the blue or red side by chance at this point,
and thus it takes slightly more queries to have one colour condence level reaching a
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Figure 5.4: Number of queries (a) versus heterogeneous network latency, and (b) the
variance under dierent Byzantine ratio.
sucient strength to dominate the other. However, the y-axis spans only 0.25 (from
152 to 152.3) at most in both gures, which indicates the number of query rounds is
negligibly aected by the network latency and the Byzantine ratio β.
5.6.2 Network Partition Environment
This section investigates the safety of Avalanche consensus under various degrees of
communication between network partitions, in terms of the convergence speed of con-
icting decisions, the number of queries, and the respective colour condence. The
statistics are collected and averaged based on 40 runs of the simulator.
Speed of Colour Determination
Figure 5.5 shows the global colour determination speed of transactions under the net-
work partition environment. It can be seen that the time spent on reaching the colour
determined state of transactions becomes shorter with more intercommunication nodes.
With only 10% of intercommunication nodes out of k sampling nodes within each query,
the experiments can be completed in roughly 13.5 seconds at all levels of the Byzantine
ratio, and this is reduced to 8.5 seconds on average when 90% of the sampled nodes are
intercommunication nodes. Although the convergence speed gap is extremely small,
the convergence takes longer with an increased Byzantine ratio up to β ≈ 0.2, and
then drops. Figure 5.5 shows that the shifting point of Avalanche is at the Byzantine
level of β ≈ 0.2 under the network partition scenario, and this is β ≈ 0.25 in the net-
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Figure 5.5: The convergence speed of the Avalanche consensus among nodes in the
network partition environment.
work latency environment from previous simulations. This indicates that the security
strength of Avalanche becomes weaker under the network partition environment.
Colour condence
Figure 5.6 (a) and (b) show the average blue and red condence levels under dierent
intercommunication rates, and the variance of the respective condence levels under
various Byzantine ratio congurations is shown in (c) and (d). From Figure 5.6 (a) and
(b), we can see that the blue and red condence values are still highly dependent on the
Byzantine ratio. The curves of the blue condence have a slightly raised trend when
the Byzantine ratio β is less than 0.15, but then it drops with a greater β. Still, the
trends for the red condence values are perfectly opposite to the blue condence. Also,
as displayed in Figure 5.6 (c) and (d), the median value of the red condence overtakes
that of the blue when β ≥ 0.15. This further demonstrates that Avalanche has its phase
shifting point around the spot of β = 0.15 under the network partition environment.
Compared to the network latency environment, the consensus shifting point is around




Figure 5.6: The respective colour condence for network partition for (a) blue colour
and (b) red colour, and the corresponding variance of the colour condence level for




Figure 5.7: The variance of Group 1's (a) blue condence level, and (b) red condence




Figure 5.8: Number of queries for the network partition (a) versus various intercom-
munication ratios, and (b) the variance of query numbers under dierent levels of the
Byzantine ratio.
Byzantine level as shown in Figure 5.2 (c) and (d). This shows that Avalanche is
weakened in the network partition scenario. The security weakening of Avalanche is
mainly caused by a stronger negative impact from malicious attackers. Such an impact
comes from not only the legitimate intercommunication nodes aected by querying
malicious nodes, but also when malicious nodes play the role of intercommunication,
as they may directly pollute another benign network partition by their faulty decisions.
Figure 5.7 demonstrates the converged decisions of two network partitions under
various Byzantine ratios. Figure 5.7 (a) and (b) show the blue and condence levels
for nodes in group 1, while Figure 5.7 (c) and (d) show the respective colour con-
dence levels of nodes in group 2. As we can see in the gures, the respective colour
condence levels of the two groups are almost perfectly identical to each other. This
indicates that two network partitions can generate the same decision when they have
intercommunication with each other, no matter how frequent it is.
Number of queries
Figure 5.8 displays the average number of queries under various degrees of intercom-
munication. As shown in Figure 5.8 (a), there is a rise-then-fall trend for most of the
statistics when the intercommunication ratio is raised. With β reaches 0.15 and 0.2,
it requires slightly more queries to reach the colour-determined state for transactions.
Also, a similar trend appears in Figure 5.8 (b). Furthermore, it also can be seen in
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Figure 5.8 (b) that the variance distribution of the number of queries becomes larger
with β = 0.15, and then it is more concentrated with β > 0.3. The above phenomena
are all due to Avalanche reaching its consensus shifting point at the Byzantine level
of β = 0.15. This indicates the decisions network-wide turn from blue-dominance to
red-dominance from here.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we investigate the impact of network latency on the performance of a
lightweight decentralised consensus protocol, namely, Avalanche. We implement con-
icting transaction events by assigning two colours to the transactions, which are blue
and red, to represent two conicting state of a transaction that cannot be accepted by
a node at the same time. We precisely quantify the safety of Avalanche by monitoring
the respective colour condence values at the end of the simulations. The evaluation
of Avalanche is done under two network environments, which are the network latency
environment, and the network partition environment.
The experimental results collected from the network latency environment show that
Avalanche is negligibly aected by the network latency due to the highly eective
communication and querying mechanism of Avalanche. Nodes can quickly have their
conicting transactions stabilised within two seconds once they get back online. Also,
the convergence speed is not aected by the Byzantine ratio levels at all. The number
of query rounds is stable under any level of network latency and Byzantine ratio.
The simulations of the network partition environment demonstrate that the colour
determination speed can be boosted with more intercommunication nodes. Interest-
ingly, Avalanche consensus becomes more fragile in the network partition environment
than in the network latency environment. Nodes can be tolerant of up to 25% of ma-
licious nodes under the network latency environment, while this is only 15% for the
network partition scenario. The degradation of the safety of Avalanche under the net-
work partition environment is mainly because the decision convergence is over-impacted
by the intercommunication among partitions. The decisions diuse from one network
partition to another in a way that is highly aected by the characteristics of inter-
communication nodes. The consensus can be directed to a wrong side by malicious
nodes misleading the intercommunication nodes, and more seriously, malicious attack-
ers could achieve this via performing the role of intercommunication between partitions,




Measuring the Safety of Avalanche
Consensus under the Multi-hop
Communication of DTNs
In the previous chapter, we exhibited the communication eciency of Avalanche, in
which the security strength is barely impacted by the P2P communication latency. In-
deed, the lightweight, ecient communication of Avalanche satises the reqairements
of low computational complexity and latency tolerance for DTNs. However, despite
the high communication latency, another representative feature of DTNs is multi-hop
message transmission to carry out a long-distance communication for some large cover-
age DTNs. Therefore, to gure out the feasibility of deploying Avalanche consensus to
DTNs, a safety analysis must take multi-hop communication into account. However,
to the best of our knowledge, existing research does not investigate how the safety
of Avalanche is aected by the multi-hop communication. In this chapter, we focus
on our malicious nodes performing the subset of Byzantine behaviours that is speci-
cally adversarial regarding their eect on the received Avalanche query messages when
they are chosen as intermediate relays or destinations, and how they propagate their
decisions in order to maximise their harmful impact on misleading the consensus of
conicting transaction events. We believe that the safety of Avalanche can be critically
degraded in a multi-hop communication environment in comparison with the one-hop
reachability of nodes because of a higher chance of encountering malicious attackers
along the routing path. The contributions of this chapter are listed below:
1. Compared to most unstructured network topologies (see Section 1.2), Distributed
Hash Tables (DHT) maintain consistency and simplicity in managing the number
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of routing hops. We leverage Pastry as the DHT solution to nodes' routing table
and message routing algorithm.
2. The original Avalanche work shows that the entire network can reach a correct
consensus when the number of malicious users is no more than 20% of the pop-
ulation. However, this is under the assumption of having direct communication
between any pairwise nodes. The security strength of Avalanche can be signi-
cantly degraded when it is deployed within a multi-hop communication network
environment. In this contribution, we summarise a general mathematical depen-
dency between the maximum Byzantine faulty capacity of Avalanche and the
number of message transmission hops, based on the maximum number of hops
and hop count probability distribution of Pastry.
3. We dene the metric of query diversity for Avalanche, which measures the number
of unique nodes queried by other nodes for the conicting transaction events. In
other words, it quanties the average degree of repetitive querying of the same
nodes for all experienced Avalanche queries.
4. We conduct comprehensive simulations for two dierent querying approaches.
One is the network with pure multi-hop communication among nodes with no
constraints on query node selection, and the other is when nodes' query selection
is constrained by diversity requirements, by limiting the query range within a
certain number of hops. The reported statistics on measuring the maximum
fault capacity of Avalanche closely match our mathematical expectation. Also,
a wider query range of nodes increases the risk of encountering malicious nodes
along the path; thus there is a higher chance of Avalanche consensus failing.
6.1 Motivation
Avalanche proposed by Team Rocket (2018) proved that a correct consensus can be
guaranteed with a strong irreversibility (< 10−9 chance of being reverted) when there
are no more than 20% of Byzantine attackers inside the population. However, the
N
5
capability of Byzantine attacks for Avalanche is only achieved under a network
environment with direct connectivity between nodes, and thus might no longer be the
case within multi-hop DTNs. Obviously, there could be a higher chance of encountering
a malicious node along the routing path when involving more forwarders. The malicious
nodes who receive messages could perform various attacks, such as message content
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modication, black hole and grey hole attacks (see Chapter 2). For the purpose of
misguiding Avalanche users, malicious attackers propagate their false decisions if they
can intercept any query request message along the way to it delivered to its intended
destination. To the best of our knowledge, the impact of multi-hop communication
with the existence of Byzantine attacks on the safety of Avalanche, and even many
other decentralised consensus protocols, falls short of investigation.
In this chapter, we concentrate on investigating the safety of Avalanche under multi-
hop communication. In order to provide a precise arrangement of the number of trans-
mission hops for message delivery, we employ a Distributed Hash Table (DHT), more
specically Pastry, for nodes' indexing and the storage of topological information. The
reason for using the structured topology is because most unstructured network topology
protocols are unable to precisely arrange the number of message transmission hops due
to the real-time per-hop routing design, especially for a dynamic DTN environment.
To evaluate the unilateral eect on the safety of Avalanche brought about by multi-hop
communication, we emphasise more on simulating the hop-by-hop transmission of mes-
sages in an easily and precisely managed approach, without considering too much the
unsuitability of employing DHT onto DTNs because of the previously introduced issues
such as high latency and long transmission hops. We model the multi-hop communica-
tion environment as nodes having a certain number of preset neighbours stored in their
Pastry routing table, in which the one-hop connectivity is guaranteed only between
the table owner node and its neighbours. Multi-hop communication can be success-
fully carried out by looking for the next proper forwarder from the routing table of
each hop node. By using Pastry, the consistency of both maintaining node IDs and the
structure of nodes' routing tables makes the prediction on the number of transmission
hops much easier. Thus, Pastry brings us simplicity and convenience in conducting our
mathematical analysis of Avalanche's safety under a multi-hop communication DTN
environment.
6.2 Related Work
Most of the decentralised consensus research that has been published focuses on balanc-
ing the trade-o between the communication demand and the maximum fault tolerance
of malicious behaviours. Avalanche was initially motivated by gossip protocols (Demers
et al. (1987)), where the knowledge is epidemically spread through the entire network.
Most of the existing decentralised consensus sustains a global agreement in the gossip
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approach. Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) (Castro and Liskov (1999)),
a well-known representative of the Byzantine agreement protocol, has the maximum
capacity of N
3
to Byzantine attackers within the population size of N , and requires the
communication demand of O(N2). Ben-Or (1983) proposes an asynchronous agreement
protocol that has the maximum fault tolerance of N > 5f , and the global consensus
can be reached in the number of rounds no less than f + 1, where f is the number of
faulty processes. The protocol presented by Berman and Garay (1993) requires N > 4f
of fault tolerance, with the processes decided in 2(f+1) rounds. Toueg (1984) presents
a randomised asynchronous consensus with N > 3f on security strength, with O(N3)
of communication complexity. Friedman, Mostefaoui, and Raynal (2004) present two
protocols for solving a consensus problem in asynchronous systems with the presence of
Byzantine process failures. One is a simple randomised protocol where the agreement
can be reached in one communication step in favourable circumstances, with a solid
requirement of N > 5f to have the system survive Byzantine behaviours. The other is
a failure-detector-based protocol which has the fault tolerance of N > 6f .
A few publications have investigated the consensus converging behaviour in a multi-
hop communication environment. Li and Liu (2017) researched consensus problems for
high-order integrator multi-agent systems in the presence of communication delay and
xed network topology. Su and Vaidya (2016) prove a necessary and sucient con-
dition for achieving approximate Byzantine consensus with multi-hop communication.
Manfredi (2014) studied the problem of reaching a consensus in the network with m-
hop protocol for nodes, which they can access in their m-steps neighbours. A sucient
stability condition of reaching a global consensus is provided in the presence of a het-
erogeneous communication delay. It shows that the algorithm responsiveness (i.e., the
time spent on getting the average consensus value for all nodes) is improved with an
increasing number of hops, m.
6.3 Distributed Hash Tables and Pastry
Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) are the most well-known representatives of the struc-
tured network topology family, and provide a highly distributed and scalable topolog-
ical information storage. It enables a distributed lookup service by using key-value
pairs. Any participating node can eciently retrieve values and data stored by others
with given keys. Because of the keyspace partitioning scheme, the ownership of the
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Figure 6.1: Topological information maintained by Pastry users 1021 with B = 4, 8
digits on node IDs, and all digits are in base 4. The top row of the routing table is
row 0. The node IDs in each entry have been split to show the common prex with
1021 - next digit - rest of node IDs. The grey cells indicate the corresponding digit of
the current node ID, and the entry positions for grey cells are supposed to be empty
in practice because they are the table owner's ID itself.
limited number of DHT addresses of other nodes. This could release much burden of
constrained-hardware nodes in some special DTN applications that are composed by
only low-end computing devices.
We leverage Pastry (Rowstron and Druschel (2001)) for nodes' ID assignment, topo-
logical information storage structure,and query routing algorithm. Pastry performs a
decentralised application-level peer indexing and message routing for a large overlay
network of nodes that connect to the Internet. Figure 6.1 shows node identities and
the topological information that is maintained by each individual Pastry user. All the
node IDs are composed of a given, uniform number of digits, with each digit within
the range of a base B. When routing packets, each node selects the best next message
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relay from its maintained Pastry tables by looking for the node which has the closest
numeric distance to the destination. This is done by applying an XOR operation be-
tween the IDs of each node on the tables and itself. Nodes using Pastry are required
to maintain three tables: leaf set, routing table, and neighbourhood set. Typically, the
leaf set contains B numerically closest node IDs, with half of them numerically clos-
est smaller than the current node ID, and the rest of the IDs are numerically closest
larger. The routing table contains ⌈logB N⌉ rows, with at most ⌈logB N⌉ × (B − 1)
entries inside. The node IDs on each row share a certain number of digits with the
prex of the table owner's node ID. When getting closer to the bottom of the routing
table, node IDs have more shared digits with the ID of the table owner, which indicates
a shorter numeric distance between them. Each node ID is randomly selected within
a corresponding range of node IDs, and it is responsible for message forwarding to the
nodes whose ID is located in this range as well. The neighbourhood set contains 2B
node IDs by default, in which the nodes are the traceable neighbours with respect to
the routing metric. This table also maintains the locality property of a node, and it is
often used when no better relay can be found from either of the leaf set or the routing
table.
Pastry brings several conveniences when analysing the safety of Avalanche in a
multi-hop DTN environment. Firstly, Pastry's routing table is a highly scalable and
low memory consumption data structure that can be adopted to dierent population
sizes by simply adjusting only a limited number of parameters. For example, suppose
the population size is 300, with a determined base number B = 3, each node ID will
denitely be ⌈logB N⌉ = ⌈log3 300⌉ = 6 digits, and the routing table of any node de-
nitely contains 6 rows. Secondly, the routing algorithm has a very low computational
complexity, as it simply chooses the node ID with the shortest numeric distance to
the specied destination node ID. In addition, the node IDs on the same row of the
routing table share a certain length of prex with the table owner's ID. By utilising this
feature, the number of remaining transmission hops can be easily forecast. With more
nodes participating in message routing, the last relay node denitely has the closest
numeric distance to the destination than all its previous message forwarders. The next
relay node after it must share more digits on node IDs with the destination than the
current node, and thus the next forwarder can only be selected within the rows close to
the bottom of the routing table. Such a property brings us the simplicity on predicting
the number of remaining hops by simply knowing which row the next relay node is
selected from, from within the routing table. The above features of Pastry make the
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evaluation for the safety of Avalanche under P2P networks mathematically easier and
avoids a lot of uncertainties caused by dynamic routing in comparison with many other
routing protocols.
6.4 Maximum Fault Capacity Analysis of Avalanche
Consensus under the Multi-hop Communication
of DTNs
In this section, we analyse the security capability of Avalanche consensus under a P2P
network environment with queries being sent in a multi-hop manner. The original
Avalanche work shows that nodes can sustain a correct majority consensus in the
presence of 20% of the nodes being Byzantine attackers, and queries can always be
sent in a 1-hop transmission. In comparison, we summarise a general mathematical
dependency between the message transmission hops and the maximum Byzantine faulty
tolerance of Avalanche, which illustrates that the safety of Avalanche is exponentially
weakened with more intermediate nodes involved in message routing.
6.4.1 Network Model and Assumption
For the sake of simpler mathematical analysis, the topological information is managed
by only the routing table of Pastry, without the leaf set and the neighbourhood set. We
assume that the Pastry routing table performs the role of managing neighbourhoods for
each individual node, i.e., all the node IDs inside a routing table are close enough to the
table owner node, in terms of both the numerical and geographical distance, so there
is no reachability issue between the table owner node and its neighbours in the routing
table. We also assume that a node can only have direct and reliable communication with
its neighbour nodes, which are consistently determined in its routing table. In addition,
we also assume that all DHT addresses are fully occupied by the entire population, i.e.,
all nodes have a sucient xed number of neighbours without any missing point on the
routing tables. Query and feedback messages are forwarded in the multi-hop approach
through many intermediate nodes to specied destinations. Nodes' mobility, hardware
failure, and nodes joining and leaving behaviour are not considered. Because of the
above assumptions, the DHT keyspace is absolutely consistent during an experiment
once it is congured.
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To maximise the eciency of dominating the entire network, the adversary model we
assumed is that malicious nodes always intercept query messages and propagate their
faulty decision in order to mislead the consensus, no matter whether they perform as
intermediate relays or destinations for routing the Avalanche query messages. Query
nodes for Avalanche consensus are randomly selected within the entire DHT keyspace.
Once the query destination node is decided, the query message is strictly forwarded
along the shortest numeric distance routing path. The next relay is always selected
in a per-hop routing manner, by choosing the node from the routing table which has
the shortest numeric distance to the destination. If there are more than one best
options for the next relay, the node with a smaller numeric ID will be chosen. The
query responding process is still the same as what we proposed in Chapter 5. We still
leverage the coloured transaction with blue and red to distinguish the vote from honest
and malicious groups of nodes, accordingly. The selected query node replies either blue
or red depending on its characteristic. An honest node always replies blue when it is
required to respond to the query. When it performs as a relay node, it is not allowed
to place its decision, and can only help forwarding query messages to the specied
destination. To maximise the harmful impact, a faulty node always intercepts all the
received queries, and responds with a red answer to the source nodes of the queries,
rather than helping to deliver the query to the destination. In other words, a routing
path always responds a red answer when any malicious node exists along the path, no
matter whether it is a relay or a destination.
6.4.2 Analysis of Avalanche
In this section, we explore the maximum capacity of malicious nodes that Avalanche
consensus, cooperating with DHT, could handle in a multi-hop communication envi-
ronment.
Let N denotes the size of the overall population {n1, n2, ..., nN} in the network, and
B be the base of node ID numbers. In Pastry, the maximum number of hops a query
can go through along the DHT nodes is ⌈logB N⌉, if there is no hardware failure or
disappearance of nodes along the routing paths.
With nodes having consistent accessibility to the DHT addresses recorded on their
routing tables, a query can denitely be sent within [1, ⌈logB N⌉] hops along the DHT
addresses one after another. Let h denote any number of hops within the range of
[1, ⌈logB N⌉]. As mentioned in the network assumption, a routing path will respond
with a red answer if the query encounters any malicious node. Let m be the total
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number of malicious nodes within the population, and ChN,m be the resulting count of
malicious nodes along a h-hop routing path. Based on the hypergeometric distribution,
the probability that a xed h-hop path responds with a red answer can be calculated
as follows:
























the remaining h − i nodes from the honest nodes. Thus, to select exact i malicious





. To gure out an overall
probability of having at least one malicious node in a h-hop path, we sum up all the
probability for all i where i ≤ h, as indicated in Equation 6.1.
However, it is very dicult for us to derive a clear and useful result from Equa-
tion 6.1 due to a high computation complexity introduced by an excessive amount
of mathematical combination calculations. We introduce some approximations to re-
duce the complexity of the equation. It is proved that hypergeometric distribution
approximates binomial distribution when the gap between the sampling size and the
population size is sucient large. When using Pastry routing table, a query can always
be delivered within h ≤ ⌈logB N⌉ hops, thus h ≪ N is always satised. To work with
mathematics that provides a simpler form solution, we approximate the probability
calculation of Equation 6.1 using binomial distribution, as follows:


















can be treated as the percentage of malicious nodes within the entire popula-
tion. Thus, (1− m
N
)h denotes the probability of having all the correct nodes along the
path, and the contrary probability 1− (1− m
N
)h is the probability of having at least one
malicious node on the path. Obviously, (1− m
N
)h becomes logarithmically smaller with
an increased h, thus 1− (1− m
N
)h is getting larger, which indicates a higher probability
of receiving a red answer from malicious nodes when there are more transmission hops
required.
Several published papers (Bracha and Toueg (1985), Castro and Liskov (1999))
mentioned that the asynchronous Byzantine fault tolerance consensus can tolerate the
attackers up to 1
3
of the population, with O(N2) communication complexity required
for consensus propagation. Avalanche is capable of supporting a 20% rate of Byzantine
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nodes with the consensus failure probability of< 10−9. In comparison with otherO(N2)
protocols, the degradation on the fault tolerance is mainly because of only O(kN logN)
communication required. We use the term 1
5
-resilience to denote Avalanche's fault tol-
erance here and after. However, the 1
5
-resilience of Avalanche is derived from the
assumption that nodes can always be reached using direct communications. In our
multi-hop adversary model, there is only one response from each sampled node, no
matter how many nodes have participated in the query relaying. Such a multi-hop
query with only the destination node response to the query has no dierence compared
to the one-hop query in essence. Therefore, to reach a correct consensus, the responses
from all the possible multi-hop routing paths, which is equivalent to random combina-
tions of all nodes within the entire population, should also maintain such a 1
5
-resilience
property. Based on this, we introduce a new theorem as follows.






Proof 6.4.1 Let βh here denotes the maximum capability of the Byzantine faulty be-




. This is because the overall target is to have all the routing paths retain
the 1
5
-resilience property, which can be written as P (ChN,m ≥ 1) ≤ 15 . Combine the
1
5
-resilience property with Equation 6.2, we have:
P (ChN,m ≥ 1) ≈ 1− (1− βh)h ≤
1
5






















nodes to guarantee the network converges to a correct consensus, when it is known that
a message can be sent in exactly h hops.
Obviously, it is impossible to guarantee the above assumption that all messages can
always be sent in exact h hops; thus, our Theorem 1 and the equation for βh only holds
in an unrealistic scenario at this stage. To gure out the maximum fault tolerance of
Avalanche in a changing path length transmission, two factors need to be taken into
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consideration. Firstly, nodes' reachability needs to be considered, which can be aected
by long distance, the network environment, nodes' behaviours etc. Secondly, the mes-
sage next relay selection mechanism that is dened by routing algorithms could also
critically impact the hop transmission. In order to involve the above two considera-
tions into the equation, we introduce additional probability distribution for hop counts
W = {wh|h ∈ [1, logB N ],
∑logB N
i=1 wi = 1} , where wh is the probability of sending a
message in exact h hops. In addition to that, we formulate the target maximum fault
tolerance of Avalanche β under a dierent lengths path (denoted as h ≤ logB N) as an
objective function of P (ChN,m ≥ 1, h ≤ logB N) ≤ 15 , where P (C
h
N,m ≥ 1, h ≤ logB N)
is the probability of encountering more than one malicious node along any length
paths. Therefore, the objective function for guring out the maximum fault tolerance
of Avalanche under exible length paths, is given below:
Maximise β
s.t. P (ChN,m ≥ 1, h ≤ ⌈logB N⌉) =
⌈logB N⌉∑
h=1








Thus far, the hop count probability distribution wh is unknown to each path length
h. In order to gure out the upper bound Byzantine tolerance β of Avalanche, we
need to precisely model wh in advance. This is highly dependent on the routing metric
and nodes' neighbourhoods. In the next section, the detail of how to generate the hop
count probability distribution wh for Pastry routing is comprehensively explained.
6.4.3 Modelling the Hop Count Distribution in Pastry
Normally, nodes using Pastry are required to maintain three tables, which are leaf
set, routing table, and neighbour set. To avoid introducing uncertainties to the weight
distribution of hop counts, we do not take the leaf set and neighbour set into account.
Inside the routing table, each node maintains exactly (B − 1)⌈logB N⌉ node ID entries
in total. The node IDs in each row have a certain number of shared digits on the prex
with the current node ID, from 0 up to ⌈logB N⌉−1 digits. Figure 6.2 shows an example
of Pastry routing, using the conguration of B = 4, N = 256, and a message is routed
from node ID 1021 to 3311. The symbol X on the node ID indicates a random number




























Figure 6.2: An example of Pastry routing from node 1021 to 3311.
needs to go through at most ⌈logB N⌉ = 4 hops, with the node on each hop having
at least one more shared digit on the prex with the destination's node ID than the
previous relay node. To achieve this, a proper next relay can only be chosen within the
last few rows on the routing table. With the more hops a message goes through, the
selection eld shrinks on the routing table. Suppose a query is received by the current
node n which is selected from the rth row (counted from bottom to top as shown in
Figure 6.3) of the previous relay's routing table. The next best relay or the destination
node ID will denitely be within the last r − 1 rows of n's routing table. As the relay
node selection range moves downward to the entries closer to the bottom of the routing
table, the query gets closer to the destination node. Because of this feature of Pastry
routing, the potential remaining number of hops can be precisely predicted, based on
the row number where the next relay is located on the routing table.
We explore the hop count distribution for Pastry routing using standard state prob-
ability strategy. Because there is no node failure concern as mentioned in our network
model assumption, DHT provides extremely stable topological information for nodes
to manage their routing. Based on this, we introduce two types of probabilities for
the current node who just received a query message, which are destination probability
and non-destination probabilities. The destination probability indicates the probability
of containing the destination node ID within the current node's routing table, which
means the current node is the second last relay along the routing path. The basic idea











Figure 6.3: Pastry routing table with row number marked.
the destination node ID in the routing table against the remaining node IDs. With
the query getting closer to the destination, the selection eld for the next forwarder
moves down to the bottom of the routing table, which means fewer remaining nodes
can be picked up as the next message forwarder. In general, the destination probability





where rrem is the number of remaining rows from which to choose the next relay. This
value needs to be referred to the row number where the current node is located on the
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Figure 6.4: The evidence of probabilities generation for node 3001 with three remaining
rows: (a) for the generation of destination probability, and (b) for the non-destination
probabilities on each remaining row.
Illustrated Example of the Destination Probability: Continuing with the
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query routing example used in Figure 6.2, Figure 6.4 shows the destination probability
calculation for node 3001 only, who is the rst hop node after 1021 on the routing
path. Figure 6.4 (a) indicates the destination node can only be selected from the last
three remaining rows of 3001's routing table because it is located on the fourth row of
node 1021's table, which can be written as rrem = 3. Therefore, only (B − 1)rrem =
(4 − 1) × 3 = 9 remaining node IDs are inside node 3001's routing table. However,
there are Brrem = 43 = 64 nodes in total belonging to the node ID range of 3XXX. It
is impossible for node 3001 itself to be either the next relay or destination; thus, there
are 63 nodes remaining in the node ID range of 3XXX. Because of the above, we can




chance for node 3001 to have the destination node ID
within its routing table.
Conversely, the non-destination probabilities refer to the situation that the desti-
nation node ID is not part of the current node's routing table. The non-destination
probabilities are assigned to each row on the routing table, which indicates the prob-
ability of choosing the next proper relay node from each corresponding row. This is
equivalent to the probability of having the destination node within the node ID range
that is covered by all the node IDs from the corresponding row on the routing table.
Figure 6.4 (b) shows the calculation for the non-destination probabilities. As indicated
above, the node IDs from the rows higher than the row rrem exclusively are impossible
to be selected as a relay node because they have a farther numerical distance than the
table owner node. In addition, the nodes from the very bottom row are also unable to
be the next relay because any of them can only be chosen when it is the destination
node. For the rest of the rows, the probability is assigned to each row, which indi-
cates the ratio of the number of the available node IDs inside the corresponding ID
range against the remaining population. The general equation for the non-destination
probability is dened as:
p(D̄, r, rprev) =
(B − 1)(Br−1 − 1)
Brprev − (B − 1)× rprev − 1
(6.6)
Dierent to rrem for the destination probability, rprev here needs to be referred to the
row number from the previous node's routing table that the current node is selected
from.
Illustrated Example of the Non-destination Probability: We leverage the
probability calculation for Figure 6.4 (b) row 3 as an example. First of all, we need
to gure out how many node IDs are covered by the nodes from row 3 on the routing













Figure 6.5: The Markov possibility transition diagram for query routing.
31XX on 3001's routing table is responsible for message forwarding to all the 15 nodes
within this node ID eld excluding itself. Similarly, node 32XX and 33XX on the
routing table also need to cover message relaying for 15 nodes each. Next, we also
need to nd out the total number of node IDs covered by the nodes within the last
rprev rows. Because node 3001 is selected from the fourth row of node 1021's routing
table, there are B(rprev−1) = 4(4−1) = 64 node IDs in total within the range of 3XXX
that need 3001 to be responsible for message forwarding. However, node 3001's routing
table contains (B − 1) × rprev = (4 − 1) × 3 = 9 nodes starting with 3, but none of
them is the destination. Node 3001 itself is also the one which should be excluded
from the remaining options; thus, there are 10 nodes should be excluded from 64.
Therefore, the destination node must be one of these 54 nodes. Finally, the possibility
of containing the destination inside the range covered by the nodes from row 3 on the






. Similarly, the probability for
row 2 is generated with the same approach, which is p(D̄, 2, 3) = 1
6
. Note that for any
rprev rows remaining, we always have
∑rprev
i=2 p(D̄, i, rprev) = 1 for the non-destination
probabilities. Also, it is worth noting that both the destination probability and non-
destination probabilities are highly dynamic. The probabilities are calculated at any
time a node receives a message, with regard to the row number of the previous relay's
routing table where it has been selected from.
Based on Equation 6.5 and Equation 6.6, we can render our state probability transi-
tion diagram as shown in Figure 6.5. Note that the only thing that needs to be aware of
is the row number that the next forwarder node is selected from in the previous node's
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routing table each time, without caring about the actual identity of the chosen node.
Each state is marked with a row number. The numbers on the non-destination states
indicate one of the nodes from the corresponding row is chosen as the next forwarder.
The non-destination states are fully connected to each other. The states' transition
can only occur from the state with a larger row number to a smaller number state, and
eventually terminate at a destination state which has the smallest row number than
any of its previous non-destination states. The row numbers for the destination states
have a dierent meaning to the ones for the non-destination states. They indicate the
remaining number of rows left, rather than being the row number indicator for the
selected next relay. The states' transition is always terminated at the destination state
with one less on the row number than the very last non-destination state.
Next, we gure out the weight probability distribution for each number of hops h,
based on the state probability transition, where h ∈ [1, ⌈logB N⌉]. Let R = {r|r ∈
[1, ⌈logB N⌉]} be the set which contains all the row numbers r. Suppose a query
is delivered in exact h hops, where there are denitely h − 1 non-destination states
and one destination state. As indicated in Figure 6.5, we have the row numbers for




combinations of the non-destination states for a h-hop path, which is denoted as SD̄ =
{si|si ⊆ [R]h−1, |si| = h−1}, and s = {rj|j ∈ [1, h−1], r1 > r2 > ... > rh−1 > 1}, where
each s represents a particular combination of non-destination states, and r stands for
the row number. Besides the non-destination states, the transition is always terminated
at an additional destination state with the row number rh−1 − 1. Based on the states
inside s, the probability of a query going through a certain combination of row numbers





p(D̄, ri, ri−1 − 1)
)
× p(D, rh−1 − 1) (6.7)
where r0 = ⌈logB N⌉ when i = 1.
Illustrated Example of Calculating p(s): Use a particular non-destination
states' combination s = {5, 4, 2} as a detailed example, where a query is passed through
four hops, in which the three relay nodes are selected from row 5, 4 and 2, respectively.
Since row 2 is the smallest row number for the non-destination states inside s, the
destination node is denitely located at row 1 of the second last relay's routing table.
Each node has ⌈logB N⌉ ≥ 5 rows on its table. Thus, if a query is sent precisely
through the nodes that are selected from the row numbers of 5 → 4 → 2 → 1 without
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caring about the identities of them, the probability of this is p(s) = p({5, 4, 2}) =
p(D̄, 5, ⌈logB N⌉)× p(D̄, 4, 4)× p(D̄, 2, 3)× p(D, 1).
The above p(s) only calculates the probability of going through a particular com-
bination of row numbers dened by s. To calculate the overall probability for all the
possible combinations transition states, we need to sum up the probabilities of all s
inside SD̄. In addition, the summed probabilities only indicate the chance of delivering
a message within h hops, but it lacks a guarantee the message cannot be sent in any
number of hops less than h. Hence, the summed probabilities need to eliminate the
previously generated weights for the transmission hops < h. Therefore, the nal weight










6.5 Approximation for the Maximum Fault Tolerance
of Avalanche
Apparently, the diculty of solving the upper bound β for Equation 6.4 is exponentially
increased due to high-order polynomials, as h grows. Alternatively, we approximate
















The basic idea is each βh from Equation 6.9 guarantees the corresponding P (ChN,m ≥
1) to be less than 1
5
to have Avalanche nodes conclude a correct consensus. With the
weighted average from each P (ChN,m ≥ 1) and the corresponding wh, P (ChN,m ≥ 1, h ≤
⌈logB N⌉) ≤ 15 always holds with the target β from Equation 6.9. In comparison with
Equation 6.4, the above Equation 6.9 is much easier to compute.
It is necessary to show the accuracy of the approximated maximum fault tolerance
of Avalanche β from Equation 6.9, by comparing it with its precise value as indicated
in Equation 6.4. However, it is hard to directly solve β through the high polynomial
function Equation 6.4 using optimisation tools. Therefore, we alternatively obtain the
actual β value via a simulation approach by monitoring at which Byzantine level that
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Avalanche will fail to be converged to a correct consensus, as exhibited in Section 6.8.
By looking at the dierence between βs, the accuracy of the above approximation
Equation 6.9 can be proved.
More generally, our key nding can be expanded and applied to other consensus
protocols under the same multi-hop communication condition and adversarial model.
Let β1 be the maximum Byzantine fault tolerance for an asynchronous decentralised
consensus protocol under a one-hop communication environment; thus, the maximum











As seen from Equation 6.10, our contribution provides a general estimation of the
degradation to the performance of any gossip-like asynchronous consensus when it
is applied to the multi-hop communication environment. Furthermore, it also takes
the selection of the routing metric into account. The maximum fault tolerance of a
consensus can be well predicted through Equation 6.10, if the message transmission
behaviours can be precisely modelled.
6.6 Diversity of Query
Diversity measures the number of unique nodes that have participated in the queries of
colour-determined transactions. It is obvious that if a larger number of unique nodes
are queried, a more correct and fairer decision can be obtained, all other factors being
equal. However, due to the limitation of the reachability of the entire population, nodes
are probably unable to query a large number of dierent nodes in the communication-
interrupted DTN environment. A fraction of nodes being queried too frequently could
boost the speed of consensus convergence; however, the consensus can be over-impacted
by the often sampled nodes if they have the same colour preference. Such a strong
local impact might not be healthy for the consensus system because of continuously
losing a global view. For example, if an honest node can only reach a fraction of
Byzantine attackers within a small area, its decision can be signicantly impacted by
the surrounding attackers. For this consideration, we aim to quantify the impact on the
safety of Avalanche brought about by the limited reachability of nodes. We use the term
diversity to measure the proportion of nodes that participate in the queries against the
entire population. In particular, the two diversity terms are leveraged, which are local
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diversity and global diversity, to quantify the degree of uniqueness of queried nodes.
Local diversity evaluates the degree of repetitive querying for a single transaction event
at an individual node level. A node who gains a higher query local diversity, means it
has a broader view of the consensus for a conicting transaction event. Global diversity
measures the average percentage of conicting transaction events in which the number
of unique nodes have participated. This evaluates the extents to which the conicting
transaction events are spread to the entire population. With a precise management
on the transmission hops, we particularly monitor how the local diversity and global
diversity are impacted by the limitation on communication hops, as well as by the safety
of Avalanche in terms of the respective colour condence level, which we evaluated for
Avalanche in the previous contribution.
Let Qt = {q1, q2, ...} denote all the completed queries for a colour-determined trans-
action t, each qi = {n1, n2, ...nk} is the ith query of this transaction, k is the sample
size where k ≪ N , and each n inside qi is the node that has been sampled by the
corresponding query. Let c be the consecutive counter, which is the number of rounds
that for any conicting transaction event has to go through until it reaches the sta-
bilised state. Avalanche sets c = 150 in its experiments. A transaction is permanently
stabilised when the last consecutive c queries come with the same colour decision; thus,
we only take the last c queries into account, that is, Qt = {q1, q2, ..., qc} and all q inside
yield the same answer.
Local diversity measures the repetitive querying a set of nodes among the population
at the individual node level, based on the query nodes selection collected from each
time of sampling the k nodes. Suppose a node n has a colour determined transaction
t, with the completed queries Qt = {q1, q2, ..., qc}. Let UID be the unique node ID list,









Global diversity measures the average percentage of the conicting transaction
events in which nodes have participated. Let T = {t1, t2, ...} be a set which con-
tains all conicting transactions, and Tn = {t1, t2, ...||Tn| ≤ |T |} be the transaction list






In the simulations, we mainly investigate how the dierent extents of the query
range impact both local diversity and global diversity, and the extent to which the
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safety of Avalanche is aected under such controlled querying conditions.
6.7 Experimental Set-up
This section describes the experimental set-up, which includes the parameter congu-
rations of both the Avalanche consensus and DHT. The network model and assumption
we used in the simulation are exactly the same as those described in Section 6.4.1. The
simulations are held under two environments with tiny dierences in the query nodes'
selection processes. In the rst case, the nodes can freely query other nodes without
constraints. In the second, the query nodes choosing range is constrained within a
pre-dened number of hops.
6.7.1 Avalanche Conguration
In the simulations, we mainly focus on investigating how the safety of Avalanche is
aected by multi-hop communication among nodes. It is not necessary to adjust the
conguration of Avalanche during experiments. Every time a query is required to
sample k = 10 nodes in a fully random manner, via the query source node arbitrarily
select k IDs from the DHT key space. The lower bound threshold α is set to 0.8, and
a query can only be validated when at least αk sampled nodes respond with the same
answer within the query. The consecutive counter c is set to 150 for the transaction
colour determination.
6.7.2 Multi-Hop Query Nodes Selection
Once a node completes selecting its query nodes, the query messages need to be deliv-
ered to these query nodes via forwarding through several intermediate nodes one after
another. The next relay node can only be chosen by a node from its routing table, in
which the selected node has the shortest numerical distance to the query destination
compared to all the others on the table.
With the existence of Byzantine faulty nodes, a query might not be able to reach
its destination due to the interruption from these faulty nodes. As mentioned in our
network assumption, a query will always be intercepted if there is any malicious node
along the path. The query will carry a red answer back to its source node as the
response to the query. In the simulations, the hop counting is terminated the rst time
it meets a malicious node along the path.
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6.7.3 Query Range Controlled Nodes Selection
To investigate the impact of the dierent degrees of the communication range on the
safety of Avalanche, we implement a range controlled query process, by constraining
the query range in terms of the number of communication hops. A larger query range
indicates a larger node pool that a node can select its query nodes from. For example, if
we have a parameter h = 3 that limits the number of transmission hops for query nodes
selection, the query nodes can only be chosen from the {1, 2, 3} hops' neighbours of
the source node, according to the traversal started from the query source node through
the entries of the subsequent nodes' routing table.
6.7.4 Conguration of Distributed Hash Table
Multi-hop Query Nodes Selection
For the multi-hop forwarding model, we set the base number B = 3 for all node IDs,
but with a dierent maximum hop number h = {3, 4, 5, 6} in each simulation. Because
we strictly follow the assumption that all DHT space addresses are fully occupied by
all the nodes, the population size N = Bh is changed across dierent simulations in
accordance with the setting of h, which is pre-determined at the system conguration
stage. Similarly, the number of entries that each node maintains is (B − 1)h, and this
is also changed with the dierent congurations of h.
Query Range Controlled Nodes Selection
The conguration of DHT for query range controlled simulations is slightly dierent
to the above scenario. Due to the consideration of the simulating time limitation, we
set the population to a relatively small size. Each node ID consists of 5 digits, which
indicates the maximum hop number is constrained to h = 5. The base number of the
node ID is set to B = 3; thus, we have the population contains N = Bh = 35 = 243
nodes. Each node maintains exactly (B − 1)h = 10 entries in its routing table.
It is worth noting that the query range settings for the simulations are q = {2, 3, 4, 5}
except one hop. This is because each node can only maintain 10 entries inside its rout-
ing table with q = 1, which indicates that a node can only query these 10 nodes from
its own routing table. Too small a sampling pool is very likely to lead to a dead end
because a node cannot collect sucient αk samples with the same answer; thus, it
becomes impossible to complete a valid query.
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.6: The respective condence values for the dierent number of hops: (a) blue
condence, and (b) red condence.
6.8 Performance Evaluation
This section describes the impact of multi-hop P2P communication on the safety of
Avalanche. We mainly focus on investigating the maximum tolerance of the Byzantine
faulty nodes of Avalanche in a multi-hop communication environment with two slightly
dierent query processes, which are multi-hop query nodes selection, and query range
controlled nodes selection. Due to the existence of randomness, each reported statistic
is averaged from 10 runs of the corresponding simulation.
6.8.1 Maximum Capacity of Byzantine Nodes
As mentioned in Section 6.5, we explore the actual maximum Byzantine fault tolerance
β from Equation 6.4 via simulations because of the impossibility of directly solving the
high polynomial equation. We compare it with Equation 6.9 for the purpose of proving
the accuracy of approximation. Figure 6.6 (a) and (b) shows the blue and red colour
condence level for each number of hops. It is worth noting beforehand that the blue
condence value < 75 indicates that Avalanche fails to reach consensus. This is because
we set the consecutive counter c = 150, and the blue condence level < c
2
indicates a
red-dominance on the decision from malicious attackers. From our observations, it is
very unlikely to exceed 153 rounds of queries for the stabilisation of any transaction.
As shown in Figure 6.6 (a), it is obvious that the blue condence value gradually
drops with an increasing Byzantine ratio. It can be seen that when the blue condence




Figure 6.7: The blue condence value distribution for dierent number of hops: (a) 3
hops, (b) 4 hops, (c) 5 hops, and (d) 6 hops.
129
0.106, 0.079, 0.074, 0.062 for 3, 4, 5 and 6 hops accordingly, which indicates that
the system can tolerate the maximum number of Byzantine faulty nodes are roughly
10.6%, 7.9%, 7.4% and 6.2% of the population. Based on Equation 6.9, the theoretically
estimated maximum fault tolerance for each number of hops above is 0.119, 0.092, 0.075
and 0.062, respectively. The maximum gap between the theoretical calculation from
Equation 6.9 and the simulation results is 1.3%, which is acceptable. The tiny bias
between the values is caused by the uncertain trend of colour condence convergence
at the shifting point of Avalanche, in which the decisions can be converged to either
side, caused by the randomness from arbitrarily selecting query nodes. Figure 6.6 (b)
displays the red condence level of the population. The red condence level always has
an opposite trend to the blue one, so we will not exhibit the plots for the red condence
level in the following gures.
It is interesting that the blue condence value distribution is less varied with an
increasing population size, as indicated in Figure 6.7. The gures show the variance of
the blue condence level for 3, 4, 5 and 6 hops. As mentioned above, the population
size is congured, based on the number of hops of h due to the assumption of fully
occupying DHT addresses. When the base number B is constantly set to 3, but with an
increasing hop number, the population size is exponentially increased, which is 27, 81,
243, 729 nodes in total for Figure 6.7 (a), (b), (c) and (d) respectively. The reason for
having less variance in a larger population is because more transaction copies could be
generated. A larger number of nodes' decisions can signicantly eliminate the impact
of the outlier of statistics; thus, a more accurate averaged record can be obtained.
6.8.2 Hop Weight Distribution
Table 6.1 shows the comparison of weight distribution for dierent maximum numbers
of hops obtained from two approaches, the theoretically generated approach and col-
lected from simulations, with a constant conguration of B = 3. The theoretical weight
distribution is purely calculated based on Equation 6.8, while the simulation statistics
are collected and averaged from the corresponding experiments for each maximum
number of hops. It can be seen that the theoretical weight distribution highly matches
the distribution collected from simulations. However, the randomness of statistics is
mainly caused by an ambiguous trend of consensus convergence at the shifting point of
Avalanche. The comparisons between the theory and simulation results show a good
support for our state probability model for weight distribution estimation of Pastry
























































































































































































































Figure 6.8: Local and global diversity with dierent degrees of query range: (a) local
diversity, and (b) global diversity.
a good support for the further analyses and improvements on DHT routing, from the
perspectives of nding shortest path, optimising routing eciency etc. However, our
weight distribution equation highly relies on the assumption of nodes fully occupying
DHT addresses. For the analyses of DHT Pastry routing under a more exible scenario,
the approach of generating hop count distribution still needs to be further investigated.
6.8.3 Diversity Impact
This section quanties the safety of Avalanche impacted by the dierent query range h.
Figure 6.8 (a) and (b) shows the local and global diversity with dierent settings for h.
Because nodes' query range is tightly constrained within the h-hop neighbours, local
diversity is obviously increased with a loosened control of h, as shown in Figure 6.8
(a). In addition, it can be seen that local diversity is linearly decreased with a greater
Byzantine ratio at all levels of h. This is because malicious nodes could intercept query
messages, and thus result in fewer transmission hops. However, the global diversity
always remains at 1.0 for all query range degrees. This indicates that even with a
smaller h, the query messages can still propagate through the entire network, as all
nodes have participated in all the conicting transaction events because of the hop-by-
hop spreading.
Figure 6.9 shows the blue condence level under dierent degrees of a query range.
Still, the blue condence level is sharply reduced with more Byzantine faulty nodes










































Figure 6.9: The blue condence value for dierent degree of query range.
inversely proportional to the query range h. As the blue condence value is at 75 on
the spot, the shifting point of Avalanche consensus is at the Byzantine ratio levels of
0.101, 0.09, 0.073 and 0.065, with the respective conguration of h as 2, 3, 4 and 5.
The results show that even though a lower local diversity is obtained when there is
a constraint on the communication hops for selecting query nodes, the security issue
is still better than the scenario of having a wider range of query nodes selection at
all Byzantine ratio levels. With a larger query range, the query message transmission
is also accompanied by a higher risk of meeting malicious nodes on the routing path;
thus, the security strength of Avalanche is degraded.
6.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate the degradation of the safety of Avalanche consensus
under DTNs with multi-hop communication. We leverage the Pastry DHT for peer
indexing, topological information storage, and routing mechanism to have the DTN
routing with the capability to manage the number of transmission hops. Based on the
consistency of topological information and a guaranteed hop-by-hop transmission en-
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vironment, we summarise a general mathematical dependency between the maximum
fault behaviour capacity of Avalanche and the number of transmission hops, which relies
on the 1
5
-resilience property of Avalanche and the hop number distribution of Pastry.
We implement two query processes to explore such an impact: one allows nodes to
arbitrarily choose their query node targets network-wide with no constraints, and in
the other, nodes' query selection is limited by the number of communication hops. Our
key ndings show that the maximum capacity of Avalanche is highly sensitive to the
transmission hops. The simulation results illustrate that the global consensus can be
easily led by only a limited number of malicious nodes under multi-hop communication.
Also, a larger query range could also result in a higher risk of encountering malicious
nodes during query packet routing, which leads to a more vulnerable consensus. Most
importantly, the simulation results well support our conducted theories of both the
weight distribution of Pastry, and the maximum fault capacity of Avalanche under
multi-hop communication. In addition, this contribution provides a fundamental pre-
liminary step in designing consensus protocols for high latency and multi-hop DTNs
for our future work.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
The contributions in this thesis attempt to augment the reliability of DTNs for various
extents of peers' communication latency. In particular, we focus on eliminating the im-
pact of P2P latencies on the fundamental routing and security performance. We rstly
propose FGAR for routing in infrastructure-less DTNs. With a ne-grained characteri-
sation of contact history and intelligent message replication, FGAR shows a remarkable
performance where the delivery rate is at least 20% better, while having 15 times fewer
message replication overhead than some famous routing protocols. In terms of DTNs'
security, the high computational complexity and the low latency tolerance feature of
the original bitcoin blockchain make it impossible to be directly deployed to high la-
tency DTNs. This thesis further shows that nodes with an increased network latency
could result in not only the degradation of the safety of blockchain, but also an inferior
position on gaining PoW reward, although they have exactly the same computation
power. Avalanche is a better option than bitcoin blockchain for DTNs because of its
low communication complexity, lesser communication demand, and memory eciency.
The eective communication approach makes Avalanche less impacted by a high net-
work latency. However, it is vulnerable under the scenario of merging opinions of nodes
from dierent network partitions. Moreover, Avalanche could become more fragile in a
multi-hop communication environment, because there is a higher chance of encounter-
ing malicious nodes during relaying message packets through more intermediate nodes.
The comprehensive investigations into the behaviour of Avalanche within DTNs in this
thesis highlight promising directions for future research regarding designing consensus
protocols for high latency, multi-hop communication DTNs.
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7.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we comprehensively show the impact of network latency on the low-level
routing and security performance of DTNs. We rst present FGAR, which is a proba-
bilistic routing protocol focuses on augmenting the message delivery rate, while elimi-
nating message replications for infrastructure-less DTN. Then, the feasibility of deploy-
ing two decentralised consensus protocols to DTNs, namely, blockchain and Avalanche,
are integratedly investigated. This is achieved via evaluating the impact of P2P com-
munication delay on the fault tolerance of these two protocols. The main contributions
of this thesis are discussed, below.
7.1.1 Main Contribution
FGAR
Most of the existing routing protocols for infrastructure-less DTNs mathematically
evaluate nodes' activeness or the connectivity quality among nodes. This is usually
done via summarising the contact regularity from history or learning the surrounding
environment. There are two major drawbacks that are caused by such a highly sum-
marised quantication. Firstly, the generated value summarises the entire history and
includes the out-dated one, which might introduce an unwanted bias to the generated
quantication values if the pattern changes over time. Secondly, such a single value
cannot eectively detect and adapt to the changes of the connectivity regularity.
In this thesis, we rst present a probabilistic routing scheme, namely FGAR, which
consists of the ne-grained characterisation of nodes' contact regularity, and the dy-
namic message replication control mechanism to avoid the over-generation of message
copies. The ne-grained bit matrix well exhibits whether there has been contact within
a particular time slot between a pair of nodes. The future contact probability of two
nodes is estimated, particularly for the remaining messages' lifetime, based on the past
encounters within the same period of previous weeks. The intelligent message replica-
tion control is achieved via an additional expected probability, which means an upper
bound threshold needs to be fullled by the accumulation of the expected probability
from each time of generating a message copy. Nodes terminate the replication process
of a message once the expected probability is fullled by a sucient number of message
replicas.
The experiments are implemented based on real-world data traces with a compar-
ison with several popular DTN routing protocols. The conducted simulations show
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that the message delivery rate has been improved by 21% on average. Compared
with PRoPHET, FGAR improves 26% on message delivery rate, whereas the message
overhead is 15 times less.
Feasibility of Applying Blockchain to High Latency DTNs
Blockchain provides immutability for protected data in a fully decentralised man-
ner within an untrusted P2P communication environment. Also, it is believed that
blockchain technology will be part of the fundamental network protocol in the near
future. However, it is infeasible to apply within high latency DTNs because of its high
computation demand from proof-of-work (PoW) and the minimal tolerance of peers'
communication delay.
In this thesis, we quantify the impact of network latency on blockchain security, in
terms of the convergence speed, and the number of violations to the `six conrmations'
convention. To avoid introducing uncertainties to the nal statistics, we normalise
peers' communication delay as dierent levels of consistent idle time between nodes.
The reported statistics show that the time spent on block convergence is proportionally
longer with increased network latency. Besides, the safety of the six conrmations
convention is highly sensitive to both the diculty of PoW mining and communication
latency. Also, nodes with a lower network latency gain a signicant unfair advantage
over PoW mining compared to a high latency group of nodes, as they dominate more
than half of the blocks on the global longest blockchain, even though all miners have
an equal computation power.
Feasibility of Applying Avalanche to High Latency DTNs
In comparison with blockchain, Avalanche consensus is more suitable for DTNs, as it
has the advantages of lighter computation complexity and communication eciency.
Avalanche does not require any heavy computation tasks like PoW. Instead, Avalanche
guarantees a global agreement via propagating nodes' opinions for each conicting
transaction event. In the simulation, we model the conicting transaction using blue
and red to denote the two sides of decisions for a conicting transaction event, which
are initiated by honest and malicious nodes, respectively. The safety of Avalanche is
quantied by monitoring the average condence level of the respective colours. The
failure of consensus is shown as more nodes voted for the red side, which indicates
the majority of opinions are inuenced by the attackers. The original Avalanche work
proved that it is able to secure a high probabilistic safety guarantee in the presence
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of 20% Byzantine attackers within the population, with a < 10−9 probability of the
decisions being reverted to the wrong side of a consensus.
Surprisingly, our contribution indicates that peers' communication latency has a
negligible impact on Avalanche consensus. The experimental results show that a node
can quickly reach the nal colour determined state once it turns online. The 1
5
-resilience
to Byzantine attackers of Avalanche is not aected by a longer communication latency.
However, Avalanche becomes more fragile under the network partition scenario, with
only up to 15% tolerance of Byzantine attackers. This is because of a stronger negative
impact brought about by malicious users from two aspects. It could be that either the
malicious attackers directly spread their decisions to the other community when they
perform as intercommunication nodes, or their faulty decisions can eectively mislead
the legitimate intercommunication nodes.
Besides the communication latency and network partitioning, multi-hop message
transmission is another representative feature of DTNs which may signicantly impact
the diusion of consensus. Since messages have to be transmitted through multiple
intermediate nodes in most DTN environments, it is possible to meet some malicious
nodes along the routing path, who may launch various attacks for their own benets or
cause the system to malfunction. This thesis further presents the security analysis of
applying Avalanche consensus to the multi-hop communication environment. We sum-
marise a general mathematical relationship between the message transmission hops and
the maximum tolerance to the Byzantine population of Avalanche. It shows the safety
of Avalanche can be exponentially weakened with an increased number of intermediate
nodes. Our key ndings show that the routing protocols which seek for the shortest
path is more suitable for guaranteeing the security of Avalanche in DTNs.
7.2 Future Work
7.2.1 Potential Improvements on FGAR
Through the conducted simulations, FGAR gave a remarkable performance under
the condition of having a constrained memory buer for devices. However, the non-
controlled replication routing schemes, such as Epidemic and PRoPHET, have a higher
delivery ratio than FGAR when devices have fewer hardware limitations. The better
delivery rate is mainly from the exploitation of opportunistic paths through random
nodes by chance from over-generated message replicas. In FGAR, there are two major
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approaches to guarantee the quality of relay selection, as well as avoid message over-
replication. One is the message will never be replicated once the expected delivery
rate Em is fullled. The other is nodes always select the next relay with the estimated
probability higher than the relay selection threshold γm. However, such a narrowed
message replication control is probably too tight when the hardware of devices is not
tightly constrained. Therefore, to augment the performance of FGAR under a better
environment, a potential improvement can be loosening the control of the upper bound
of Em and γm. An associated solution to this can be when a message is close to its
time-to-live, a gradual rise is applied to Em for the purpose of generating more message
copies, and the γm is lowered to allow the low delivery probability nodes to receive mes-
sage replicas in order to exploit opportunistic paths. Of course, this needs to be done
with the awareness of the remaining buer space of the next relay; thus, an additional
check procedure on the willingness of receiving low-delivery-chance messages from the
encountered nodes is required.
Another potential improvement on FGAR can be exibly detecting the contact
patterns among peers, instead of strictly inspecting the daily or weekly regularity.
Since FGAR always follows the weekly pattern by default, it might not be capable of
detecting some transient connectivities. For example, two nodes have just encountered
each other recently, while there was absolutely no contact between them in the past. A
real-world case is two travellers who from dierent cities and live in hotel rooms next
to each other. In this case, they are proper message relays to each other within a short
period, but FGAR can only estimate a low probability by inspecting a relatively long-
term regularity. One way to solve this issue is to add quick browsing over the contact
history within a few most recent time slots, thus exploiting such instant connectivity.
Other than this, a self-customisation to the ne-grained table structure could be a more
advanced solution, in which nodes are not strictly required to maintain the contact
history table in a uniform structure. The regularity can be characterised into dierent
forms according to users' preferences. The underlying principle of customising the
regularity characterisation needs to be well designed to prevent nodes blung. Also, the
probability generation needs to adapt to dierent forms of characterisation, accordingly.
The detail of such improvements requires further comprehensive investigation.
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7.2.2 Challenges and Opportunities of Designing Consensus For
DTNs
The key challenge of designing a consensus protocol is guaranteeing a negligible proba-
bility for the entire network to reach the wrong side of the consensus with the existence
of a certain proportion of malicious nodes. In the meantime, the related issues that
researchers need to be aware of in designing consensus protocols include latency tol-
erance and the prevention of various attacks against the multi-hop communication of
DTNs.
A feasible improvement of Avalanche is to avoid re-querying the same fraction of
nodes too many times, with the purpose of eliminating the local inuence from these
nodes and gaining a better global view. A potential concern for Avalanche is that it
does not have any constraint on the number of times of re-querying the same node.
A single node can be queried many times, if other candidates are unreachable at the
moment. Because of this, Avalanche users can very easily fall into a local inuence
issue. The querying range of Avalanche can be constrained within a small fraction of
nodes due to the unreachability of long-distance nodes. Thus, the decision of an honest
node could be signicantly impacted by malicious nodes, if too many attackers exist in
such a small range area and the reachability to the farther nodes is interrupted. Our
future work will focus more on simulating the environment of gathering the malicious
nodes within a small area to observe whether a strong local impact could mislead the
decision convergence of other legitimate users in the network. Also, to address the
local area querying issue, a potential improvement to Avalanche is to prevent querying
the already-sampled nodes too many times. A list of already-been-queried nodes can
be maintained for each unconrmed transaction. The candidates within the sampling
pool can be set with an upper bound on the number of re-querying times to avoid being
queried too many times, and they can only be re-selected after a short time interval.
By applying additional constraints to the selection of nodes to query, such a problem
can be well addressed, but this could accompany a longer waiting time to complete
the query rounds. Therefore, a reasonable trade-o balancing mechanism for this is
required in future improvements as well.
In this thesis, we have demonstrated the respective strengths and weaknesses of both
bitcoin blockchain and Avalanche consensus. Blockchain is highly vulnerable in a high
communication delay environment, as multiple blockchain branches exist and they are
unable to be aligned to an identical blockchain within the entire network. However,
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it does not have any problem with multi-hop communication because updating the
blockchain requires a full propagation to all users. Avalanche gains a consistent security
strength under any degree of communication latency, but this can be signicantly
weakened in a multi-hop communication environment because of man-in-the-middle
attack from encountering malicious nodes along the routing path.
The contributions of this thesis illuminate a vital direction, that combining the
advantages of blockchain and Avalanche consensus can be signicant in developing a
new consensus protocol for DTNs. Overcoming the issues caused by network latency
and multi-hop communication are the two most critical challenges in maintaining an
immutable global consensus within DTNs. We have already shown the remarkable
strengths of blockchain and Avalanche in this thesis, that the full dissemination of
blockchain data could eectively prevent attacks from multi-hop communication, and
Avalanche guarantees a high consistency on its security strength under various degrees
of peers' communication latency. However, simply merging two consensus mechanisms
introduces further communication complexity from both collecting query feedback and
propagating the entire blockchain data through the network. Thus, an ecient broad-
cast process includes both the full dissemination of the protected data, and a partial
propagation mechanism of query messages needs to be well designed in order to prevent
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